Re: Re: [Zynot-pkgmgr] Repoteus: Zynot Tree Vision

On 7/14/03 4:24 PM, "jesse" <[email protected]> wrote:

> If they are isgned by our devs who are on your keyring .. then you
> should be able to trust. Esp if it's got 2 or more valid sigs.
> 
> Over any  distrib medium a package that had this requirement would be
> considered pristine. You would be able to check those sigs agains
> keyservers as well as your local copy of the pubkeys.you could trust
> that package if all those check were ok.
> 
> If random joe-schmo  builds a binary and pops it on p2portage signed. It
> doesnt give it any more credability in the eyes of porteous. ( not part
> of or keysystem ).

That given I would still never allow this on my system, signed or not
signed.  Also this would divert a lot of dev attention from working on the
distro proper.. Instead they would be building (and yielding TONS of emails
from users if they signed the builds as good and they are not).  I know this
from experience doing this stuff with Gentoo.

IMO this is something we should still avoid for now.

If you haven't noticed I have problems with the whole concept of p2p
distribution of anything for an operating system, and I am not alone on this
stuff.  

If p2p ever gets implemented I for one will want HUGE guarantees that the
option not only be able to be disabled, but that there also be a version of
the pkgmgr that this option literally does not even exist in.  One user
turning on something like this unchecked can have massive repercussions on a
large LAN.  It goes against the grain in corporate environment in a very big
way here.

Potentially this could make M$ email virii look tame from a security
standpoint...if one signed pkg gets compromised and distributed as trusted
(signed) into a p2p system.  With p2p you have zero control after it has
gotten into nodes, that compromised build could live forever, revoking or
no.  At least on (semi) controlled mirrors we can properly revoke it if the
need should ever arise.

Mark