Re: Questions about new mailing lists setup on common-lisp.net
Erik Huelsmann <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.lisp.common-lisp-net.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CACOoB6gxBKn9SrPUmh4OCXOcV-c=HOB-gGd5H9qCQXOwLhGJxg@mail.gmail.com> |
On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 8:07 PM, Erik Huelsmann <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> > From what I understand now there is no password associated >>> with a subscription to a list, nor is there any password >>> associated with the owner/admin role of a list. >>> >>> Can you tell me what you have read that makes it seem like very very >>> insecure? Also, what are you talking about "password associated >>> with ..."? >>> >>> > Am I wrong >>> in believing that now someone simply has to send emails >>> with a forged From: field to hijack control of the list/subscription? >>> >>> Well, what made you believe that? Is there a simple way that folks can >>> easily hijack a list over email? >>> >>> As far as I know, it was audited by a company that worries about such >>> things, http://mlmmj.org/docs/readme-security/ , and does not have a >>> problem... can you please show me how/where/when you are able to hijack a >>> list? [email protected] is a great place to start, and please >>> feel free to hijack it. >>> >>> Let me know if I have answered all the questions, and let me know the >>> security holes you have discovered. >>> >>> -- drewc >>> >>> >> Indeed you have answered all the questions I asked and this does clarify >> the current situation. >> > > You did write comments on each of his questions, but could you explain how > you think mlmmj addresses the security risks put forward regarding > establishing sender identity related to e-mail? I'm not finding an answer > to that in your comments. (The fact that the software doesn't contain any > security glitches doesn't mean its authentication model is flawless, so the > pointer to the security readme isn't the answer I'm looking for.) > Drew responded to me off-list over IM yesterday. The summary of the reaction is: every moderation request uses a unique and randomly generated reply-to address, making it hard(er) to just spoof admin mails. Bye, Erik.