Exmh releases, and a large bunch of small changes in the exmh tree...
| Newsgroups | gmane.mail.exmh.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
(Read on, important stuff (point 4) towards the bottom)
I had a longish weekend with nothing to do, so I started hacking some more code.
And as often happens, I got diverted off the original goal, which was to fix the
remaining bugs in the separate-window for ftoc and/or msg code. What I just
dropped into the CVS tree:
1) A bunch of html and doc fixes, some typos, broken links, bad color choices
(somebody thought #fffff0 was visible against 'white' :) and the like.
2) misc/README.mybogo.tcl was both crufty and outright wrong, plus it didn't
support spamassassin, so I fixed the bogo.tcl already in the lib/ tree. :)
There should now be a Preferences for 'Bayesian spam filter', and the Message
window should now have a Spam... menu. Still to do:
2a) Come up with a clever way to hide or grey out the Spam... menu if
the user hasn't configured it in Preferences.
2b) the original mybogo.tcl talked about adding key bindings - anybody think
that's a good/bad idea? Easy enough to do, but consensus would be nice.
2c) Buglet - you can't feed an entire folder to the spam filter unless you
select at least one message. A better fix would probably be to move the
'entire folder' variants from the mops list to the fops list...
3) I did a mass cleanup of a lot of places where we were doing things like
'exec chown' or 'exec rm', and changed them to equivalent native Tcl 'file'
calls. This was for 2 reasons: (a) just clean up and efficiency, and (b) (leading
in to the next point...)
4) I did a fairly extensive security audit, and found some *nasty* bugs about a
week or so ago - basically, an attacker could manage to pass fairly arbitrary
text to an 'exec' call in a number of places. The two biggest got patched in
CVS a week ago, stashed under some other actual bug fixes for mime.tcl. I wanted
to try to keep the cat in the bag until I was able to deal with the other 'exec'
calls.
The security hole is pretty big - it can be triggered by a remote attacker with a
specially crafted piece of malformed MIME.
Given that the hole was a metamail-related one, maybe that's even more reason
to find an alternate base64 {en,de}coder and heave all the Metamail code over the side.
I think the hole is big enough to merit a 2.7.1 release at least - what do others
think?
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