Re: Security findings

Alejandro Colomar via Mutt-dev <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.mail.mutt.devel
Message-ID <aeUVQL56_1COSFCO@devuan>
Hi Matthias,

On 2026-04-19T15:36:05+0200, Matthias Andree via Mutt-dev wrote:
> Am 18.04.26 um 17:42 schrieb Kevin J. McCarthy:
> > On Sat, Apr 18, 2026 at 09:27:59PM +0800, Kevin J. McCarthy wrote:
> > > On Sat, Apr 18, 2026 at 02:14:53PM +0200, evilrabbit via Mutt-dev wrote:
> > > > Please find below a number of confirmed security findings in the
> > > > mutt client.
> > > > None of these are significant but should probably be addressed.
> > > 
> > > Thanks, I will start taking a look at these tomorrow.
> > 
> > Just as a note to the other devs.  I started looking at some of these
> > tonight.
> > 
> > I've pushed up to gitlab some (very quickly made) branches:
> >   kevin/stable-security-01        Fix NULL dereference in
> > show_sig_summary().
> >   kevin/stable-security-02        Fix infinite loop in gpgme
> > data_object_to_stream().
> >   kevin/stable-security-05        Fix IMAP auth_crm MD5 digest of secret
> > to use memcpy().
> >   kevin/stable-security-06        Fix imap_auth_gss() security_level
> > size.
> >   kevin/stable-security-07        Check for embedded nul in
> > url_pct_decode().
> >   kevin/stable-security-08        Abort if there are DNS entries but
> > don't match.
> > 
> > These still need to be cleaned up, verified, and tested.
> > 
> > For #8 I need to check the RFC myself, so if anyone with OpenSSL code
> > experience wants to confirm that would be welcome.
> > 
> > For #3, I'm not sure if we really need to fix this.
> > 
> > For #4, I welcome input from others about this.  Randomizers are not my
> > thing.  If the algorithm is insufficient for what we are using it for,
> > then I welcome help in implementing something better.
> > 
> Re #8, it's been a while since I'd read the standards (RFC 5280 and 6125),
> but what's in the OP matches my recollection. I find the check plausible and
> correct. There might be improperly issued certificates afoot (I've also seen
> even some CA issue certificates with serial number 0, which wolfSSL would
> reject) so with that change merged, mutt starts rejecting certificates -
> that don't repeat or pattern match the CN in the SAN - that it used to
> accept, so this should be announced as a "breaking change" in the NEWS.
> 
> Also, I wonder if I'd personally want to repeat the match_found=0
> initialization redundantly so I have a safety net if I were to edit the code
> later. Might trigger compiler warnings though because the compiler can prove
> it's redundant.

I'd prefer not adding dead code.  It helps in the short term, preventing
dumb mistakes, but complicates the logic of the code, which in the long
term can lead to confusion and more subtle bugs.


Have a lovely day!
Alex

> 
> -- 
> 
> Matthias Andree
> 

-- 
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es>
signature.asc (application/pgp-signature, 833 B)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=6PPG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.