Re: Why are we here? What are our goals?
Len Sassaman <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.mail.ng |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Hector Santos wrote: > > Are the posters able to restrict knowledge of their identity to only > themselves, or not? > > No. They can not post mail without accountablity or tracability or some > kind. That that's not anonymity. That's identity escrow. > > I believe that that statement to be false, and based on a flawed premise. > > Which is? That it is acceptable to build a protocol which must resort to legal action in order to be sustainable. > > What you are suggesting here is a protocol which deals with abuse by > > resorting to lawsuits or prosecution. From a technical standpoint, that's > > a pretty inadequate protocol. > > I don't agree. Incorrect description of that you deem is my premise. > > I can not support or endorse any concept of complete 100% untracable > posting. And it does have ramifications that are legal and both technical. > See CAN-SPAM. CAN-SPAM is not relevant. > > A good message protocol will not require "traceability" as a necessary > > component for its security. It will handle network abuse gracefully and > > through innate protections. > > How so? That seems to be a contradiction. To "Handle Abuse" implies there > is some trackable or "access" concept involved. You appear to want to deal with abuse through accountability and punishment. A protocol designed for use on a global network should be able to proactively resist attack, instead of relying on reactive out-of-band action as a deterrent. > > It's my understanding that CAN-SPAM bans the forging of network headers. > > That does not prohibit strong anonymity, and does not affect anonymous > > remailers. > > If you don't forge your transaction then you are no longer anonymous! That is a false statement. I suggest you read a bit of the large body of academic research on anonymity protocols for background. For instance, Mixmaster forges nothing. Mail delivered to a recipient from a Mixmaster remailer bears the legitimate headers and information of the remailer's MTA. > CAN-SPAM clearly says that TRACABILITY IS A MUST! It is the only way it can > be enforced. And that includes direct and indirect senders. Please read > it thoroughly. It is quite clear. Are you an attorney? > Anyway. This is EXACTLY why we need to get this straight. You are > advocating the concept that I must accept your entire message first to > decide if its acceptable or not. No consideration for who is delivering the > message or protocol level controls. Sounds familar? I am advocating no such thing. What the recipient must accept, how the message is delivered, and whether the sender's identity must be verifiable are all orthogonal concepts. > Sorry, both concepts are unacceptable by me for any new design. If you want > to have a primitive protocol with one command "DATA" or break it into two, > HEAD and BODY commands, great! Propose it! I have less of a problem with > that. But that HEAD must all the TRUSTED relationship and network tracing > concepts we must deal with. Why must you dictate a global recipient policy? It is wiser to build in optional 'trust' relationship opportunities, and permit the recipients to define their own threshold for what messages they will accept.