Re: Operations requirement: no hop-by-hop
Paul Hoffman / IMC <[email protected]> Mon, 16 Feb 2004 08:32:51 -0800
| Newsgroups | gmane.mail.ng |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <p0602040abc569f8f6413@[63.202.92.153]> |
At 9:32 AM +0100 2/16/04, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote: >>If your requirement is that there be full authentication before >>communication, fine. My requirement is that I can communicate with >>people who I cannot authenticate ahead of time. > >Full authentication doesn't necessarily follow here. A simple return >routability check would also go a long way. In today's spam environment, that is possibly true. But if we could magically turn on full routability in SMTP, spammers would adjust their tactics. They have done so for every block we have put in their path. We are trying to design a *next-generation* protocol, not a temporary patch. It is not useful to say "I have a requirement that spammers will probably get around after I implement it." >I'm thinking about a layered policy mechanism that would work >something like this: > >- apply personal white list >- apply system-wide blacklist >- apply personal blacklist >- allow all strongly authenticatable sources (ie others who can >present a certificate that we can authenticate directly or using a >trusted CA) >- reject everything that looks too much like spam >- reject/defer attachments that are too big >- allow everything else if the return address works If those are your requirements, then we are in agreement. All of that works fine without policy in the middle of the transmission stream. >In a setup like this the MTA would need to know personal white and >black lists, spamcheck yes/no and attachment limits for >known/unknown sources. By "the MTA", you mean *your* MTA. No problem there. There is still no policy in the transmission stream. You can instruct your MTA what to accept and what to reject without policy being enforced in the transmission stream. Please explain how you requirements above requires your MTA to tell the sending MTA (or the sender, if the eventual protocol has no initiating MTA) what the policies are ahead of time. Why can that not be done at the time of message delivery, after the message's metadata has been passed? --Paul Hoffman, Director --Internet Mail Consortium