Re: SPFv3 proposal: rawfail result
Michael Deutschmann <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.mail.spam.spf.discuss |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <%[email protected]> |
On Sat, 5 Feb 2011, Stuart D. Gathman wrote: > The whitelisting is robust for most alias forwarders when you whitelist the > forwarder domain, and use SPF or best guess to identify mail from the > forwarder. When attempting the explain this before, I called it > a "pretend" MAIL FROM. The algorithm in its simple form goes like this: That doesn't help with the scenario that worries me: A user subscribes to ISP A for some time, but then switches to ISP B. ISP A graciously sets up a forward from his old mailbox to his new one at ISP B (this is also the situation where the forwarder is least motivated to try something like SRS). ISP B and the user are quite hip mail-security wise, so they arrange a whitelisting for the servers ISP A has been using for the handoff, and then enable reject-on-SPF-fail for other cases. Then ISP C buys out ISP A, and consolidates mail handling at one data center. The forwards now come from a different IP, different rDNS domain, and different HELO. The whitelisting breaks. (And then users at ISP D notice they can't mail to the forwarded mailbox, and lobby ISP D to use "?all" instead of "-all" to work around the problem...) The only cure for this problem is for ISP A and ISP B to agree on how the whitelisting is to be done. Then ISP A will ensure that whatever indicia are being used remain stable, or at the very least warn ISP B before changing the handoff server. Aside from the above scenario, merely temporarily disabling SPF to let a few forwards through, observing the IP address, hostname and HELO, and then whitelisting whatever seems most stable should work well enough. ---- Michael Deutschmann <[email protected]>