Re: SPF and bouncing
alan <[email protected]> Thu, 05 Apr 2012 01:27:20 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.mail.spam.spf.discuss |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
At 00:52 05/04/2012 Thursday, Michael Deutschmann wrote: >On Wed, 4 Apr 2012, alan wrote: >> >that means that mailservers have to be prepared to accept >> >unbounceable mail. >> >> the opposite they should accept or reject at their edge, once the >> decision is made though they should not later change their minds. > >They can reject *some* of the unbounceable mail at the edge. But even if >we optimistically assume that SPF-pass mail is bounceable, rejecting an >email (in-transaction, of course) *solely because* it is not bounceable is >a non-starter in 2012. you don't reject based on if its bounceable?? (as you never bounce any mail so its a non-factor) also spf pass says nothing about the from address's validity (except in a few edge cases like me who have per user spf) you reject based on, spammyness, sender reputation, local policy, content, spf-fail dkim-fail whatever ONLY >> what conspiracy?? > >The "Conspiracy Against Bounces". I call it that because it is a >substantial change in the ground rules of SMTP that was never codified in >an RFC. It's just a majority of admins on the ground deciding "We hate >backscatter, and we can fight it the same way we do direct spam.". The >fact that now any mail accepted at the edge must be delivered all the way >in (unless you break RFC and blackhole) was an accepted consequence. this is not recent thinking, this is more a reaction (backlash) against the increase in idiotic setups that emerged that did stuff like accept (spamfilter) then test if recipient-exists, and create bounce. additionally the spam/av filters that didnt reject but bounced to the obviously forged from so yes at some point we collectively decided no-more of this idiocy >Note that I support the CAB. So do you (quite enthusiastically!). > >> if worried about forged <> >> BATV is a simple and easily implemented way to reject forged bounces > >BATV is a kind of VERP, and VERP interacts poorly with whitelisting and >greylisting. there are ways round the whitelisting issues as long as your users are allowed to whitelist by ip+from: (from as opposed to envelope-from) (mail gets past rcpt by envelope-from domain being within one thats later from: whitelisted) (as if they use batv the sending ip is quite predictable) >Lately I've been considering programming my mailserver to automatically >whitelist anyone I send to. But if the other guy uses VERP, the envelope >recipient I mail to is not the same as the envelope sender who will reply. simply whitelist the domain from RCPT-reject, if from:(in data) differs from whitelisted address then reject after data IF you would have otherwise rejected at RCPT i find its a lost cause as most spam i see is from old friends accounts (long abandoned) now cracked/harvested and re-abused so i whitelist few but by IP (trusted senders who are known non-emitters) or by from: when from otherwise untrustable fremailers (but only if received from validated sending ip's for those freemailers)