Demographics and Islamic Destiny

http://www.bigquestionsonline.com/features/demographics-and-islamic-destiny

Demographics and Islamic Destiny
What does the future of the Muslim world look like?

AFP/Getty Images
By ROD DREHER
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
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There is not one Islam in the world, nor is there a typical Muslim.  
The Future of the Global Muslim Population, the latest report from the  
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, takes a comprehensive look at the  
demographic profile of global Islam, and reveals data that may upend  
familiar stereotypes. The report also outlines political, economic,  
and other challenges facing majority Muslim nations and countries with  
significant Islamic minorities.
The John Templeton Foundation provided grant support for Pew’s  
research, through the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project.  
Rod Dreher, the Foundatin’s director of publications, recently spoke  
to Pew Forum senior researcher Brian J. Grim about the report.
How does the new Pew report help us understand the tumultuous recent  
events shaking governments in the Arab world?
The Pew-Templeton report estimates the size of Muslim populations  
around the globe today, and it projects how much they will grow in the  
coming 20 years. But the report also does much more. In order to  
explain the basis for the projections, it provides a detailed  
demographic profile of Muslims in virtually every corner of the world.  
Instead of portraying a single “Muslim world,” it takes stock of the  
enormous variations among Muslim-majority countries. These demographic  
differences are important to bear in mind when looking at the three  
countries undergoing the biggest street protests. The report shows,  
for example, that in Tunisia, where the current wave of unrest began,  
the median age is 29 years — five years above the average for Muslim- 
majority countries. In comparison, the median age in Egypt is 24, and  
in Yemen it’s 18 — six years below the average for Muslim-majority  
countries. Also, among the three countries, the highest gross domestic  
product (GDP) per capita in U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power  
parity (PPP) is in Tunisia ($8,000) followed by Egypt ($6,000) and  
Yemen ($2,500).
Interestingly, the unrest began in the older, relatively richer  
country — where the middle class is also relatively larger — and then  
it spread to the younger, relatively less well-off countries. But, at  
the same time, the unrest is clearly political in nature, and this  
report does not delve into politics. Social and political attitudes  
will be explored in much greater depth in the upcoming Pew-Templeton  
survey of the Muslim world.
When many Americans think of Muslims, they think first and foremost of  
Arabs. How do the numbers belie that stereotype — and how should that  
affect the way we think about the Islamic world?
Demographically speaking, Islam is more an Asian religion than it is a  
Middle Eastern religion. The largest Muslim populations today are in  
the Asian countries of Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The  
study projects that in 20 years a majority of the world’s Muslims  
(about 60 percent) will continue to live in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The portion of Muslims living in the Middle East and North Africa will  
also remain steady, at about 20 percent. But the portion of the  
world’s Muslims living in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to rise; in  
20 years, for example, more Muslims are likely to live in Nigeria than  
in Egypt, in large part because Nigeria has higher fertility rates.
Why is the global rate of Muslim population growth so much higher —  
twice as much — than non-Muslim increase?
Several factors account for the faster projected growth among Muslims  
than non-Muslims worldwide. Generally, Muslim populations tend to have  
higher fertility rates (more children per woman) than non-Muslim  
populations. This is true both when we compare Muslim-majority  
countries with other countries and when we look below the national  
level, comparing Muslims with the general population in countries for  
which we have such data, including Canada, China, India, Israel,  
Nigeria, Russia and the United States. (Notable exceptions include  
Chad, Tanzania and Uganda, where Muslims have lower fertility rates  
than non-Muslims.)
In addition, a large share of the global Muslim population is in, or  
soon will enter, the prime reproductive years (ages 15-29). Also,  
improved health and economic conditions in Muslim-majority countries  
have led to greater-than-average declines in infant and child  
mortality rates, and life expectancy is rising even faster in Muslim- 
majority countries than in other less-developed countries.
Muslims, however, are facing the same fertility falloff as everybody  
else around the globe. Why is that happening? Is it happening because  
of factors within the Islamic religion, or in spite of them?
There are two parts to your question. First of all, you’re right —  
globally, the Muslim population isgrowing, but the rate of that growth  
is slowing. Rather than a runaway train, you can think of it as a  
decelerating engine. It’s moving in the same direction as the general  
global population — toward lower fertility — though the deceleration  
of Muslim population growth is some decades behind the general trend.  
One of the main factors in declining fertility rates is education,  
which can be seen by comparing the fertility rates in Muslim-majority  
countries where females receive the fewest and the most years of  
schooling. In the eight Muslim-majority countries where girls  
generally receive the fewest years of schooling, the average fertility  
rate (five children per woman) is more than double the rate (2.3  
children per woman) in the nine Muslim-majority countries where girls  
generally receive the most years of schooling.
The second part of your question, which has to do with the impact of  
religion on fertility rates, is much tougher. It’s a subject of  
considerable debate, and we think it’s a fruitful area for further  
research. But we warn in the report that one should not simply assume,  
just because fertility tends to be higher in Muslim-majority countries  
than in other developing countries, that Islamic teachings are the  
reason. Cultural, social, economic, political, historical and other  
factors may play equal or greater roles.
For example, many Muslims live in countries with higher-than-average  
rates of poverty, less-adequate health care, fewer educational  
opportunities and more-rural populations. All of these conditions are  
associated with higher fertility rates.Having said that, it’s also  
true that Islamic authorities in some countries, such as Afghanistan  
and Saudi Arabia, reinforce cultural norms that limit women’s autonomy  
— by restricting their educational and career options, for example, or  
making it difficult for women to initiate a divorce. These  
restrictions may contribute to higher fertility because, as I just  
mentioned, there is evidence that Muslim women, like other women  
around the world, tend to delay marriage — and consequently childbirth  
— as they attain higher levels of education.
The growth of the Muslim population in non-Muslim majority countries —  
the U.S., nations of the European Union, and Israel in particular — is  
bound to affect the political and social situations inside those  
countries. Broadly speaking, what kind of challenges will both Muslim  
and non-Muslim citizens of these countries face from these demographic  
changes?
Our study does not address this question directly, but it is safe to  
make a few general observations. First, in the U.S. and European  
Union, the growth has been primarily through immigration. But in the  
decades ahead, Muslims will become less of a first-generation  
immigrant population — that is, the proportion of Muslims born in the  
U.S. and European countries will rise.
Second, for minority populations, certain figures can have symbolic  
importance. Crossing the double-digit mark may, potentially, be one  
such benchmark. Our study projects that Muslims will be approaching  
double-digit percentages of the population in several European  
countries.
In the United Kingdom, for example, Muslims are expected to comprise  
8.2 percent of the population in 2030, up from an estimated 4.6  
percent today. In Austria, Muslims are projected to reach 9.3 percent  
of the population in 2030, up from 5.7 percent today; in Sweden, 9.9  
percent (up from 4.9 percent today); in Belgium, 10.2 percent (up from  
6.0 percent today); and in France, 10.3 pecent (up from 7.5 percent  
today).
In the United States, Muslims make up a much smaller share of the  
total population. But we project that if current trends continue,  
Muslims will comprise 1.7 percent of the U.S. population in 2030,  
which is approximately the same portion that Episcopalians, Jews or  
Mormons represent today. In Israel — including all of Jerusalem but  
not the West Bank or Gaza — we project that Muslims will make up  
nearly one-in-four Israelis in 2030 (23.2 percent).
Though you project the Muslim growth rate in Europe to be significant,  
the numbers are nowhere near large enough to support claims that the  
continent will become Muslim, or Muslim-dominated, anytime soon. Is  
that prospect overblown?
There has been a lot of speculation about the growth of the Muslim  
population around the world, and many of those who speculate do so  
without careful attention to demographic data. The data that we have  
do not point in the direction of what some call “Eurabia” scenarios,  
in which Muslims dominate Europe numerically. Indeed, by 2030 we  
project that Muslims will make up just 8 percent of Europe’s overall  
population, up from 6 percent today.
What role do conversions have in growing the Islamic population?
Without a doubt, people convert to Islam. But don’t forget that some  
also switch from Islam to other religions or into the unaffiliated  
category. Unfortunately, at present, reliable statistical data on  
conversion to and from Islam are scarce. What little information is  
available suggests that there is no substantial net gain or loss in  
the number of Muslims through conversion globally; the number of  
people who become Muslims through conversion seems to be roughly equal  
to the number of Muslims who leave the faith. Historically, that’s  
another question.  But we have no hard data that show conversion is  
having a substantial impact on Muslim populations today. In a large  
survey we conducted in 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009, for  
example, the number of people who identified themselves as Muslim was  
roughly equal to the number who said they were raised Muslim in almost  
every country.
According to Pew’s projections, by 2030, Muslims will make up about  
1.7 percent of the U.S. population, putting them on par with where  
Jews and Episcopalians are today. But both Jews and Episcopalians have  
cultural influence disproportionate to their tiny numbers. What  
changes will American Muslims, as well as American society and  
culture, have to undergo if U.S. Muslims are to have more influence?  
Are there lessons for Muslims from the Jewish and Episcopalian  
experience?
As a non-advocacy organization, the Pew Forum does not take stands on  
policy debates — and that includes issues such as how much influence  
religious groups should have in the United States.
But we do have some factual information on the Muslim population of  
the United States from our 2007 report, Muslim Americans: Middle Class  
and Mostly Mainstream, as well as from this new demographic study. We  
estimate, for example, that about two-thirds (64.5 percent) of U.S.  
Muslims today are foreign-born. But by 2030, more than four-in-ten  
(44.9 percent) will be U.S.-born. In addition, Muslims in the U.S. are  
quite ethnically and racially diverse. We know from the 2007 study —  
based on a very large survey that the Pew Research Center conducted in  
English, Arabic, Urdu and Farsi — that no more than about 8 percent of  
all U.S. Muslims come from any one foreign country. About four-in-ten  
(38 percent) are white, about a quarter (26 percent) are black, a  
fifth (20 percent) are Asian and the rest (16 percent) describe  
themselves as mixed or other.
In addition, education and income levels among U.S. Muslims are  
roughly comparable with those of the U.S. population as a whole.  
That’s a rather different picture than in some European countries,  
such as France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain, where Muslims are  
much less affluent than the general population. All this points to the  
[rising] influence of the Muslim community in the United States in the  
years ahead.

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