Re: 2 forwarded messages...DNSEXT discussion of Day and Kaminsky
Andy Bradford <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.djbdns |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Thus said Jeff King on Sun, 01 Mar 2009 04:42:03 EST: > For a single query, we expect the attacker to require around 2 billion > packets. For a 10Mbps link, this would take about 40 hours of > sustained attack. However, if the attacker triggers multiple identical > queries, then they require only about 16 million packets, requiring > only 18 minutes on the same link. Unless my math is wrong, that equates to about 13,888 packets per second sustained for 40 hours, right? That's a lot of packets for small operations, and would likely be easily noticed. For a larger outfit, that may not even show up as a blip. > Your risk may be amplified if the attacker can send packets to you > faster (because you have less time to respond). Your risk is amplified > if you have patched dnscache to have a higher value for MAXUDP > (because fewer packets are required). And yet, the more packets per second that are sent, the more risk the attacker has in actually bringing down your infrastructure, or otherwise triggering alarms. What is the likelyhood that something like this would go unnoticed? > Dean insists that the expected number of packets with this attack is > actually 28 million. I think his math is suspect. See: 28 million within what period of time? Andy -- [-----------[system uptime]--------------------------------------------] 9:14pm up 1:31, 1 user, load average: 1.20, 1.14, 1.10