Re: DNSSEC and registrar rollover

Hi Michael,

Thank you for sharing your experiences.

On your question what is the most appropriate forum for your comments, I
think that the e-mail list [email protected] is the most
suitable to discuss operational issues.

Cheers,

-- Benno


On 04/11/2018 11:58, Michael A. Peters via nsd-users wrote:
> A bit off topic, I don't know the right place to share this concern. I'm
> guessing there's an IETF list?
> 
> I found http://dnssec.ietf.org/ but no mention of list.
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/list/wg/ does not have a DNSSEC list listed.
> 
> Going through the process of rolling over the key signing keys for many
> of the domains I administer. I only rollover KSK about every 18 to 24
> months, not often.
> 
> The proper way is to have registry add new DS record, sign zsk with
> both, when properly propagated through caching resolvers, safe to stop
> signing with old ksk and remove old DS records.
> 
> That's easy when there's an interface that lets me do it without support
> staff involved.
> 
> Issue is that not all top level domains have API set up to do that
> through my registry (namecheap) - .email for example does not, I have to
> contact support staff.
> 
> Unfortunately, and I do not know if it is registry incompetence or TLD
> incompetence, they sometimes don't just add the new DS and then wait for
> another support request to remove the old DS once the rollover has aged
> - even though that is what I ask for.
> 
> Sometimes they add the new DS and immediately remove the old, resulting
> in DNSSEC failure until things propagate.
> 
> This has to be addressed, TLD registrars need to have mechanism in place
> to allow DNS administrators to add DS records and remove records w/o
> needing to go through technical support that seem to sometimes not
> understand why it is important to NOT remove the old DS records until
> specifically requested to do so.
> 
> Websites going offline and e-mail delivery being delayed because of
> improper KSK rollover by support staff will both discourage rotation of
> KSK and discourage use of DNSSEC.
> 
> Just like certificate authorities are now expected to provide CT and
> OSCP, registries should be expected to provide a standard API for DS
> records so that registrars can provide the necessary tool to allow
> addition and deletion of DS records w/o human error of support staff
> that rarely deal with DNSSEC and do not understand the process.
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-- 
Benno J. Overeinder
NLnet Labs
https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/