Re: Port numbers in the network layer?
John Day <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.end2end |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <a06240827cda0abadad9d@[10.0.1.3]> |
At 9:32 PM +0200 4/25/13, Detlef Bosau wrote: >Am 25.04.2013 14:52, schrieb John Day: > >>Re: [e2e] Port numbers in the network layer? >>The question is why is a protocol-id field required in some >>protocols and not others. >> >>If it is to identify the protocol in the layer above, then how many >>thousand SCTP instances can I identify on top of a single IP >>instance. If it identifies the protocol, then that should be >>possible. Obviously it isn't what it is intended for. >> > >So, what is, concisely, the problem and your proposed solution? Problem? What problem? No one suggested there was a problem. The question was about the distinction between protocol-id fields and port-ids. I explained the difference and what the function of the protocol-id field was as opposed to the purpose of source and destination port-ids. It is the case that the protocol-id field does have the rather disturbing property of requiring an (N)-protocol to have information about (N+1)-protocols, while port-ids provide better isolation. One of the implications of Watson's work is that port-id and connection-endpoint-ids should be distinct. This has a number of benefits. > >Up to know, each individual TCP connection is uniquely identified by >an address quadruple (node 1, port 1, node 2, port2). > >Why doesn't this work? For what value of "work"? ;-) The current practice in TCP has certain security problems. These stem from the fact that port-ids and connection-endpoint ids are conflated and the use of well-known ports. The TCP server must rely on source port to distinguish connections to a well-known port. This is a number it did not generate and can be spoofed and hence creates a security vulnerability. > >And which solution works better? Taking the lessons from delta-t noted above and eliminating the need for well-known ports avoids a number of security vulnerabilities. see G. Boddapati, L. Chitkushev, J. Day, and I. Matta "Assessing the Security of a Clean-Slate Internet Architecture," Seventh Workshop on Secure Network Protocols (NPSec) October 30th, 2012.