Re: Proper form for a public FMS outproxy?

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[email protected] writes:

> On 2019-07-20 07:59, Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> [email protected] writes:
>>
>>> Now, my idea is this: You set up a public (onion or clearnet) frontend
>>> where you can make and read posts, with its back-end being FMS.
>> =E2=80=A6
>>> Frontends would be disposable and dime-a-dozen; a front-end with too
>> To get to this situations, you must make it very, very easy to host
>> them. This might be a major endeavor (but one which would benefit
>> Freenet a lot).
>> =E2=80=A6
> Well, would it? You can pass through FMS, and only intercept the parts
> related to posting. You'd also want to intercept the progress screens
> for downloads, which might be a bit harder.

If you want to make it dime-a-dozen, you need to make it easy to install
Freenet with FMS already setup.

> All you'd need to do is write the code that does the filtering.

If you have actual IDs, you must provide a secure way to log in =E2=80=94 n=
ot
secure against the server, but secure against others users impersonating
you.

Visibility is also based on the ID, otherwise you don=E2=80=99t get real sp=
am
defense (you=E2=80=99d have to rely on the site hoster to manage spam for y=
ou).

> What I'm curious about is how the identity generation should
> proceed. In particular, can the WoT have multiple identities sharing
> the same key?

No, and that wouldn=E2=80=99t be a good idea, since they could switch to the
other ID if they=E2=80=99d manage to trick the server into using another pu=
blic
name.

> That makes implementation much simpler too, since you don't need to
> pass on the IP info or treat onions as a special case. What you could
> do otherwise is to use for instance the Spamhaus RBL. That would block

If you block open proxies, then you exclude all tor users, but you don=E2=
=80=99t
get real security, because botnets are horribly cheap.

> Doesn't FMS already limit posting rate on the client side?

Not that I know of. It has delay of messages to provide more anonymity.

> Solving an additional captcha per week would be trivial to add.

> This might be overkill though. Adds implementation cost, and now the
> server gets access to non-public information (although it never has to
> save it). Easier to just tell people to make a new identity once a
> month.

The server always has non-public information about the users. The
question is just how to represent it.

>>> Specifically, a user that didn't like this would set list trust of the
>>> master identity to 0. Do you reckon this would happen?
>>
>> Yes, I think this would happen, because one bad apple would spoil the
>> whole identity.
>>
>> But if you would find a way to pre-generate IDs and then assign them to
>> new users (so the standard FMS spam-defense would work), then this idea
>> could work.
>>
>> If the proxy had a main ID which gives trust-list-trust to these IDs,
>> then people could decide whether they want to see the new IDs.
>>
> Well, this is what I'm concerned about. Do you reckon they would
> blacklist the main ID's trust list, because it has too many children
> which are rotten apples?

Yes. It would then be the same as those public IDs (where the secret key
was published intentionally) which get blocked after abuse.

> Then the bots could agree on some protocol; they make posts announcing
> themselves somewhere, and then these are assumed to take effect after
> X seconds. If other bots find X too low, they rate them negatively,
> but they all get to specify X. And a similar parameter, let's call it
> Y.

There are distributed leader election protocols. You could use a simple
bully-protocol
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_election#Asynchronous_ring[3]

> Bots which "jump the gun" would get blacklisted by the other bots
> programmatically. Bots which censor messages would get blacklisted,
> provided they didn't block all messages sent within a certain
> timeframe.

You=E2=80=99d likely have to block them via FMS and only consider bots in t=
he
distributed algorithm which are not blacklisted by given moderator IDs.

> Another question is if FCP already supports a "stripped-down mode",
> where it doesn't expose internal material, only stuff that's on the
> network. I know SIGAINT ran a Freenet <-> Tor proxy, do you know how
> they did it?

There is public gateway mode, but I would not vouch for its security =E2=80=
=94
it might have deteriorated over the past years of little usage.

Best wishes,
Arne
=2D-
Unpolitisch sein
hei=C3=9Ft politisch sein
ohne es zu merken

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