Re: Burning bridges was Re: [i2p] I2P's security from global passive traffic analysis
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.freenet.general,gmane.network.i2p |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 (continuing the reply w/ regards to the other non-CBR issues) > This is as opposed to a system such as I2P operates now, where > connections are set up on the whim of the tunnel creator, where > passive traffic analysis can probably reveal where the tunnel is > going to, unless either its construction is so slow that it's > impossible to tell it from the other tunnels I wouldn't say construction, but operation. Construction is just one packet, and payload does not immediately follow. > (this is a serious option; users may not mind it if we give them > a nice GUI), True, throttling individual tunnels to no more than X KBps has real potential for some applications. I2P 3.0 will offer this [1] [1] http://www.i2p.net/todo#batching > or we are very lucky with cover traffic. Tunnel creation itself doesn't require us to be very lucky, the attack P = (c/n)^h is negligible. Tunnel operation against global passive adversaries, however, is a bitch. =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDYQ5jWYfZ3rPnHH0RAiO8AJ9DW6L8S3ZB4juKoRqZbCfpiMCCVQCgiCuK mEH0SZ+4hCG/WhFNPCJj+34= =cprv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ chat mailing list [email protected] Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[email protected]?subject=unsubscribe