Web-of-trust questions
Helge Preuss <scout-KMZC6x8V1/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.freenet.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I just listened to the lecture about the new freenet version Ian Clarke and Oskar Sandberg gave at the 22C3 (the CCC has released it: http://media.ccc.de/filez/congress/2005/lectures/audio/vorbis/22C3-492-en-freenet_new_version.ogg). It left open some questions for me. I do not read the freenet mailing list regularly, so I apologize if these questions have been asked before, but an explanation would be nice anyway. Ian and Oskar explained the routing model of freenet 0.7 and the issues it aims to address. If I understood correctly, the point is to connect only to trusted peers to ensure that no hostile nodes discover you are running freenet (and possibly compromise the connection). The reasoning behind this is that in repressive regimes running freenet (and thereby communicating that you have something to hide) may be enough in itself to get you into trouble. While I agree with the premise, I have two issues with this. One, can't everybody discover you run freenet by doing a portscan on your computer? I assume that would be a more efficient way to mass-detect freenet nodes than smuggling hostile nodes into freenet - especially if you're a government agency with broad resources. Two, they mentioned that a major aim is to get many people to run freenet. That is obvious. But how would you achieve this goal if people are forced to *personally know* other people connected to the network? What do I do if I'm, say, a dissident with no special knowledge of computers and no hacker friends either? Do I just give up and sit on my single freenet node? Or do I turn to a centralized service, thus rendering the web of trust obsolete? Maybe (probably) I misunderstood something. But I don't see how the two goals - trusted connections and wide coverage - go together. And given that you can be detected with a portscan anyway, isn't it practical just to forget about the web of trust and maximize coverage instead? Regards Helge -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFEbh4tMfG7Vu9K+FQRAi5+AKDDeujxgESQMw+jmHNpWYpS/rYUOACg00Uq X3OxUpV1+5sp7+Ol/GU302o= =P/I3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ chat mailing list [email protected] Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[email protected]?subject=unsubscribe