Re: Freenet speed & local threats

> On Fri, 9 Dec 2011 05:26:19 -0500, Chris wrote:
>> I am looking into setting up a distribution where Tor or freenet is
>> used to create a secure and anonymous environment for communicating.
>
> Very cool. I've done that too :-).
>
>> One of the issues with freenet is that it is slow. I haven't used it
>> in many years and do understand it has gotten much better. I also am
>> aware that after a few days it gets faster as popular data is
>> retained and gets 'cached' on your node and nearby nodes based on
>> what those around you are doing.
>>
>> What I'm trying to figure out is what happens when your node is not on
>> 24/7 and you can only connect infrequently for several hours at a
>> time.
>
> It runs at esssentially the same speed (minus the benefits of immediate
> local caching, of course) -- which is pretty slow but manageable. It
> may take a few seconds / a minute longer to fetch things, but that's
> still a minute longer than the censored web provides, so either way
> users will have to adjust their expectations. Booting into the network
> will also take an additional minute or so, which always-on nodes don't
> have to worry about.
>
>> Many users have a persistent local threat that they need to be aware
>> of. Leaving a server running is not an option as it could be
>> compromised by an adversary.
>>
>> Removable media can reduce that threat.
>
> The keyword being *reduce* :p. We all have that concern and fear, of
> unforeseen zero-day linux exploits, etc. (We already know they exist in
> Window$ :). Ideally you would want to make extra sure you have "enough"
> contingency planning (proper permissioning / stable and patched
> software / firewalls / perhaps "caged" virtual machines / "sentry"
> programs / whatever your paranoia desires), so such fears are
> minimized. They will never be eliminated though.
>

I was not referring to zero day exploits actually. The key word here was
local real-world threats. Such as an adversary gaining physical access to
the server/machine running freenode. Removable media may not eliminate the
threat although there is less opertunity for a more sophisticated targeted
attack. A software keylogger inserted into the MBR or similar would not be
possible if the boot medium is never available to the attacker. On the
other hand a physical keylogger may still be possible and maybe even a
software based keylogger although more difficult to disguise/install
without being noticed. I can think of at least a few different ways of
getting a keylogger onto a system without having access to the boot drive
or having to install a physical device. I would still need physical access
to the computer. At least one method would not even require BIOS
modification and would work on any x86 machine.

>> What I'm looking to find out is if you run a freenode from a
>> removable media and then run a local server running freenode to use
>> as one of your peers (which could be on all the time) does this post
>> a threat?
>
> Besides the obvious risks of either of those machines being compromised
> (by any number of ways: physically, buggy software, leaky software,
> etc), traffic analysis will always be a threat with Tor, and also with
> Freenet if bad guys have somehow managed to occupy all your peer
> connections. But besides these well known threats, I think it's pretty
> safe. But not perfectly safe.

Lets give a scenario:

We have to assume that a persons Internet connection is being monitored.
This might be via a sophisticated non-governmental actor (such as by
breaking WEP/WPA) or by a government act such as monitoring at the telco.
The adversary should also be assumed to be "unethical" in that there are
no rules and can physically modify or otherwise install a software based
monitoring solution on any boot media they have access to.


The first question is how many peers need to be compromised to identify
the content being transmitted?

If a few of your freenode peers can be compromised and the adversary can
monitor your Internet connection and local area network can they identify
the contents which are being requested/sent by you? This assumes that they
can't bug the physical machine that you are using to run freenode.

If you add a server with freenode (which can be bugged) to your local LAN
that is then added as one of your peers does this compromise the security?
The point of adding a server with freenode to peer with on the local LAN
would be to speed up requests since the machine that is actually used for
browsing freesites (such as a laptop) can't be left on all the time (as
doing so gives an adversary opportunity to bug it). This means it has to
run from a removable boot medium that can be accounted for at all times.

>
>> If no local server is run that you peer with how is the speed if you
>> only connect every few days? Is running freenet for a few hours to
>> several hours going to be sufficient or will it be unbearably slow?
>
> It's bearable. (After it takes a few minutes to connect to the
> network.) I suppose it's similar to fetching a freesite you never
> fetched before -- perhaps a bit faster.
>
>> With Tor speeds are frequently severely limited. Especially
>> with .onion nodes. Some non-onion servers can be accessed with
>> significant speed though for sustained periods (15-300... maybe
>> faster).
>
> That's probably not a Tor-specific problem -- but simply the less
> powerful server behind the onioning. I don't think there are any
> youtube-sized .onion servers.

I'm petty sure this is the result of going through 6 nodes. The chance of
getting a fast connection through 6 nodes seems highly unlikely. With
three nodes you might get 30-300 when connecting to a non-onion web site.
Frequently 60-120 and sometimes 300.

With onion sites though you connect through three nodes plus the server
connects through three nodes. That is 6 nodes you have to go through to
get content. You can only forcefully change your three nodes. On average
you are looking at 5-10 (frequently up to maybe 30) although probably
maxing out at 100.

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