Re: Freenet speed & local threats

On Sun, 11 Dec 2011 16:36:53 -0500, Chris wrote:
> How many users actually compile it themselves?

Me, and all other Gentoo users :-).

> How many examine the diffs?

I do, rarely :s.


> > [...]
> > How would you propose to differentiate between a bugged node and a
> > normal node?
> 
> This is why you have authentication and checks against any inability
> to connect to nodes.

There is no such authentication that would help here. And you would be
able to connect to any node normally -- except the compromised nodes
would still find a way to become your peers and surround you. (I'm not
sure exactly what criteria need to be met for your node to accept
a stranger's offer, but I'm sure a dedicated adversary can easily meet
them.)

> You are looking at the issue wrong. It doesn't matter which nodes are
> bugged. If a user can't connect to higher than normal percentage of
> nodes it should send up a red flag for one.

They will be able to.

> You can keep track of nodes as well and check out which nodes are new
> and which have been added over time. The number of new nodes coming
> online shouldn't exceed a certain threshold. If there are 5,000 and
> on average the number of nodes increase by 2 a week then 100 new
> nodes coming online should send up a red flag. I don't know what the
> actual numbers are or the range. Maybe some weeks do see 100 nodes
> and others only 2. There is probably a number though that could
> increase the time it takes to pull off such an attack.

There is no such metric -- a slashdot article, for example, could
easily trigger such a gauge. Moreover, you're not understanding the
attack enough -- the bad guys don't need to control too many bugged
nodes -- just a few which they will find a way to peer with you.

By the way, here is one freesite that tries to measure how many nodes
are on the network:
  USK@85gZTCiQO9IEPDAGvjktO9d-ZMS1lIABR6JB85m4ens,VGDItiCVzCcWAay51faZzcIfAepzeHpzXYvChlueWYE,AQACAAE/stats/1533/


> >> and if is not made apparent that is a problem with freenet (or
> >> whichever project you would be suggesting).
> >
> > Yes it is. And that's why it's in the FAQ :p. You should take a bit
> > more time, and read it more carefully:
> >
> > "Combined with harvesting and adaptive search attacks, [the
> > bootstrapping attack] explains why opennet is regarded by many
> > core developers as hopelessly insecure. If you want good security
> > you need to connect only to friends."
> 
> I don't think you understand how it works that well. I suspect if
> some of your friends are compromised you won't be.

Did you even read the "Correlation attacks" subsection, from
http://freenetproject.org/faq.html#attack ?


> I don't doubt that some developers think opennet mode is hopelessly
> insecure.

It's not that they "think" it's hopelessly insecure. It really is :p. I
mean, it might still be "good enough" -- but there are actual,
well-known, unsolvable problems with the opennet idea. Which that FAQ
should have explained :p.


> I think the best way to organize a revolt or guerrilla war fare in
> todays world would probably be to anonymously organize multiple small
> groups.

I strongly disagree. The battle (no matter which one you pick,
probably) is ultimately in the minds of the boring violence-phobic
masses -- the majorities. If you don't have popular support, you're
doomed no matter what you try to do. The best way to organize a revolt
is to talk to your friends and family and convince them peacefully and
rationally. (And freenet is a great tool for this! :D.)
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