Re: JFKi vs JFKr

We have 3 connection modes:

1. Darknet - including new connections established as part of opennet
after a completed request.

Encrypted using both sides' keys, so full privacy is available. For
reasons explained below, we should use JFKi.

2. Bootstrap - new node reads a list of seednodes, connects to several
nodes (can't be NATed), each of them sends an announcement for it within
the darknet which eventually results in a list of nodes connecting to
the newbie.

Encrypted using the responder's key. Initiator knows the responder.

3. Invite - i give you a file which contains my reference and a
time-limited access code that allows you to connect one node.

Similar to bootstrap but only works with proof of knowledge of the
access code. E.g. on the first stage, I -> R, we add a requirement for H
( "invite" + access code ), and on the second and third we add a
challenge/response protocol.

On Thu, Mar 22, 2007 at 08:36:14PM +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> Interesting proposal.
> 
> Two key elements that make the use case and attacks somewhat different
> to what was expected by the authors of JFK:
> - On a darknet, each side already knows the other node's public key.
>   (Although there is also opennet, and one-time invitations, to
>   consider).
> - Darknet: There is an outer layer of encryption based on both nodes'
>   setup keys, which will protect us from eavesdropping in any event,
>   unless the attacker already has both references in which case we have
>   no privacy in any case.
> - On an opennet, or possibly some invite protocols, we would encrypt
>   using only the receiver's setup key. But still, the initiator MUST
>   know the identity of the receiver in advance in any case.
> 
> Hence we are really much closer to the client/server model than the p2p
> model for purposes of JFK: We do not need to protect the identity of the
> receiver from either active or passive attacks. 
> 
> JFKr prevents eavesdropping (not a problem for us), it prevents active
> identity discovery of the responder. JFKi on the other hand prevents
> active identity discovery of the initiator, which is a plausible if
> limited attack on Freenet: Get the node's reference, take over its IP
> address, watch for incoming connect attempts, you get IP + pubkey.
> With JFKi, you will still get incoming connect attempts, but they do not
> include a pubkey.
> 
> The RFC says:
> 
> "The second variant of the JFK protocol provides the same DoS 
> protection and identity protection against passive attackers for 
> both the Initiator and the Responder, but no protection against 
> active identity discovery attacks for the Initiator (the Responder 
> is protected against active identity discovery)."
> 
> Translation: If you take over a node's IP, you can identify connecting
> nodes, although you can't connect to them.
> 
> One thing JFKr does have going for it is the lack of non-repudiable
> signatures (you can't prove that two nodes connected, even if you have
> their noderefs). But I'm not convinced how much this will help.



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