Re: Some issues and considerations

On Monday 21 January 2008 10:09, Michael Rogers wrote:
> > Secondly, there 
> > are government installations in the UK (for instance a new MI6 building 
> > on the London enbankment, which has the national internet traffic 
> > channeled through it) which carry out surveillance of communications 
> > including internet communications. This surveillance includes not just 
> > keyword profiling but also several other different kinds of intelligent 
> > and statistical analysis of the traffic itself, even where encrypted 
> > files are involved, and an significant intelligence perspective can be 
> > obtained in this way.
> 
> Yes, traffic analysis is a very important issue. Freenet does its best to 
> frustrate traffic analysis by using a transport protocol with no 
> unencrypted header fields, delaying and coalescing small packets to 
> disguise timing patterns, and padding packets to disguise the size of the 
> payload. Nevertheless I'm sure it's possible to design a rule for a deep 
> packet inspection engine that will identify Freenet traffic.

Depends on what you mean by "deep packet inspection". It would have to be 
stateful; traffic flow analysis would do it nicely, whatever we wrap it in, 
or perhaps some rules on not matching other things and size profiles.
> 
> A possible direction for future research would be hiding Freenet traffic 
> inside other application-layer protocols (HTTP, BitTorrent, RTP etc).
> 
> Cheers,
> Michael

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