Re: "tiny" keys for freenet

Evan Daniel wrote:

> On Sat, Feb 6, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Michael Rogers
> <m.rogers-kecf2yCh/[email protected]> wrote:
>> Evan Daniel wrote:
>>>> They only request the successful one, so the squatted ones fall out of
>>>> the network.
>>>
>>> In which case, the KSK isn't actually the SHA of the final data...
>>
>> Right - it's the SHA1 of the data stored under the KSK. The data stored
>> under the KSK is the key of a redirect to the final data. The inserter
>> can make any number of redirects to the same data, and therefore any
>> number of distict KSKs, until one of them inserts without a collision,
>> at which point the inserter has a KSK to give to the requester.
> 
> Then what's the benefit over using a short KSK, as I was suggesting?

It all boils down to that the receiver can verify he's not being redirected 
to a bogus site.

I was hoping for a short and secure hash, but alas the short part is not 
that short anymore.