Re: RFC 9498: The GNU Name System
"Schanzenbach, Martin" <[email protected]> Tue, 21 Nov 2023 20:10:30 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.gnunet.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi, On 21.11.23 18:55, Maxime Devos wrote: > Op 21-11-2023 om 08:34 schreef Schanzenbach, Martin: >> We are happy to announce that our *The GNU Name System* (GNS) >> specification is now published as RFC 9498 [0]. > >> in order to transparently enable this functionality for migration >> purposes, a local GNS-aware SOCKS5 proxy [RFC1928] can be configured >> to resolve domain names > > Are you sure this is transparent? Consider the case where a website has > a log-in system, and instead of being based on passwords, it is based on > TLS client certificates (for example, https://ci.guix.gnu.org/ has such > a system to decide who is allowed to adjust ‘specifications’ and > ‘restart builds’). > > Given that the SOCKS5 proxy is technically a MITM attack, and the client > certificates instead of only server certificates, I would expect (and > hope) that the SOCKS5 proxy can't convince the server that it is the > client. > obviously, TLS client authentication does not work in this case and this migration path, unless the proxy itself does it. I do not see a problem with the proxy doing it. It just somehow needs to have access to your client certs. Out implementation does not support this kind of flow atm. BR > It's a somewhat niche use case, so mostly transparent, sure. > But transparent, without qualifiers, I don't think so. > > Best regards, > Maxime Devos