Re: RFC 9498: The GNU Name System

"Schanzenbach, Martin" <[email protected]> Tue, 21 Nov 2023 20:10:30 +0100
Newsgroups gmane.network.gnunet.devel
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Hi,

On 21.11.23 18:55, Maxime Devos wrote:
> Op 21-11-2023 om 08:34 schreef Schanzenbach, Martin:
>> We are happy to announce that our *The GNU Name System* (GNS)
>> specification is now published as RFC 9498 [0].
> 
>> in order to transparently enable this functionality for migration 
>> purposes, a local GNS-aware SOCKS5 proxy [RFC1928] can be configured 
>> to resolve domain names
> 
> Are you sure this is transparent?  Consider the case where a website has 
> a log-in system, and instead of being based on passwords, it is based on 
> TLS client certificates (for example, https://ci.guix.gnu.org/ has such 
> a system to decide who is allowed to adjust ‘specifications’ and 
> ‘restart builds’).
> 
> Given that the SOCKS5 proxy is technically a MITM attack, and the client 
> certificates instead of only server certificates, I would expect (and 
> hope) that the SOCKS5 proxy can't convince the server that it is the 
> client.
> 

obviously, TLS client authentication does not work in this case and this 
migration path, unless the proxy itself does it.
I do not see a problem with the proxy doing it. It just somehow needs to 
have access to your client certs.
Out implementation does not support this kind of flow atm.

BR

> It's a somewhat niche use case, so mostly transparent, sure.
> But transparent, without qualifiers, I don't think so.
> 
> Best regards,
> Maxime Devos