[M] Change in openvpn[master]: Replace SHA256 with SIPHASH24 in HMAC cookie approach
"plaisthos \(Code Review\) via Openvpn-devel" <[email protected]> Mon, 3 Aug 2026 13:25:30 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.openvpn.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <7bba4a1ed4d4b3a268648d8b8d5b3d306120733f-EmailReplacePatchSet-HTML@gerrit.openvpn.net> |
--===============2869784934155380829==
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Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos=2E
Hello fli=
chtenheld,
I'd like you to reexamine a change=2E Please visit
http:/=
/gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet/c/openvpn/+/1827?usp=3Demail
to look at the new pa=
tch set (#4)=2E
The following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Cod=
e-Review-1 by flichtenheld
Change subject: Replace SHA256 with SIPHASH24 =
in HMAC cookie approach
=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=
=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=
=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=2E=
=2E=2E=2E
Replace SHA256 with SIPHASH24 in HMAC cookie approach
Using SHA=
256 for this is overkill since we only need a 64bit hash
value that is not =
predictable=2E Siphash24 also fulfils these
requirements while being much f=
aster=2E
Change-Id: I3b6bb178ffb2bb49981bc23eabf04fe8e06d6fc3
---
M CMakeL=
ists=2Etxt
M src/openvpn/init=2Ec
M src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec
M src/openvpn/open=
vpn=2Eh
M src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec
M src/openvpn/s=
sl_pkt=2Eh
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam
M tests/unit_tests/open=
vpn/test_pkt=2Ec
9 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
gi=
t pull ssh://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet:29418/openvpn refs/changes/27/1827/4
d=
iff --git a/CMakeLists=2Etxt b/CMakeLists=2Etxt
index 9e1dde1=2E=2E29b53a9 =
100644
--- a/CMakeLists=2Etxt
+++ b/CMakeLists=2Etxt
@@ -875,6 +875,7 @@
=
src/openvpn/packet_id=2Ec
src/openvpn/reliable=2Ec
=
src/openvpn/run_command=2Ec
+ src/openvpn/siphash_reference=2Ec
=
src/openvpn/session_id=2Ec
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec
=
src/openvpn/tls_crypt=2Ec
diff --git a/src/openvpn/init=2Ec b/src/openvpn/i=
nit=2Ec
index db753dc=2E=2E9b6ad7b 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/init=2Ec
+++ b/=
src/openvpn/init=2Ec
@@ -3473,7 +3473,7 @@
if (flags & CF_INIT_TLS_AUT=
H_STANDALONE)
{
c->c2=2Etls_auth_standalone =3D tls_auth_stan=
dalone_init(&to, &c->c2=2Egc);
- c->c2=2Esession_id_hmac =3D session=
_id_hmac_init();
+ siphash_key_init(c->c2=2Esession_id_key);
}
=
}
diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec b/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec
index 9acf297=
=2E=2Eb64cdd7 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec
+++ b/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec
=
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(tas, state, &m->t=
op=2Ec2=2Efrom, &m->top=2Ec2=2Ebuf);
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D m->top=2Ec=
2=2Esession_id_hmac;
+ uint8_t *hmac_key =3D m->top=2Ec2=2Esession_id_ke=
y;
struct openvpn_sockaddr *from =3D &m->top=2Ec2=2Efrom=2Edest;
=
int handwindow =3D m->top=2Eoptions=2Ehandshake_window;
@@ -119,7 +119,7 =
@@
{
/* Calculate the session ID HMAC for our reply a=
nd create reset packet */
struct session_id sid =3D
- =
calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwi=
ndow, 0);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id=
, from, hmac_key, handwindow, 0);
send_hmac_reset_packet(m, st=
ate, tas, &sid, true, sock);
return false;
@@ -151,7 +151,7 =
@@
{
/* Calculate the session ID HMAC for our reply and creat=
e reset packet */
struct session_id sid =3D
- calculate=
_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindow, 0);
+ =
calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac_key, ha=
ndwindow, 0);
send_hmac_reset_packet(m, state, tas, &sid, false,=
sock);
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();
=
bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
- =
bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, handwindow, =
pkt_is_ack);
+ bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, fro=
m, hmac_key, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);
const char *peer =3D print=
_link_socket_actual(&m->top=2Ec2=2Efrom, &gc);
uint8_t pkt_firstby=
te =3D *BPTR(&m->top=2Ec2=2Ebuf);
diff --git a/src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh b/sr=
c/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh
index fa00822=2E=2Ee9e18bf 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/o=
penvpn=2Eh
+++ b/src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include "plugi=
n=2Eh"
#include "manage=2Eh"
#include "dns=2Eh"
+#include "siphash=2Eh"
=
/*
* Our global key schedules, packaged thusly
@@ -335,10 +336,9 @@
=
* \c --tls-auth commandline option=2E */
- hmac_ctx_t *session_=
id_hmac;
- /**< the HMAC we use to generate and verify our syn cookie li=
ke
- * session ids from the server=2E
- */
+ uint8_t session_id_=
key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE];
+ /**< the siphash secret we use to generate and =
verify our syn cookie like
+ * session ids from the server=2E */
=
/* used to optimize calls to tls_multi_process */
struct interval tmp=
_int;
diff --git a/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh b/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh
index =
ade7762=2E=2E462175c 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh
+++ b/src/openvpn=
/siphash=2Eh
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include <stdint=2Eh>
#include <stdio=2E=
h>
-#include <stdbool=2Eh>
+#include "crypto=2Eh"
/* We need to include =
this to check for the OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC macro */
#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENS=
SL
@@ -77,4 +77,14 @@
#endif
}
+/**
+ * Initialises a SIPHASH key with =
a random value
+ * @param key the key to be initialised
+ */
+static inline=
void
+siphash_key_init(uint8_t *key)
+{
+ prng_bytes(key, SIPHASH_KEY_S=
IZE);
+}
+
#endif /* ifndef SIPHASH_H */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=
=2Ec b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec
index f8444451=2E=2E6a6d9f9 100644
--- a/src=
/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#incl=
ude "crypto=2Eh"
#include "session_id=2Eh"
#include "reliable=2Eh"
+#incl=
ude "siphash=2Eh"
#include "tls_crypt=2Eh"
/*
@@ -442,64 +443,53 @@
=
return buf;
}
-hmac_ctx_t *
-session_id_hmac_init(void)
-{
- /* We =
assume that SHA256 is always available */
- ASSERT(md_valid("SHA256"));
=
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx =3D hmac_ctx_new();
-
- uint8_t key[SHA256_DIG=
EST_LENGTH];
- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key)));
-
- hmac_ctx_ini=
t(hmac_ctx, key, "SHA256");
- return hmac_ctx;
-}
-
struct session_id
=
calculate_session_id_hmac(struct session_id client_sid, const struct openvp=
n_sockaddr *from,
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwind=
ow, int offset)
+ const uint8_t *key, int handwind=
ow, int offset)
{
- union
- {
- uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DI=
GEST_LENGTH];
- struct session_id sid;
- } result;
-
/* Get =
the valid time quantisation for our hmac,
* we divide time by handwin=
dow/2 and allow the previous
* and future session time if specified b=
y offset */
uint32_t session_id_time =3D ntohl((uint32_t)(now / ((hand=
window + 1) / 2) + offset));
- hmac_ctx_reset(hmac);
+ uint8_t inpu=
t[64];
+
+ /* ensure input array is large enough */
+ static_assert(s=
izeof(input) >=3D sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) + sizeof(session_id_time) + s=
izeof(client_sid=2Eid), "input buffer not sized correctly");
+ static_as=
sert(sizeof(input) >=3D sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) + sizeof(session_id_time=
) + sizeof(client_sid=2Eid), "input buffer not sized correctly");
+
+ st=
ruct buffer in =3D { 0 };
+ buf_set_write(&in, input, sizeof(input));
+
=
/* We do not care about endian here since it does not need to be
=
* portable */
- hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&session_id_time=
, sizeof(session_id_time));
+ buf_write(&in, (const uint8_t *)&session_i=
d_time, sizeof(session_id_time));
/* add client IP and port */
=
switch (from->addr=2Esa=2Esa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
- =
hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&from->addr=2Ein4, sizeof(struc=
t sockaddr_in));
+ buf_write(&in, (const uint8_t *)&from->addr=
=2Ein4, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
break;
case AF=
_INET6:
- hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&from->addr=2Ei=
n6, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+ buf_write(&in, (const uint8_=
t *)&from->addr=2Ein6, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
break;
=
}
/* add session id of client */
- hmac_ctx_update(hmac, clien=
t_sid=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
+ buf_write(&in, client_sid=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
- =
hmac_ctx_final(hmac, result=2Ehmac_result);
+ struct session_id sid;
=
+ siphash(buf_bptr(&in), buf_len(&in), key, sid=2Eid, sizeof(sid=2Eid));=
- return result=2Esid;
+ return sid;
}
bool
check_session_hma=
c_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
=
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
- h=
mac_ctx_t *hmac,
+ uint8_t *key,
=
int handwindow,
bool pkt_i=
s_ack)
{
@@ -551,7 +541,7 @@
for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 0; o=
ffset++)
{
struct session_id expected_id =3D
- cal=
culate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindow, offs=
et);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, k=
ey, handwindow, offset);
if (memcmp_constant_time(&expected_id, =
&state->server_session_id, SID_SIZE) =3D=3D 0)
{
diff --git a/src/=
openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh
index 82cb5b1=2E=2E03e8930 10=
0644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh
@@ -151,28=
+151,20 @@
const struct li=
nk_socket_actual *from,
con=
st struct buffer *buf);
-/* Creates an SHA256 HMAC context with a random =
key that is used for the
- * session id=2E
- *
- * We do not support loadin=
g this from a config file since continuing session
- * between restarts of =
OpenVPN has never been supported and that includes
- * early session setup=
=2E
- */
-hmac_ctx_t *session_id_hmac_init(void);
-
/**
* Calculates the=
HMAC based server session id based on a client session id
* and socket a=
ddr=2E
*
* @param client_sid session id of the client
* @param fro=
m link_socket from the client
- * @param hmac the hmac co=
ntext to use for the calculation
+ * @param key the siphash key t=
o use for the calculation
* @param handwindow the quantisation of the =
current time
* @param offset offset to 'now' to use
* @return =
the expected server session id
*/
struct session_id calculate=
_session_id_hmac(struct session_id client_sid,
- =
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
+ =
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *fr=
om,
+ const uint8_t *key,
=
int handwindow, int offset);
/**
=
@@ -185,13 +177,13 @@
*
* @param state session information
* =
@param from link_socket from the client
- * @param hmac t=
he hmac context to use for the calculation
+ * @param key the sip=
hash key to use for the calculation
* @param handwindow the quantisati=
on of the current time
* @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is=
a P_ACK_V1
* @return the expected server session id
*/
b=
ool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, cons=
t struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
- hmac_c=
tx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);
+ =
uint8_t *key, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);
/*
* Write a co=
ntrol channel authentication record=2E
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvp=
n/Makefile=2Eam b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam
index ae15759=2E=
=2Ec76d94a 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam
+++ b/tests/=
unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@
$(top_srcdir)/src/op=
envpn/reliable=2Ec \
$(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/run_command=2Ec \
$(top_=
srcdir)/src/openvpn/session_id=2Ec \
+ $(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/siphash_re=
ference=2Ec \
$(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec \
$(top_srcdir)/src=
/openvpn/win32-util=2Ec \
$(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/tls_crypt=2Ec
diff --=
git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt=2Ec b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test=
_pkt=2Ec
index cad2ce0=2E=2E17987a4 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/t=
est_pkt=2Ec
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt=2Ec
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
=
#include "mss=2Eh"
#include "reliable=2Eh"
+#include "siphash=2Eh"
in=
t
parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file, co=
nst int line_num,
@@ -403,7 +404,8 @@
static void
test_verify_hmac_tls_au=
th(void **ut_state)
{
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init();
+ =
uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0 };
+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key=
));
struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };
from=2Edest=2Eadd=
r=2Esa=2Esa_family =3D AF_INET;
@@ -422,21 +424,20 @@
assert_int_equal=
(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);
/* This is a valid packet but c=
ontaining a random id instead of an HMAC id*/
- bool valid =3D check_ses=
sion_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, false);
+ bool vali=
d =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, false);
=
assert_false(valid);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
f=
ree_buf(&buf);
free_tas(&tas);
- hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);
- hmac_=
ctx_free(hmac);
}
static void
test_verify_hmac_none(void **ut_state)
=
{
now =3D 1000;
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init();
+ =
uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0 };
+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key))=
;
struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };
from=2Edest=2Eaddr=
=2Esa=2Esa_family =3D AF_INET;
@@ -456,13 +457,13 @@
assert_int_equal(=
verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
/* This packet has a random hmac, so=
it should fail to validate */
- bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_p=
kt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);
+ bool valid =3D check_sess=
ion_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);
assert_false=
(valid);
struct session_id client_id =3D { { 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1,=
0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8 } };
assert_memory_equal(&client_id, &state=2E=
peer_session_id, sizeof(struct session_id));
- struct session_id expec=
ted_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, 0);=
+ struct session_id expected_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id=
, &from=2Edest, key, 30, 0);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
=
buf_reset_len(&buf);
@@ -474,7 +475,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decry=
pt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_=
VALID_ACK_V1);
- valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=
=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);
+ valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&sta=
te, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);
assert_true(valid);
@@ -483,23 +=
484,23 @@
* So setting time to the two future ones should work
=
*/
now =3D 980;
- assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state=
, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_=
pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));
now =3D 1040;
- asser=
t_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true)=
);
+ assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, ke=
y, 30, true));
now =3D 1002;
- assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_p=
kt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ assert_true(check_sessio=
n_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));
now =3D 1022;=
- assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac,=
30, true));
+ assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=
=2Edest, key, 30, true));
now =3D 1010;
- assert_true(check_session=
_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ assert_true(c=
heck_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));
=
/* Changing the IP address should make this invalid */
from=2Edest=2Ea=
ddr=2Ein4=2Esin_addr=2Es_addr =3D ntohl(0x01020305);
- assert_false(chec=
k_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ asse=
rt_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true)=
);
/* Change to the correct one again */
from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Ei=
n4=2Esin_addr=2Es_addr =3D ntohl(0x01020304);
- assert_true(check_sessio=
n_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ assert_true(=
check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));
=
/* Modify the peer id, should now fail hmac verification */
buf_inc_l=
en(&buf, -4);
@@ -508,18 +509,17 @@
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state)=
;
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
as=
sert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
- assert_false(check_sess=
ion_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));
+ assert_fal=
se(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));
=
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
free_buf(&buf);
- hmac_ctx_=
cleanup(hmac);
- hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
}
static void
test_verify_hma=
c_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state)
{
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D sessi=
on_id_hmac_init();
+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0 };
+ rand_=
bytes(key, sizeof(key));
struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };
=
from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Esa=2Esa_family =3D AF_INET;
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
=
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
/* should fail b=
ecause it acks 2 */
- bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&stat=
e, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_an=
d_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);
assert_false(valid);
=
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
@@ -552,31 +552,17 @@
assert_=
int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);
/* should fail because=
it has message id 2 */
- valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state=
, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);
+ valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_=
id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);
assert_false(valid);
f=
ree_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
free_buf(&buf);
- hmac_ctx_clean=
up(hmac);
- hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
-}
-
-static hmac_ctx_t *
-init_static_=
hmac(void)
-{
- ASSERT(md_valid("SHA256"));
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx =
=3D hmac_ctx_new();
-
- uint8_t key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] =3D { 1, 2, 3,=
0 };
-
- hmac_ctx_init(hmac_ctx, key, "SHA256");
- return hmac_ctx;
=
}
static void
test_calc_session_id_hmac_static(void **ut_state)
{
- =
hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D init_static_hmac();
+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZ=
E] =3D { 1, 2, 3, 0 };
static const int handwindow =3D 100;
str=
uct openvpn_sockaddr addr =3D { 0 };
@@ -588,27 +574,27 @@
struct sess=
ion_id client_id =3D { { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 } };
now =3D 1005;
-=
struct session_id server_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &a=
ddr, hmac, handwindow, 0);
+ struct session_id server_id =3D calculate_s=
ession_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, 0);
- struct sessi=
on_id expected_server_id =3D { { 0x84, 0x73, 0x52, 0x2b, 0x5b, 0xa9, 0x2a, =
0x70 } };
+ struct session_id expected_server_id =3D { { 0xec, 0xa3, 0xd=
5, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0xee } };
/* We have to deal with different=
structs here annoyingly */
/* Linux has an unsigned short int as fami=
ly_t and this is field is always
* stored in host endianness even tho=
ugh the rest of the struct isn't=2E=2E=2E,
* so Linux little endian d=
iffers from all BSD and Linux big endian */
if (sizeof(addr=2Eaddr=2Ei=
n4=2Esin_family) =3D=3D sizeof(unsigned short int) && ntohs(AF_INET) !=3D A=
F_INET)
{
- struct session_id linuxle =3D { { 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x3d,=
0x20, 0x14, 0x53, 0xbe, 0x0a } };
+ struct session_id linuxle =3D {=
{ 0x70, 0x04, 0x8c, 0x0f, 0xfe, 0x30, 0x85, 0x12 } };
expected_se=
rver_id =3D linuxle;
}
assert_memory_equal(expected_server_id=2Ei=
d, server_id=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
struct session_id server_id_m1 =3D
- =
calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, -1);
+ =
calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, -1);
=
struct session_id server_id_p1 =3D
- calculate_session_id_hmac(cl=
ient_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, 1);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(cl=
ient_id, &addr, key, handwindow, 1);
struct session_id server_id_p2 =
=3D
- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, =
2);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, 2=
);
assert_memory_not_equal(expected_server_id=2Eid, server_id_m1=2Ei=
d, SID_SIZE);
assert_memory_not_equal(expected_server_id=2Eid, server_=
id_p1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
@@ -618,20 +604,17 @@
now =3D 1062;
stru=
ct session_id server_id2_m2 =3D
- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_i=
d, &addr, hmac, handwindow, -2);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_=
id, &addr, key, handwindow, -2);
struct session_id server_id2_m1 =3D
-=
calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, -1);
=
- struct session_id server_id2 =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, =
&addr, hmac, handwindow, 0);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, =
&addr, key, handwindow, -1);
+ struct session_id server_id2 =3D calculat=
e_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, 0);
struct sessio=
n_id server_id2_p1 =3D
- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr,=
hmac, handwindow, 1);
+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr,=
key, handwindow, 1);
assert_memory_equal(server_id2_m2=2Eid, server=
_id_m1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
assert_memory_equal(server_id2_m1=2Eid, expect=
ed_server_id=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
assert_memory_equal(server_id2=2Eid, ser=
ver_id_p1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
assert_memory_equal(server_id2_p1=2Eid, ser=
ver_id_p2=2Eid, SID_SIZE);
-
- hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);
- hmac_ctx_fre=
e(hmac);
}
static void
--
To view, visit http://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Ene=
t/c/openvpn/+/1827?usp=3Demail
To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail fil=
ters, visit http://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet/settings?usp=3Demail
Gerrit-Mess=
ageType: newpatchset
Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-C=
hange-Id: I3b6bb178ffb2bb49981bc23eabf04fe8e06d6fc3
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1=
827
Gerrit-PatchSet: 4
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@rfc2549=2Eorg>=
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@lichtenheld=2Ecom>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn=
-devel <openvpn-devel@lists=2Esourceforge=2Enet>
Gerrit-Attention: plaistho=
s <arne-openvpn@rfc2549=2Eorg>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <frank@lichte=
nheld=2Ecom>
--wWYXkwluGrY=
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><style></style></head><body><p> Attention is cur=
rently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos=2E </p>
<p>plaisthos <strong>=
uploaded patch set #4</strong> to this change=2E</p><p><a href=3D"http://ge=
rrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet/c/openvpn/+/1827?usp=3Demail">View Change</a></p><p>Th=
e following approvals got outdated and were removed:
Code-Review-1 by flich=
tenheld</p><pre class=3D"blocks" style=3D"font-family: monospace,monospace;=
white-space: pre-wrap;">Replace SHA256 with SIPHASH24 in HMAC cookie appro=
ach<br><br>Using SHA256 for this is overkill since we only need a 64bit has=
h<br>value that is not predictable=2E Siphash24 also fulfils these<br>requi=
rements while being much faster=2E<br><br>Change-Id: I3b6bb178ffb2bb49981bc=
23eabf04fe8e06d6fc3<br>---<br>M CMakeLists=2Etxt<br>M src/openvpn/init=2Ec<=
br>M src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec<br>M src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh<br>M src/openvpn/sip=
hash=2Eh<br>M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec<br>M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh<br>M tes=
ts/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam<br>M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt=
=2Ec<br>9 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)<br><br></pre><p=
re class=3D"blocks" style=3D"font-family: monospace,monospace; white-space:=
pre-wrap;">git pull ssh://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet:29418/openvpn refs/change=
s/27/1827/4</pre><pre style=3D"font-family: monospace,monospace; white-spac=
e: pre-wrap;"><span>diff --git a/CMakeLists=2Etxt b/CMakeLists=2Etxt</span>=
<br><span>index 9e1dde1=2E=2E29b53a9 100644</span><br><span>--- a/CMakeList=
s=2Etxt</span><br><span>+++ b/CMakeLists=2Etxt</span><br><span>@@ -875,6 +8=
75,7 @@</span><br><span> src/openvpn/packet_id=2Ec</span><br><span>=
src/openvpn/reliable=2Ec</span><br><span> src/openvpn/run_=
command=2Ec</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
src/openvpn/siphash_reference=2Ec</span><br><span> src/openvpn/sess=
ion_id=2Ec</span><br><span> src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec</span><br><span=
> src/openvpn/tls_crypt=2Ec</span><br><span>diff --git a/src/openvp=
n/init=2Ec b/src/openvpn/init=2Ec</span><br><span>index db753dc=2E=2E9b6ad7=
b 100644</span><br><span>--- a/src/openvpn/init=2Ec</span><br><span>+++ b/s=
rc/openvpn/init=2Ec</span><br><span>@@ -3473,7 +3473,7 @@</span><br><span> =
if (flags & CF_INIT_TLS_AUTH_STANDALONE)</span><br><span> {</sp=
an><br><span> c->c2=2Etls_auth_standalone =3D tls_auth_standalon=
e_init(&to, &c->c2=2Egc);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0,=
100%, 40%);">- c->c2=2Esession_id_hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(=
);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ siphash_k=
ey_init(c->c2=2Esession_id_key);</span><br><span> }</span><br><span>=
}</span><br><span> </span><br><span>diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec b/sr=
c/openvpn/mudp=2Ec</span><br><span>index 9acf297=2E=2Eb64cdd7 100644</span>=
<br><span>--- a/src/openvpn/mudp=2Ec</span><br><span>+++ b/src/openvpn/mudp=
=2Ec</span><br><span>@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@</span><br><span> </span><br><span> =
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(tas, state, &m->top=2Ec2=2Efrom,=
&m->top=2Ec2=2Ebuf);</span><br><span> </span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D m->top=2Ec2=2Esession_=
id_hmac;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t=
*hmac_key =3D m->top=2Ec2=2Esession_id_key;</span><br><span> struct=
openvpn_sockaddr *from =3D &m->top=2Ec2=2Efrom=2Edest;</span><br><s=
pan> int handwindow =3D m->top=2Eoptions=2Ehandshake_window;</span><=
br><span> </span><br><span>@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@</span><br><span> {</=
span><br><span> /* Calculate the session ID HMAC for our reply =
and create reset packet */</span><br><span> struct session_id s=
id =3D</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- =
calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindo=
w, 0);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
calculate_session_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac_key, han=
dwindow, 0);</span><br><span> send_hmac_reset_packet(m, state, =
tas, &sid, true, sock);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> =
return false;</span><br><span>@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@</span><br><span> {</s=
pan><br><span> /* Calculate the session ID HMAC for our reply and c=
reate reset packet */</span><br><span> struct session_id sid =3D</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calculate_se=
ssion_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindow, 0);</span>=
<br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calculate_sess=
ion_id_hmac(state->peer_session_id, from, hmac_key, handwindow, 0);</spa=
n><br><span> </span><br><span> send_hmac_reset_packet(m, state, tas=
, &sid, false, sock);</span><br><span> </span><br><span>@@ -166,7 +166,=
7 @@</span><br><span> struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();</span><br><s=
pan> </span><br><span> bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_=
VALID_ACK_V1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- =
bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, handwindow, =
pkt_is_ack);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac_key, handwind=
ow, pkt_is_ack);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> const char *pee=
r =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top=2Ec2=2Efrom, &gc);</span>=
<br><span> uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR(&m->top=2Ec2=2Ebu=
f);</span><br><span>diff --git a/src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh b/src/openvpn/open=
vpn=2Eh</span><br><span>index fa00822=2E=2Ee9e18bf 100644</span><br><span>-=
-- a/src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh</span><br><span>+++ b/src/openvpn/openvpn=2Eh<=
/span><br><span>@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@</span><br><span> #include "plugin=2E=
h"</span><br><span> #include "manage=2Eh"</span><br><span> #=
include "dns=2Eh"</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, =
40%);">+#include "siphash=2Eh"</span><br><span> </span><br><span>=
/*</span><br><span> * Our global key schedules, packaged thusly</span><br=
><span>@@ -335,10 +336,9 @@</span><br><span> * \c --tls-auth command=
line option=2E */</span><br><span> </span><br><span> </span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *session_id_hmac;</span><br>=
<span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- /**< the HMAC we use to g=
enerate and verify our syn cookie like</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(=
0, 100%, 40%);">- * session ids from the server=2E</span><br><span styl=
e=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- */</span><br><span style=3D"color: hs=
l(120, 100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t session_id_key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE];</span><b=
r><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ /**< the siphash secr=
et we use to generate and verify our syn cookie like</span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ * session ids from the server=2E */<=
/span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* used to optimize calls to tls_mul=
ti_process */</span><br><span> struct interval tmp_int;</span><br><span=
>diff --git a/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh b/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh</span><br><=
span>index ade7762=2E=2E462175c 100644</span><br><span>--- a/src/openvpn/si=
phash=2Eh</span><br><span>+++ b/src/openvpn/siphash=2Eh</span><br><span>@@ =
-24,7 +24,7 @@</span><br><span> </span><br><span> #include <stdint=2Eh&g=
t;</span><br><span> #include <stdio=2Eh></span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-#include <stdbool=2Eh></span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+#include "crypto=2Eh"</span><br=
><span> </span><br><span> /* We need to include this to check for the OPENS=
SL_IS_AWSLC macro */</span><br><span> #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL</span><b=
r><span>@@ -77,4 +77,14 @@</span><br><span> #endif</span><br><span> }</span=
><br><span> </span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+/**</sp=
an><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ * Initialises a SIPHAS=
H key with a random value</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40=
%);">+ * @param key the key to be initialised</span><br><span style=3D"colo=
r: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ */</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%=
, 40%);">+static inline void</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%,=
40%);">+siphash_key_init(uint8_t *key)</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl=
(120, 100%, 40%);">+{</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);"=
>+ prng_bytes(key, SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hs=
l(120, 100%, 40%);">+}</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);=
">+</span><br><span> #endif /* ifndef SIPHASH_H */</span><br><span>diff --g=
it a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec</span><br><span>inde=
x f8444451=2E=2E6a6d9f9 100644</span><br><span>--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2E=
c</span><br><span>+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec</span><br><span>@@ -31,6 +3=
1,7 @@</span><br><span> #include "crypto=2Eh"</span><br><span> #i=
nclude "session_id=2Eh"</span><br><span> #include "reliable=
=2Eh"</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+#include =
"siphash=2Eh"</span><br><span> #include "tls_crypt=2Eh"=
</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /*</span><br><span>@@ -442,64 +443,53 @=
@</span><br><span> return buf;</span><br><span> }</span><br><span> </sp=
an><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-hmac_ctx_t *</span><br><s=
pan style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-session_id_hmac_init(void)</span><=
br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-{</span><br><span style=3D"co=
lor: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- /* We assume that SHA256 is always available =
*/</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- ASSERT(md_valid=
("SHA256"));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">=
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx =3D hmac_ctx_new();</span><br><span style=3D"colo=
r: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);=
">- uint8_t key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];</span><br><span style=3D"color: h=
sl(0, 100%, 40%);">- ASSERT(rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key)));</span><br><sp=
an style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=3D"color: hs=
l(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_init(hmac_ctx, key, "SHA256");</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- return hmac_ctx;</sp=
an><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-}</span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span> struct session_id</span><=
br><span> calculate_session_id_hmac(struct session_id client_sid, const str=
uct openvpn_sockaddr *from,</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40=
%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, int offse=
t)</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
const uint8_t *key, int handwindow, int offset)</span><br><span> {=
</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- union</span><br><=
span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- {</span><br><span style=3D"co=
lor: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- uint8_t hmac_result[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]=
;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- struct sessi=
on_id sid;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- } resul=
t;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span> =
/* Get the valid time quantisation for our hmac,</span><br><span> *=
we divide time by handwindow/2 and allow the previous</span><br><span> =
* and future session time if specified by offset */</span><br><span> =
uint32_t session_id_time =3D ntohl((uint32_t)(now / ((handwindow + 1) / 2) =
+ offset));</span><br><span> </span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, =
40%);">- hmac_ctx_reset(hmac);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, =
100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t input[64];</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(12=
0, 100%, 40%);">+</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
/* ensure input array is large enough */</span><br><span style=3D"color: =
hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ static_assert(sizeof(input) >=3D sizeof(struc=
t sockaddr_in6) + sizeof(session_id_time) + sizeof(client_sid=2Eid), "=
input buffer not sized correctly");</span><br><span style=3D"color: hs=
l(120, 100%, 40%);">+ static_assert(sizeof(input) >=3D sizeof(struct =
sockaddr_in) + sizeof(session_id_time) + sizeof(client_sid=2Eid), "inp=
ut buffer not sized correctly");</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(1=
20, 100%, 40%);">+</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
struct buffer in =3D { 0 };</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100=
%, 40%);">+ buf_set_write(&in, input, sizeof(input));</span><br><spa=
n style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+</span><br><span> /* We do not=
care about endian here since it does not need to be</span><br><span> =
* portable */</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac=
_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&session_id_time, sizeof(session_id_=
time));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ buf_writ=
e(&in, (const uint8_t *)&session_id_time, sizeof(session_id_time));=
</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* add client IP and port */</span>=
<br><span> switch (from->addr=2Esa=2Esa_family)</span><br><span> =
{</span><br><span> case AF_INET:</span><br><span style=3D"color: h=
sl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&=
;from->addr=2Ein4, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));</span><br><span style=3D=
"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ buf_write(&in, (const uint8_=
t *)&from->addr=2Ein4, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));</span><br><span>=
break;</span><br><span> </span><br><span> case AF_INET=
6:</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ct=
x_update(hmac, (const uint8_t *)&from->addr=2Ein6, sizeof(struct soc=
kaddr_in6));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
buf_write(&in, (const uint8_t *)&from->addr=2Ein6, sizeof(s=
truct sockaddr_in6));</span><br><span> break;</span><br><span> =
}</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* add session id of client */=
</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_update(h=
mac, client_sid=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 1=
00%, 40%);">+ buf_write(&in, client_sid=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><=
span> </span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_fi=
nal(hmac, result=2Ehmac_result);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 1=
00%, 40%);">+ struct session_id sid;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl=
(120, 100%, 40%);">+ siphash(buf_bptr(&in), buf_len(&in), key, s=
id=2Eid, sizeof(sid=2Eid));</span><br><span> </span><br><span style=3D"colo=
r: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- return result=2Esid;</span><br><span style=3D"c=
olor: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ return sid;</span><br><span> }</span><br><=
span> </span><br><span> bool</span><br><span> check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id=
(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,</span><br><span> =
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,</span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac,</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
uint8_t *key,</span><br><span> int ha=
ndwindow,</span><br><span> bool pkt_is_ack)</=
span><br><span> {</span><br><span>@@ -551,7 +541,7 @@</span><br><span> =
for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 0; offset++)</span><br><span> {<=
/span><br><span> struct session_id expected_id =3D</span><br><span =
style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calculate_session_id_hmac(=
state->peer_session_id, from, hmac, handwindow, offset);</span><br><span=
style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calculate_session_id_hm=
ac(state->peer_session_id, from, key, handwindow, offset);</span><br><sp=
an> </span><br><span> if (memcmp_constant_time(&expected_id, &a=
mp;state->server_session_id, SID_SIZE) =3D=3D 0)</span><br><span> =
{</span><br><span>diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh b/src/openvpn/ssl_=
pkt=2Eh</span><br><span>index 82cb5b1=2E=2E03e8930 100644</span><br><span>-=
-- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh</span><br><span>+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Eh<=
/span><br><span>@@ -151,28 +151,20 @@</span><br><span> =
const struct link_socket_actual *from,</span><br=
><span> const struct buffer =
*buf);</span><br><span> </span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);=
">-/* Creates an SHA256 HMAC context with a random key that is used for the=
</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- * session id=2E</spa=
n><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- *</span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- * We do not support loading this from a co=
nfig file since continuing session</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 1=
00%, 40%);">- * between restarts of OpenVPN has never been supported and th=
at includes</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- * early s=
ession setup=2E</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- */</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-hmac_ctx_t *session_id_h=
mac_init(void);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span=
><br><span> /**</span><br><span> * Calculates the HMAC based server sessio=
n id based on a client session id</span><br><span> * and socket addr=2E</s=
pan><br><span> *</span><br><span> * @param client_sid session id of th=
e client</span><br><span> * @param from link_socket from the clie=
nt</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- * @param hmac =
the hmac context to use for the calculation</span><br><span style=3D"c=
olor: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ * @param key the siphash key to use=
for the calculation</span><br><span> * @param handwindow the quantisat=
ion of the current time</span><br><span> * @param offset offset to =
'now' to use</span><br><span> * @return the expected =
server session id</span><br><span> */</span><br><span> struct session_id c=
alculate_session_id_hmac(struct session_id client_sid,</span><br><span styl=
e=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- =
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac,</span><br><span st=
yle=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,</span><br><span style=3D"color: =
hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ const ui=
nt8_t *key,</span><br><span> in=
t handwindow, int offset);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /**</span><br=
><span>@@ -185,13 +177,13 @@</span><br><span> *</span><br><span> * @param=
state session information</span><br><span> * @param from =
link_socket from the client</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 4=
0%);">- * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation<=
/span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ * @param key =
the siphash key to use for the calculation</span><br><span> * @param h=
andwindow the quantisation of the current time</span><br><span> * @para=
m pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1</span><br><span> * =
@return the expected server session id</span><br><span> */</s=
pan><br><span> bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_st=
ate *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,</span><br><span style=3D"c=
olor: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *h=
mac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(=
120, 100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t *key, int han=
dwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /*</span><br>=
<span> * Write a control channel authentication record=2E</span><br><span>=
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam b/tests/unit_tests/open=
vpn/Makefile=2Eam</span><br><span>index ae15759=2E=2Ec76d94a 100644</span><=
br><span>--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam</span><br><span>+++ b=
/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/Makefile=2Eam</span><br><span>@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@=
</span><br><span> $(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/reliable=2Ec \</span><br><span=
> $(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/run_command=2Ec \</span><br><span> $(top_srcd=
ir)/src/openvpn/session_id=2Ec \</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 1=
00%, 40%);">+ $(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/siphash_reference=2Ec \</span><br><=
span> $(top_srcdir)/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=2Ec \</span><br><span> $(top_srcd=
ir)/src/openvpn/win32-util=2Ec \</span><br><span> $(top_srcdir)/src/openvp=
n/tls_crypt=2Ec</span><br><span>diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_=
pkt=2Ec b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt=2Ec</span><br><span>index cad2c=
e0=2E=2E17987a4 100644</span><br><span>--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_=
pkt=2Ec</span><br><span>+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt=2Ec</span><=
br><span>@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@</span><br><span> </span><br><span> #include &quo=
t;mss=2Eh"</span><br><span> #include "reliable=2Eh"</span><b=
r><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+#include "siphash=2Eh&q=
uot;</span><br><span> </span><br><span> int</span><br><span> parse_line(con=
st char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file, const int line_num,=
</span><br><span>@@ -403,7 +404,8 @@</span><br><span> static void</span><br=
><span> test_verify_hmac_tls_auth(void **ut_state)</span><br><span> {</span=
><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D se=
ssion_id_hmac_init();</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);"=
>+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0 };</span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key));</span><br><spa=
n> </span><br><span> struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };</span><b=
r><span> from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Esa=2Esa_family =3D AF_INET;</span><br><sp=
an>@@ -422,21 +424,20 @@</span><br><span> assert_int_equal(verdict, VER=
DICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* This is a=
valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/</span><br>=
<span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- bool valid =3D check_session=
_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, false);</span><br>=
<span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ bool valid =3D check_sessi=
on_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, false);</span><br=
><span> assert_false(valid);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> fre=
e_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);</span><br><span> free_buf(&buf=
);</span><br><span> free_tas(&tas);</span><br><span style=3D"color:=
hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);</span><br><span style=3D"=
color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_free(hmac);</span><br><span> }</sp=
an><br><span> </span><br><span> static void</span><br><span> test_verify_hm=
ac_none(void **ut_state)</span><br><span> {</span><br><span> now =3D 10=
00;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hm=
ac =3D session_id_hmac_init();</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100=
%, 40%);">+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0 };</span><br><span sty=
le=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ rand_bytes(key, sizeof(key));</span=
><br><span> </span><br><span> struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };=
</span><br><span> from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Esa=2Esa_family =3D AF_INET;</spa=
n><br><span>@@ -456,13 +457,13 @@</span><br><span> assert_int_equal(ver=
dict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* This=
packet has a random hmac, so it should fail to validate */</span><br><span=
style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- bool valid =3D check_session_hmac=
_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);</span><br><span =
style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ bool valid =3D check_session_hma=
c_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);</span><br><span>=
assert_false(valid);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> struct ses=
sion_id client_id =3D { { 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8 } =
};</span><br><span> assert_memory_equal(&client_id, &state=2Epe=
er_session_id, sizeof(struct session_id));</span><br><span> </span><br><spa=
n style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- struct session_id expected_id =
=3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, 0);</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ struct session_id =
expected_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &from=2Edest, key,=
30, 0);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(=
&state);</span><br><span> buf_reset_len(&buf);</span><br><span>=
@@ -474,7 +475,7 @@</span><br><span> </span><br><span> verdict =3D tls_=
pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);</span><br><spa=
n> assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);</span><br><span sty=
le=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_=
id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);</span><br><span style=3D"=
color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&=
amp;state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);</span><br><span> </span><br><s=
pan> assert_true(valid);</span><br><span> </span><br><span>@@ -483,23 +=
484,23 @@</span><br><span> * So setting time to the two future ones sh=
ould work</span><br><span> */</span><br><span> now =3D 980;</span>=
<br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_false(check_sessi=
on_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));</span><b=
r><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_false(check_sessi=
on_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));</span><br=
><span> now =3D 1040;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%)=
;">- assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2E=
dest, hmac, 30, true));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%)=
;">+ assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2E=
dest, key, 30, true));</span><br><span> now =3D 1002;</span><br><span s=
tyle=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_=
pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));</span><br><span styl=
e=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_p=
kt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));</span><br><span> n=
ow =3D 1022;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- asser=
t_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30=
, true));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert=
_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, =
true));</span><br><span> now =3D 1010;</span><br><span style=3D"color: =
hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&sta=
te, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl=
(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_true(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&stat=
e, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));</span><br><span> </span><br><span> =
/* Changing the IP address should make this invalid */</span><br><span> =
from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Ein4=2Esin_addr=2Es_addr =3D ntohl(0x01020305);</spa=
n><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_false(check_ses=
sion_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));</span>=
<br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_false(check_ses=
sion_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));</span><=
br><span> </span><br><span> /* Change to the correct one again */</span=
><br><span> from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Ein4=2Esin_addr=2Es_addr =3D ntohl(0x01=
020304);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_tr=
ue(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, tr=
ue));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_tru=
e(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true=
));</span><br><span> </span><br><span> /* Modify the peer id, should no=
w fail hmac verification */</span><br><span> buf_inc_len(&buf, -4);=
</span><br><span>@@ -508,18 +509,17 @@</span><br><span> free_tls_pre_de=
crypt_state(&state);</span><br><span> verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_l=
ite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);</span><br><span> assert=
_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: =
hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&st=
ate, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hs=
l(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_false(check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&st=
ate, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true));</span><br><span> </span><br><span> =
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);</span><br><span> free_buf(&=
amp;buf);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx=
_cleanup(hmac);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hm=
ac_ctx_free(hmac);</span><br><span> }</span><br><span> </span><br><span> st=
atic void</span><br><span> test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut=
_state)</span><br><span> {</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%=
);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init();</span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 0=
};</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ rand_bytes(k=
ey, sizeof(key));</span><br><span> </span><br><span> struct link_socket=
_actual from =3D { 0 };</span><br><span> from=2Edest=2Eaddr=2Esa=2Esa_f=
amily =3D AF_INET;</span><br><span>@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@</span><br><span> =
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);</span><br><span> </span><=
br><span> /* should fail because it acks 2 */</span><br><span style=3D"=
color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_i=
d(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);</span><br><span style=3D"c=
olor: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_=
id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);</span><br><span> asser=
t_false(valid);</span><br><span> free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state)=
;</span><br><span> </span><br><span>@@ -552,31 +552,17 @@</span><br><span> =
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);</span><br><span> <=
/span><br><span> /* should fail because it has message id 2 */</span><b=
r><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- valid =3D check_session_hm=
ac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, hmac, 30, true);</span><br><spa=
n style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ valid =3D check_session_hmac_a=
nd_pkt_id(&state, &from=2Edest, key, 30, true);</span><br><span> =
assert_false(valid);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> free_tls_pre_=
decrypt_state(&state);</span><br><span> free_buf(&buf);</span><=
br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);</=
span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_free(hmac)=
;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-}</span><br><span st=
yle=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, =
100%, 40%);">-static hmac_ctx_t *</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 10=
0%, 40%);">-init_static_hmac(void)</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 1=
00%, 40%);">-{</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- ASS=
ERT(md_valid("SHA256"));</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 1=
00%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx =3D hmac_ctx_new();</span><br><span s=
tyle=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0,=
100%, 40%);">- uint8_t key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] =3D { 1, 2, 3, 0 };</s=
pan><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=
=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_init(hmac_ctx, key, "SHA2=
56");</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- return =
hmac_ctx;</span><br><span> }</span><br><span> </span><br><span> static void=
</span><br><span> test_calc_session_id_hmac_static(void **ut_state)</span><=
br><span> {</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_c=
tx_t *hmac =3D init_static_hmac();</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120,=
100%, 40%);">+ uint8_t key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE] =3D { 1, 2, 3, 0 };</span>=
<br><span> static const int handwindow =3D 100;</span><br><span> </span=
><br><span> struct openvpn_sockaddr addr =3D { 0 };</span><br><span>@@ =
-588,27 +574,27 @@</span><br><span> struct session_id client_id =3D { {=
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 } };</span><br><span> </span><br><span> now =3D=
1005;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- struct sess=
ion_id server_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, =
handwindow, 0);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
struct session_id server_id =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &a=
ddr, key, handwindow, 0);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> </span><br><sp=
an style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- struct session_id expected_serv=
er_id =3D { { 0x84, 0x73, 0x52, 0x2b, 0x5b, 0xa9, 0x2a, 0x70 } };</span><br=
><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ struct session_id expecte=
d_server_id =3D { { 0xec, 0xa3, 0xd5, 0xcc, 0xb4, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0xee } };</sp=
an><br><span> /* We have to deal with different structs here annoyingly=
*/</span><br><span> /* Linux has an unsigned short int as family_t and=
this is field is always</span><br><span> * stored in host endianness =
even though the rest of the struct isn't=2E=2E=2E,</span><br><span> =
* so Linux little endian differs from all BSD and Linux big endian */</sp=
an><br><span> if (sizeof(addr=2Eaddr=2Ein4=2Esin_family) =3D=3D sizeof(=
unsigned short int) && ntohs(AF_INET) !=3D AF_INET)</span><br><span=
> {</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- struct=
session_id linuxle =3D { { 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x3d, 0x20, 0x14, 0x53, 0xbe, 0x0a =
} };</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ struct =
session_id linuxle =3D { { 0x70, 0x04, 0x8c, 0x0f, 0xfe, 0x30, 0x85, 0x12 }=
};</span><br><span> expected_server_id =3D linuxle;</span><br><spa=
n> }</span><br><span> assert_memory_equal(expected_server_id=2Eid, =
server_id=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> struct se=
ssion_id server_id_m1 =3D</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%)=
;">- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindo=
w, -1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calc=
ulate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, -1);</span><br=
><span> struct session_id server_id_p1 =3D</span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &=
addr, hmac, handwindow, 1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, =
40%);">+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwi=
ndow, 1);</span><br><span> struct session_id server_id_p2 =3D</span><br=
><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calculate_session_id_hm=
ac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, 2);</span><br><span style=3D"col=
or: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &am=
p;addr, key, handwindow, 2);</span><br><span> </span><br><span> assert_=
memory_not_equal(expected_server_id=2Eid, server_id_m1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</sp=
an><br><span> assert_memory_not_equal(expected_server_id=2Eid, server_i=
d_p1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span>@@ -618,20 +604,17 @@</span><br><span=
> now =3D 1062;</span><br><span> </span><br><span> struct session_i=
d server_id2_m2 =3D</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- =
calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, -2)=
;</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calculate_=
session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, -2);</span><br><span=
> struct session_id server_id2_m1 =3D</span><br><span style=3D"color: h=
sl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr,=
hmac, handwindow, -1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);"=
>- struct session_id server_id2 =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id,=
&addr, hmac, handwindow, 0);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, =
100%, 40%);">+ calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, key, =
handwindow, -1);</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ =
struct session_id server_id2 =3D calculate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &=
;addr, key, handwindow, 0);</span><br><span> struct session_id server_i=
d2_p1 =3D</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- calc=
ulate_session_id_hmac(client_id, &addr, hmac, handwindow, 1);</span><br=
><span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ calculate_session_id_=
hmac(client_id, &addr, key, handwindow, 1);</span><br><span> </span><br=
><span> assert_memory_equal(server_id2_m2=2Eid, server_id_m1=2Eid, SID_=
SIZE);</span><br><span> assert_memory_equal(server_id2_m1=2Eid, expecte=
d_server_id=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span> assert_memory_equal(serve=
r_id2=2Eid, server_id_p1=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span> assert_memor=
y_equal(server_id2_p1=2Eid, server_id_p2=2Eid, SID_SIZE);</span><br><span s=
tyle=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">-</span><br><span style=3D"color: hsl(0,=
100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);</span><br><span style=3D"color: =
hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- hmac_ctx_free(hmac);</span><br><span> }</span><br>=
<span> </span><br><span> static void</span><br><span></span><br></pre><p>To=
view, visit <a href=3D"http://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet/c/openvpn/+/1827?usp=
=3Demail">change 1827</a>=2E To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filte=
rs, visit <a href=3D"http://gerrit=2Eopenvpn=2Enet/settings?usp=3Demail">se=
ttings</a>=2E</p><div itemscope itemtype=3D"http://schema=2Eorg/EmailMessag=
e"><div itemscope itemprop=3D"action" itemtype=3D"http://schema=2Eorg/ViewA=
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pn/+/1827?usp=3Demail"/><meta itemprop=3D"name" content=3D"View Change"/></=
div></div>
<div style=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset </=
div>
<div style=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-Project: openvpn </div>
<div style=
=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-Branch: master </div>
<div style=3D"display:none"=
> Gerrit-Change-Id: I3b6bb178ffb2bb49981bc23eabf04fe8e06d6fc3 </div>
<div s=
tyle=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-Change-Number: 1827 </div>
<div style=3D"disp=
lay:none"> Gerrit-PatchSet: 4 </div>
<div style=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-Ow=
ner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@rfc2549=2Eorg> </div>
<div style=3D"disp=
lay:none"> Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@lichtenheld=2Ecom> </=
div>
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<div style=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-=
Attention: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@rfc2549=2Eorg> </div>
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=3D"display:none"> Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <frank@lichtenheld=2Ec=
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