Re: Transfer from one server to another, compress and digest

Hi,

On 03/01/2024 23:28, Gert Doering wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Wed, Jan 03, 2024 at 10:45:50PM +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
>> On 03/01/2024 20:03, Gert Doering wrote:
>>> Not sure I can come up with a good attack scenario
>>> in an OpenVPN PKI scenario where the CA would be stopped from doing
>>> something nasty by doing the full .csr dance (because it could still just
>>> create arbitrary .key/.crt on its own, thus getting access to the VPN
>>> server).
>>
>> I think the .csr dance would prevent the CA from impersonating well known
>> users with a well known certificate.
> 
> Only if you verify that "well known certifificate" with something like
> peer-fingerprint - taking into account bits of the pubkey/privkey that
> are not part of the actual "CA signing" thing (because everything else,
> like "CN=important user", the CA can sign as it wants...)

Agreed!
I left the implementation of "well known" to the reader :-)
The certificate is not just its CN.

Cheers,

> 
> gert

-- 
Antonio Quartulli