Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()

[PATCH] smb: client: add bounds checks when iterating SMB1 WSL EAs

Add boundary and overflow checks when traversing extended attribute (EA)
entries for SMB1 WSL reparse points in cifs_query_path_info(), to prevent
out-of-bounds memory accesses from malformed next_entry_offset values.

This is necessary because SMB1 WSL EA iteration does not currently have
any explicit bounds checking, unlike SMB2 path which has check_wsl_eas().
The new checks ensure the current EA pointer plus its size does not
exceed the end of the EA buffer during iteration and before parsing.

Signed-off-by: YuanfuXie <[email protected]>
---
 fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
index 9694117050a6..940bae49b2cc 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
@@ -645,13 +645,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,
 	if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {
 		struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;
 		u32 next = 0;
+		u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len;
 
 		ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;
 		do {
 			ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next);
+			if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) > eas_end)
+				break;
 			next = le32_to_cpu(ea->next_entry_offset);
 		} while (next);
-		if (le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
+		if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) <= eas_end &&
+		    le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
 			ea->next_entry_offset = cpu_to_le32(ALIGN(sizeof(*ea) +
 						ea->ea_name_length + 1 +
 						le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length), 4));
@@ -691,13 +695,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,
 	if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {
 		struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;
 		u32 next = 0;
+		u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len;
 
 		ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;
 		do {
 			ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next);
+			if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) > eas_end)
+				break;
 			next = le32_to_cpu(ea->next_entry_offset);
 		} while (next);
-		if (le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
+		if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) <= eas_end &&
+		    le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
 			ea->next_entry_offset = cpu_to_le32(ALIGN(sizeof(*ea) +
 						ea->ea_name_length + 1 +
 						le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length), 4));
-- 
2.43.0

> On Apr 6, 2026, at 21:49, Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
> name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
> smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
> later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
> ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
> + vlen.  Isn't pointer math fun?
> 
> The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
> 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
> bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
> the end of iov.
> 
> Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
> check.
> 
> An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
> into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
> interpreted as.
> 
> Cc: Steve French <[email protected]>
> Cc: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
> Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>
> Cc: Tom Talpey <[email protected]>
> Cc: Bharath SM <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Cc: stable <[email protected]>
> Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> index 364bdcff9c9d..fe1c9d776580 100644
> --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov)
> 		nlen = ea->ea_name_length;
> 		vlen = le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length);
> 		if (nlen != SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN ||
> -		    (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
> +		    (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
> 			return -EINVAL;
> 
> 		switch (vlen) {
> -- 
> 2.53.0
> 
> 
> 
>