[PATCH 6.6 081/166] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 3d8b9d06bd3ac4c6846f5498800b0f5f8062e53b upstream.

The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen.  Isn't pointer math fun?

The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.

Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.

An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.

Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Talpey <[email protected]>
Cc: Bharath SM <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
 fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rs
 		nlen = ea->ea_name_length;
 		vlen = le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length);
 		if (nlen != SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN ||
-		    (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
+		    (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		switch (vlen) {