Re: security concern: key management flaw with silc-client
"mal content" <artifact.one-gM/[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.network.silc.devel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 17/05/07, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg-silc-QLrU/[email protected]> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Hi SILC folks-- > > I'm using silc-client 1.0.4.1 at the moment, monolithic build (not > irssi-plugin). I'm concerned that there is a serious security flaw in > the model used for silc-client's management of clientkeys. I'm hoping > that someone can explain to me what i'm doing/thinking wrong, and how > silc-client (or some other SILC client?) can help a reasonable user to > avoid this scenario. Hello. I think the problem here is one of perspective, specifically the view of SILC that the current silc-client imposes. As you (probably) know, nicknames are not the unique identifiers that they are in IRC. The only unique identifier in SILC is a key. The client imposes the perspective that nicknames are unique identifiers (I assume in order to provide an environment comfortably familiar to IRC) where in fact a 'pure' SILC client should probably provide a means to associate a name with a public key in the client. This way, when you've verified Alice for the first time, you can associate the name 'Alice' with the given key and at a later effectively ask 'Is this Alice?', regardless of whatever the user has given as a nickname: /get_key_and_name Alice nickname_that_alice_is_using /verify_key Alice nickname_that_alice_is_using The get_key_and_name function does what /getkey currently does and associates the name 'Alice' with it. The verify_key function checks to see if the key you associated with the name 'Alice' matches the key the other user is offering. Think of it as a cryptographically verified "buddy list". Of course there may be weaknesses in this idea as well, as I said I'm just thinking aloud. MC _______________________________________________________________________ Info: https://lists.silcnet.org/mailman/listinfo/silc-announce Archive: https://lists.silcnet.org/pipermail/silc-announce FAQ: http://silcnet.org/support/faq/