grunt rebels hold back trillion dollar army

Jon <[email protected]> Wed, 18 Aug 2004 16:57:06 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.org.ballistichelmet.heads
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Posted on Wed, Aug. 18, 2004
Despite superior firepower, U.S. loses ground to al-Sadr's militia
BY TOM LASSETER
Knight Ridder Newspapers
http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/world/9434817.htm?1c

BAGHDAD, Iraq - (KRT) - When U.S. forces pushed through southern Iraq in 
the war last year, Najaf was just another spot on the map to Baghdad. 
But during the past two weeks of fighting in Najaf, the dusty city 
proved to be a glaring example of the limits of American military might 
in post-sovereignty Iraq.

Few people doubt that U.S. military forces have the ability to overwhelm 
Iraqi rebels. But as was the case in Fallujah earlier this year, the 
need to balance force with politics has stripped away many of their 
advantages.

As a result, firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has grown in stature as a 
rebel icon.

The two military forces are starkly different.

Fighters loyal to al-Sadr, called the Mahdi Army, run the streets of 
Najaf in a chaotic circus of men in flip-flops and sandals who pump 
their old AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers in the air, call 
for death to America and generally shoot at anything moving.

U.S. forces are better equipped, in uniforms, boots and body armor, and 
they ride in armored vehicles topped with machine guns and cannons.

But while the Mahdi Army can move and shoot pretty much at will, U.S. 
commanders are forced into deliberate, careful maneuvers, waiting for 
political discussions in Washington and Baghdad to bear fruit.

U.S. forces no longer have the advantage of overwhelming air power. 
After cordoning off the city center's Imam Ali Shrine and surrounding 
areas, the Marines had to dismount and pick their way through a nearby 
cemetery, fighting close-quarter battles among the mausoleums and 
headstones with Mahdi gunmen who invited death as a passage to paradise.

The reasons were these:

_There was the public relations concern of killing too many civilians in 
the tightly packed Najaf neighborhoods. Many of the homes are old 
buildings that would collapse if hit by a tank round.

_When al-Sadr hunkered down in the shrine, it became impossible to 
launch airstrikes against him without seriously damaging one of the 
holiest sites in Shiite Islam and risking a wider uprising.

_There were also profound political implications for Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi, a supporter of the U.S. presence in Iraq whose political base 
could fracture if things went badly in Najaf.

According to figures supplied by the military, the toll from the 
violence has been lopsided. In one short period, fewer than 10 Marines 
were killed, while U.S. officials placed the number of Mahdi dead at 
more than 300.

But al-Sadr was able to bring in thousands of supporters, primarily from 
the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, who vowed to be human shields. With 3 
million people in Sadr City, if only 5 percent of the population were to 
support him, he'd have 150,000 people behind him, more than the number 
of U.S. troops in Iraq.

With every photograph and television shot of a Mahdi fighter daring to 
fight the U.S. military, al-Sadr's support seemed to grow amongst Iraq's 
majority Shiite population, once counted on to be the backbone of 
post-war U.S. policy in Iraq.

Throughout it all, U.S. forces have been hamstrung.

Instead of being able to unload the massive air superiority at their 
fingertips - continuous Apache helicopter strikes and F-15 fighter jet 
bombing runs that could have wiped out the militia in a day - they had 
to pick and choose, start and stop.

In the pauses between, al-Sadr played a game of military inches. Despite 
the overwhelming U.S. firepower on the ground in Najaf, he looks to have 
gained ground.
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