Will the Syrian regime take on the world?

Will the Syrian regime take on the world?

By Ammar Abdulhamid
Special to The Daily Star
Friday, September 03, 2004
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=7991

To an outside observer, the Syrian regime must seem bent on pursuing a 
path of confrontation with the rest of the world. At the beginning of 
the American invasion of Iraq, and thanks to the bellicose posture the 
Syrian regime adopted during the early stages of the conflict, a similar 
showdown with the US was averted only at the last minute. This occurred 
because cooler heads in the Bush administration prevailed in their 
argument that a quarrel with Syria would, at that stage, distract 
Washington from its main task in Iraq.

Now, and as a result of its continued and shameless dabbling in Lebanese 
affairs, the Syrian regime has not only angered the US once again, it 
has also alienated a long-time, and useful, European friend, namely 
President Jacques Chirac of France. Chirac recently called publicly and 
explicitly for the Syrian regime to avoid interfering in the Lebanese 
presidential election. When Syria ignored this and went ahead and 
imposed an extension of President Emile Lahoud's term, this provoked 
consternation and resentment in Paris.

The policies adopted by the Syrian regime in the last few months raise 
an important existential question about the decision-making process in 
Syria, and more specifically the way the process is managed and who are 
the people involved in it. In judging Syria's decision-making process to 
be flawed (and we cannot be of two minds about that; the process is 
definitely flawed), one invariably sees a need for change both in the 
management style by which policies are formulated, and in the personnel 
formulating these policies.

This brings to mind a dilemma Syria has been facing during the last four 
years, since President Bashar Assad took power, namely that of a clash 
between the "old guard" and a "new guard" in Damascus, and the fact that 
the entrenched interests of the ruling elite have simultaneously been a 
main obstacle to reform and the main catalyst for an impending catastrophe.

Bluntly put, the old guard's deficient worldview and its desire to 
protect its ingrained interests are combining to create foreign and 
domestic policies that are, on the one hand, wreaking havoc on Syria's 
economy, and, on the other, bringing it closer to an eventual 
confrontation with the international community. That the US and the 
French are now on the same side of the situation in Lebanon, when this 
was not always the case, should be a reminder to the Syrian regime that 
European support cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, Europe's 
independence on Syria in the past was often more a sign of displeasure 
with Washington's leadership style than an endorsement of Syrian 
policies or of the Syrian regime itself.

As things stand now, very few in the world are willing to endorse the 
behavior of the Syrian regime. In fact, the leadership has become 
Syria's greatest liability. The more mistakes the regime makes in 
conducting Syria's internal and external affairs, the more it will 
delegitimize itself in the eyes of both the Syrian people and regional 
and international policymakers and observers.

The reformist elements within the Syrian regime, Assad included, should 
realize that the challenge ahead is not about regime survival, but about 
the survival and viability of Syria as a state (and ours is not the only 
Middle Eastern country facing such a challenge). The leadership's future 
policies should be guided by this realization, and an understanding that 
Syria is quickly running out of time.

The decision to support an amendment of the Lebanese Constitution to 
extend Lahoud's mandate for an additional three years was exactly the 
kind of impromptu decision that Damascus should avoid making in the 
future. Although the decision's sudden nature seemed to indicate, in 
part, an attempt to settle an internal dispute within the Syrian regime 
itself, the best way for ending such disputes down the road must be, 
instead, through the adoption of a bold initiative to enhance political 
reform and openness.

Once such an initiative is announced, it will likely lead to internal 
commotion in Syria among those who expect to suffer from a reform 
process. But such a step will also be supported by many elements within 
Syrian society, and outside. This includes opposition groups inside the 
country or in exile, as well as Syrian civil society and human or civil 
rights activists, the expatriate community, and decision-makers in both 
the US and the EU.

The considerable international support that Assad received at the 
beginning of his mandate in 2000, and which he continues to enjoy today 
in some circles, was premised on an expectation of reform. Now more than 
ever it will be the president's ability to deliver on these 
expectations, while avoiding miscalculations of the kind we have seen in 
Lebanon, that will determine the fate and future of Syria. But, do the 
reformers in the Syrian regime have what it takes?

Ammar Abdulhamid is a visiting fellow at the Saban Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington.and 
coordinator of the Tharwa Project. He wrote this commentary for THE 
DAILY STAR
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