An expert on U.S.–Israeli relations reveal s details from his recent visit with the FBI.

[ Does anyone think I would be able to get a job with the FBI ?  I=20
wonder if background checks into bh would prohibit that.  Rooting out=20
this shit seems like it would be a fulfilling job.  ]

Mole Hunt
An expert on U.S.=96Israeli relations reveals details from his recent=20
visit with the FBI.

By Jason Vest and Laura Rozen
Web Exclusive: 09.03.04
http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-view.ww?id=3D8467

In May, Stephen Green was hard at work campaigning for a seat in=20
Vermont's House of Representatives when he got a phone call. The last=20
person the 64-year-old former United Nations official, then preoccupied=20
with health-care policy issues, expected to hear from was an FBI agent,=20
who asked if he could come to Washington to chat with him about the=20
history of Israeli espionage efforts against the United States.

As the author of two books on U.S.-Israeli relations, Green knew=20
something about the subject. Still, the phone call seemed to come out of=20
the blue. Green quickly discovered, however, that the FBI had a keen=20
interest in the subject. Federal agents were involved in an=20
investigation into an alleged Israeli "mole" in the office of Douglas=20
Feith, the under secretary of defense for policy.

Early reports suggested that the FBI had wiretap evidence that a veteran=20
Iran analyst working in Feith's office at the Defense Intelligence=20
Agency, Larry Franklin, may have passed a classified draft of a National=20
Security Presidential Directive on Iran to an official working for the=20
pro-Israel lobbying organization, the American Israel Public Affairs=20
Committee (AIPAC). Members of the organization, in turn, were said to=20
have passed the document on to Israel. (AIPAC officials strongly deny=20
the accusations.)

But as Green spoke with investigators, he realized the agents were=20
investigating far more than Franklin.

"Larry Franklin's name never came up, but several others did," he said.

Green, as the FBI agents knew, had a special expertise in the field of=20
Israeli espionage in the United States. In the 1980s, he had taken time=20
off from his job at the UN to look into the U.S.=96Israeli "special=20
relationship." He spent years combing through public records, filing and=20
litigating Freedom of Information Act requests, and tracking down=20
current and retired government officials. He eventually wrote two books,=20
Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations With Israel and Living By The=20
Sword: America and Israel in the Middle East. The Times of London and=20
Foreign Affairs commended his work, describing it as "praised by those=20
who believe the United States has damaged its own security, and Israel's=20
too, by uncritical and often secret support of Israel's actions, no=20
matter how extreme." Yet, as Foreign Affairs reported, Green's work also=20
caused "sputter[ing] with indignation" among "those who believe=85 that=20
American and Israeli interests are identical."

Green returned to the UN in 1990 and followed the subject from there.=20
Earlier this year, he published a piece in the newsletter CounterPunch,=20
recapping previously reported -- though long-forgotten -- government=20
investigations of prominent neoconservatives for their suspected=20
espionage or improper information-sharing with Israel. And that's where=20
the FBI comes in.

According to the FBI agents who contacted Green, as he recounts, the=20
article had come to their attention when one of Green=92s sources -- a=20
retired national security official they were interviewing -- shared it=20
with them.

And so on June 22, Green found himself sitting across an oval-shaped=20
conference table from two FBI agents at an undisclosed northern Virginia=20
venue. The meeting lasted nearly four hours.

"They were extraordinarily well-informed; it was apparent they've been=20
at this for awhile," Green says. "I asked them if there was a current=20
reason for them asking questions about things that go back over 30=20
years, and they sort of looked at each other and said, 'Yes, it's a=20
present issue,' but wouldn't say specifically what. Though they did ask=20
very specific questions about one individual in particular."

Green said the agents asked about several current or former Pentagon=20
officials such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Michael=20
Ledeen, and Stephen Bryen.

"The tenor of their questions was such that it defined where these=20
people were in terms of the nature of their focus," Green says. "They=20
also asked about a couple other Office of Special Plans people,=20
including Harold Rhode. Ironically, about the only name that didn't come=20
up was Larry Franklin."

Regardless of the status of the investigation, something seemed a bit=20
fishy. After all, Israel -- one of the United States=92 closest allies,=20
with deep support in the Bush Administration and especially at the=20
Defense Department -- hardly needs a Pentagon-embedded spy to get access=20
to interagency debates about U.S. policy to Iran, as observers have=20
pointed out. And compared with the information on arms shipments that=20
former US Navy analyst Jonathan Pollard passed on to Israel in the=20
1980s, a draft of a document about U.S. policy toward Iran would hardly=20
seem like the crown jewels.

Yet, as Newsweek has reported, Franklin had come to the FBI=92s attention=
=20
a year and a half ago, when he walked in on a lunch with an Israeli=20
diplomat and an AIPAC lobbyist, both of whom were under FBI surveillance=20
for a year. In addition, Newsweek reported that when news of the=20
investigation surfaced, Franklin had already been cooperating with the=20
FBI for several weeks and had reportedly led FBI agents to those who may=20
have received information from him.

The previous FBI investigation came into focus only on September 1, when=20
The Washington Post reported that for two years, the FBI has conducted a=20
counterintelligence investigation into whether AIPAC has forwarded=20
=93highly classified materials from the National Security Agency . . . to=
=20
Israel.=94 The Post piece describes Franklin=92s alleged role as merely=20
=93coincidental=94 to the larger FBI probe of alleged intelligence-passin=
g=20
through AIPAC to Israel.

Both AIPAC and Tel Aviv vehemently deny any wrongdoing. And indeed, the=20
Israeli diplomat who acknowledges meeting with Franklin and AIPAC --=20
Naor Gilon, the Israeli embassy=92s No. 3 official and a specialist on=20
Iran=92s nuclear program -- returned to Washington on August 29 from a=20
summer vacation in Israel. He admits that he met with Franklin, but=20
insists he=92s done nothing wrong.

A source familiar with the investigation told The American Prospect that=20
when news of the investigation broke, the Justice Department had been=20
preparing a request to the State Department to have an Israeli diplomat=20
-- by implication Gilon -- declared persona non grata for allegedly=20
having received classified U.S. intelligence from AIPAC sources.

Furthermore, a September 1 report by NBC speculated that the reason the=20
Israelis may have broken their declared post-Pollard policy of not=20
spying on the United States is because of Israel=92s preeminent concern=20
about Iran=92s nuclear program, and its view that the United States may=20
not be prepared to act assertively enough to prevent Iran from acquiring=20
nuclear weapons.

The Post piece seems to imply that Franklin is more of an anti-Tehran=20
zealot than anything else and wasn=92t engaging in espionage per se. But=20
as the Post article and the June meeting between Green and the FBI seem=20
to indicate, the FBI is looking into the possibility there's been=20
communication between Israeli elements and U.S. officials, including=20
several who work for Feith and have access to sensitive intelligence on=20
Iran and its nuclear program.

Jason Vest is Prospect senior correspondent. Laura Rozen reports on=20
national security issues from Washington, D.C. and for her weblog, War=20
and Piece.
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