Re: [BGP Hijack] AS202734 hijacked multiple Chinese Carriers on May 16-17 – Full evidence and attribution

Zhong-

As has been pointed out already, when a suspected hijack/leak only appears
on a single route collector, with no evidence that any other ASNs/upstreams
received/accepted those announcements, common sense should tell you that
perhaps no leak or hijack occurred.

It is quite common for individual route collectors to see something that
appears like a hijack or leak, but the context matters.

Hopefully this is a valuable lesson for you going forward.

On Thu, May 21, 2026 at 11:31 AM me via NANOG <[email protected]> wrote:

> Dear NANOG community,
>
> I am sharing a fully-attributed BGP hijacking incident that occurred on
> May 16-17, 2026.
>
> **What happened:**
>
> Between May 16-17, 2026, AS202734 announced 3,948 IPv4 prefixes that it
> does not legally own, targeting major Chinese carriers and infrastructure,
> including:
> - China Telecom (125.104.0.0/13)
> - China Unicom (123.144.0.0/12)
> - China Mobile
> - China Education and Research Network (CERNET)
> - China Postal Bureau (120.72.160.0/24)
> - Alibaba Cloud, Tencent Cloud, Huawei Cloud
>
> The same ASN also announced China Telecom's IPv6 backbone (240e::/20).
>
> **Key technical evidence:**
> - Attacker's own BIRD config shows manual injection of hijacked routes on
> May 1 (premeditation).
> - Attacker's own Looking Glass shows the hijacked routes were active in
> his routing table.
> - Attacker's GitHub shows he submitted a new ASN (AS402333) on May 16, the
> day of the hijack.
> - Sponsoring org (MoeDove)'s official website shows they operate 36 global
> PoPs, including nodes in mainland China (Shanghai, Hangzhou, Zhengzhou,
> Chengdu).
>
> **Who is behind it:**
> AS202734 is registered to Junqi Tian (Jacob Tian), a graduate student at
> McGill University and researcher at Mila - Quebec AI Institute. His RIPE
> WHOIS address is: 1103-2100 Rue de Bleury, Montreal, Canada.
>
> **The sponsoring org:**
> MoeDove LLC (ORG-ML942-RIPE) is the sponsoring organization. Their network
> engineer responded to my abuse report by calling me an "idiot" and refused
> to investigate.
>
> **What I have done:**
> - Reported to RIPE NCC, Vultr, HE, Cloudflare, Mila, and his academic
> supervisor.
> - Vultr has cut IPv4 peering and is "working with the customer" on IPv6.
> - RIPE NCC opened tickets #1042641 and #1043090, but stated they "do not
> have the scope to act."
>
> **Attached原始邮件 (.eml) 供验证：**
> - `moedove_abuse_reply_idiot.eml` (MoeDove engineer's response)
> - `ripe_carl_guderian_1042641.eml` (RIPE NCC first reply)
> - `ripe_carl_guderian_1043090.eml` (RIPE NCC second reply)
>
> **Questions for the community:**
> 1. Has anyone else observed unusual prefixes from AS202734 / AS402333 /
> AS44324?
> 2. What operational steps can the community take to filter bogons from
> these ASNs?
> 3. Are there best practices for dealing with a sponsoring LIR that refuses
> to act?
>
> **Public evidence:**
> - HE BGP Toolkit: https://bgp.he.net/AS202734
> - RIPE WHOIS: https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/query?searchtext=AS202734
>
> Thank you for reading. I welcome any technical scrutiny or advice. Full
> evidence archive (with PII redacted) is available upon request.
>
> ---
> zhong miao
> [email protected]
> Independent Security
> Researcher_______________________________________________
> NANOG mailing list
>
> https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/MI6VWOX7XOCDIS244RLJSMS2ITZWTGED/
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