Fwd: Fwd: [IP] N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat

http://www.iana.org/reports/2009/in-report-27nov2009.html

Its dated 27-Nov-2009, (and)

NIXI did not confirm during my proceedings about .IN reg, (and)

NIXI;'s audited accounts are still very unclear about INNIC (the .IN
registry), (and)

On August 2013 the NIXI published draft comments for setting up the
INNIC to handle the
.IN registry.

Sarbajit

On 3/23/14, Suresh Ramasubramanian <[email protected]> wrote:
> not sure what you mean by "inregistry is operating illegally without icann's
> approval". Where do you get the data for that claim?
>
> --srs (iPad)
>
>> On 23-Mar-2014, at 8:55, sarbajit roy <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> Obviously the Yanks don't want the Chinese to do on a "home" scale what
>> they were doing on a large industrial scale using compromised CISCO
>> routers.
>>
>> I, ie. India Against Corruption, am in the middle of a major legal dispute
>> with NIXI and the .IN registry where the .IN Registry (which is yet to be
>> set up and is functioning illegally and without ICANN;s approval) operated
>> a "ghost" registry so that that the Yanks could secretly install
>> compromised CISCO routers on a GoI secure internal terrestrial network
>> linking India's premier research organisations - mainly the nuclear
>> research installation, and that they did this starting from 8 months
>> before Pokhran-2 . The research institution where this long running ELINT
>> penetration occurred still continues to be on that network and is
>> presently headed by a US citizen specially appointed by the PMO after
>> taking special Cabinet clearance. (SRS: this is corroborated by a NIXI
>> order, "RTI" and disclosures of IANA's website) and a hasty and secret
>> modification to that public Institution's memorandum of association.
>>
>> Sarbajit
>>
>>
>>> On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 7:17 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> So any huawei gear installed on customer premises is potentially
>>> backdoored?
>>>
>>> --srs (iPad)
>>>
>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>
>>>> From: Dave Farber <dave-skGKvZKd2/[email protected]>
>>>> Date: 23 March 2014 0:16:06 IST
>>>> To: "ip" <[email protected]>
>>>> Subject: [IP] N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat
>>>> Reply-To: dave-skGKvZKd2/[email protected]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>> From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne-Pi7Cr0HDNED2eFz/[email protected]>
>>>> Date: Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 2:09 PM
>>>> Subject: [Dewayne-Net] N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security
>>>> Threat
>>>> To: Multiple recipients of Dewayne-Net <dewayne-net-Pi7Cr0HDNED2eFz/[email protected]>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat
>>>> By DAVID E. SANGER and NICOLE PERLROTH
>>>> Mar 22 2014
>>>> <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html>
>>>>
>>>> WASHINGTON -- American officials have long considered Huawei, the Chinese
>>>> telecommunications giant, a security threat, blocking it from business
>>>> deals in the United States for fear that the company would create "back
>>>> doors" in its equipment that could allow the Chinese military or
>>>> Beijing-backed hackers to steal corporate and government secrets.
>>>>
>>>> But even as the United States made a public case about the dangers of
>>>> buying from Huawei, classified documents show that the National Security
>>>> Agencywas creating its own back doors -- directly into Huawei's
>>>> networks.
>>>>
>>>> The agency pried its way into the servers in Huawei's sealed
>>>> headquarters in Shenzhen, China's industrial heart, according to N.S.A.
>>>> documents provided by the former contractor Edward J. Snowden. It
>>>> obtained information about the workings of the giant routers and complex
>>>> digital switches that Huawei boasts connect a third of the world's
>>>> population, and monitored communications of the company's top
>>>> executives.
>>>>
>>>> One of the goals of the operation, code-named "Shotgiant," was to find
>>>> any links between Huawai and the People's Liberation Army, one 2010
>>>> document made clear. But the plans went further: to exploit Huawai's
>>>> technology so that when the company sold equipment to other countries --
>>>> including both allies and nations that avoid buying American products --
>>>> the N.S.A. could roam through their computer and telephone networks to
>>>> conduct surveillance and, if ordered by the president, offensive
>>>> cyberoperations.
>>>>
>>>> "Many of our targets communicate over Huawei-produced products," the
>>>> N.S.A. document said. "We want to make sure that we know how to exploit
>>>> these products," it added, to "gain access to networks of interest"
>>>> around the world.
>>>>
>>>> The documents were disclosed by The New York Times and Der Spiegel, and
>>>> are also part of a book by Der Spiegel, "The N.S.A. Complex." The
>>>> documents, as well as interviews with intelligence officials, offer new
>>>> insights into the United States' escalating digital cold war with
>>>> Beijing. While President Obama and China's president, Xi Jinping, have
>>>> begun talks about limiting the cyber conflict, it appears to be
>>>> intensifying.
>>>>
>>>> The N.S.A., for example, is tracking more than 20 Chinese hacking groups
>>>> -- more than half of them Chinese Army and Navy units -- as they break
>>>> into the networks of the United States government, companies including
>>>> Google, and drone and nuclear-weapon part makers, according to a
>>>> half-dozen current and former American officials.
>>>>
>>>> If anything, they said, the pace has increased since the revelation last
>>>> year that some of the most aggressive Chinese hacking originated at a
>>>> People's Liberation Army facility, Unit 61398, in Shanghai.
>>>>
>>>> The Obama administration distinguishes between the hacking and corporate
>>>> theft that the Chinese conduct against American companies to buttress
>>>> their own state-run businesses, and the intelligence operations that the
>>>> United States conducts against Chinese and other targets.
>>>>
>>>> American officials have repeatedly said that the N.S.A. breaks into
>>>> foreign networks only for legitimate national security purposes.
>>>>
>>>> A White House spokeswoman, Caitlin M. Hayden, said: "We do not give
>>>> intelligence we collect to U.S. companies to enhance their international
>>>> competitiveness or increase their bottom line. Many countries cannot say
>>>> the same."
>>>>
>>>> But that does not mean the American government does not conduct its own
>>>> form of corporate espionage with a different set of goals. Those
>>>> concerning Huawei were described in the 2010 document.
>>>>
>>>> "If we can determine the company's plans and intentions," an analyst
>>>> wrote, "we hope that this will lead us back to the plans and intentions
>>>> of the PRC," referring to the People's Republic of China. The N.S.A. saw
>>>> an additional opportunity: As Huawei invested in new technology and laid
>>>> undersea cables to connect its $40 billion-a-year networking empire, the
>>>> agency was interested in tunneling into key Chinese customers, including
>>>> "high priority targets -- Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, Cuba."
>>>>
>>>> [snip]
>>>>
>>>> Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://dewaynenet.wordpress.com/feed/>
>>>>
>>>
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