Re: TrueCrypt mount without TrueCrypt ?

On 100320 at 23:00, Daniel Pittman wrote:
> Steffen Schulz <[email protected]> writes:
> > Why do you assume its about the PC?
> 
> Which, I think, implies that this is about not just "the PC", but "an
> arbitrary PC, outside my normal administrative control" — since the later
> could presumably be prepared with the drive encryption software through other
> channels, and without the requirement for self-extracting.

True. However, a random PC of a friend or the company PC are valid
targets for this kind of usage. The idea might simply be to have some
level of privacy. Targeted attacks are something different.

> On the other hand, perhaps there is some utility in the approach the OP is
> taking which hasn't occurred to me: while I /think/ my logic is sound, and my
> conclusion correct, someone could point out something that changes the
> position.

Unlikely :-)

Even if TrueCrypt itself is not compromised in the way you described a
possible attack, merely accessing the data on a compromised platform
will expose it.

Theoretically you could use Trusted Computing infrastructure to prevent
a compromised machine from spoofing a secure user interface and
prompting you to access your encrypted data. But we'll probably never
get this far..


/steffen
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