Re: Considering the pressure to turn HTTPS into a three-party protocol
Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.org.w3c.tag |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CACvaWvahQNBJU2LhZXocEh1qLh7RjrKPqmsXLc_W2yzrsRqB_Q@mail.gmail.com> |
On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Mark Nottingham <[email protected]> wrote: > CA certs and extensions are built into all of the major browsers. This is demonstrably not true. Chrome (on most platforms), Opera (post-Blink) IE, Safari, and Firefox (as packaged by every major Linux distro, but not as distributed by Mozilla) all treat CA certificates as part of the OS/operating environment, much in the same way that name resolution is. Of those that distribute certs in-band, this is only Firefox (as distributed by Mozilla) and Opera (prior to Blink). I realize I'm ignoring a large swathe of UAs in that mix, but I think if we're going to use terms like "all major browsers", then it's worth noting how incorrect this statement is. > Because this is a question of how the Web is presented to and understood by end users, Having the W3C issue findings on how the Web presents security indica has historically gone over like a lead balloon (c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/wsc-ui/ )