Re: BPF64: proposal of platform-independent hardware-friendly backwards-compatible eBPF alternative
Philip Paeps <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.network,gmane.network.tcpdump.devel,gmane.os.freebsd.architechture,gmane.os.freebsd.devel.hackers,gmane.os.freebsd.devel.net |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 2024-09-11 06:12:28 (+0800), Vadim Goncharov wrote: > David Chisnall <[email protected]> wrote: >> BPF can be loaded only by root, who can also load kernel modules and >> map /dev/[k]mem, and FreeBSD does not protect the root <-> kernel >> boundary. > > Wrong. It is possible for decades to do `chmod a+r /dev/bpf*` and run > tcpdump as non-root, which will load BPF code into kernel. Is *that* > also a vulnerability, and if so, why it was never reported? This is equivalent to chmod a+w /dev/mem. Unwise configuration decisions are not vulnerabilities. Philip