Re: Stronger ssh settings
Christian Weisgerber <[email protected]> Sun, 5 Apr 2026 16:09:43 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.architechture |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Alexander Leidinger: > I propose to extend our ssh config (and maybe other configs) regarding > - settings for government standards > - improved FreeBSD defaults Upstream OpenSSH has a history of walking a good compromise line between phasing out aging algorithms and maintaining compatibility with most of the installed base. I don't think FreeBSD can improve on those defaults. Government standards may require disabling some of the algorithms OpenSSH prefers. That is more likely a disimprovement. Anyway, if people would like example configurations compliant with FIPS or such, I don't object. > (I simply included what I use on my systems, and they > should work for connections from and to all supported FreeBSD releases as I > have them like that since a long time; an alternative would be to use the > exclude syntax instead). Algorithm lists have the habit of going stale. They would have to be carefully reviewed each time OpenSSH is updated. Unless a definitive list is required, using the +/- syntax to prefer/disable algorithms is frequently a better choice. > +### FreeBSD ### > +HostKeyAlgorithms rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-ed25519 Why do you drop ECDSA and all CA algorithms? > +KexAlgorithms [email protected],curve25519-sha256,[email protected],diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 Why do you drop the standard name "sntrup761x25519-sha512"? More importantly, who do you drop mlkem768x25519-sha256, which is the upstream default? Let me guess, this list is a few years old and has gone stale. I think "improved FreeBSD defaults" are a bad idea. -- Christian "naddy" Weisgerber [email protected]