svn commit: r45011 - in head/share: security/advisories security/patches/SA-14:14 xml
Xin LI <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Author: delphij
Date: Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014
New Revision: 45011
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/45011
Log:
Add SA-14:14.openssl.
Added:
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
Modified:
head/share/xml/advisories.xml
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl.asc Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssl
+Announced: 2014-06-05
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
+ 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p5)
+ 2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1)
+ 2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1-p2)
+ 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p8)
+ 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p15)
+ 2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
+ 2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p12)
+CVE Name: CVE-2014-0195, CVE-2014-0221, CVE-2014-0224, CVE-2014-3470
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
+a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
+Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
+and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
+general purpose cryptography library.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+Receipt of an invalid DTLS fragment on an OpenSSL DTLS client or server can
+lead to a buffer overrun. [CVE-2014-0195]
+
+Receipt of an invalid DTLS handshake on an OpenSSL DTLS client can lead the
+code to unnecessary recurse. [CVE-2014-0221]
+
+Carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in
+OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. [CVE-2014-0224]
+
+Carefully crafted packets can lead to a NULL pointer deference in OpenSSL
+TLS client code if anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are enabled. [CVE-2014-3470]
+
+III. Impact
+
+A remote attacker may be able to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client
+or server by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or
+server. [CVE-2014-0195]
+
+A remote attacker who can send an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS
+client can crash the remote OpenSSL DTLS client. [CVE-2014-0221]
+
+A remote attacker who can send a carefully crafted handshake can force the
+use of weak keying material between a vulnerable client and a vulnerable
+server and decrypt and/or modify traffic from the attacked client and
+server in a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. [CVE-2014-0224]
+
+A remote attacker who can send carefully crafted packets can cause OpenSSL
+TLS client to crash. [CVE-2014-3470]
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 10.0]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 9.x and 8.x]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-9.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/8/ r267103
+releng/8.4/ r267104
+stable/9/ r267106
+releng/9.1/ r267104
+releng/9.2/ r267104
+stable/10/ r267103
+releng/10.0/ r267104
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0195>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0221>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0224>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3470>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD)
+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+=o4+e
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
+@@ -627,8 +627,17 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
++ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ {
++ item = NULL;
++ frag = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
+
++
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ */
+@@ -784,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
++ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+@@ -842,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+- max, ok);
++ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy)
+@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+@@ -2510,6 +2512,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy)
+@@ -1301,6 +1301,15 @@ start:
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
++ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++
++ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1435,7 +1444,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+- if (s->session == NULL)
++ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy)
+@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
++ {
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
++ }
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #endif
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (working copy)
+@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+ #define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
+
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD)
+
+iQIcBAABCgAGBQJTkGnSAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnnkEQAOu1iaWZHInskbHmwN5bEpSA
+66PfKJRO+dT0lfAPzX8NOlgCo/Vy8NR7OMSf5KHhAMz8qBV67FAbj9V8FNra3jp/
+u6S9q7ln5HnUhBvia4aLI31vKTINRooPg7fgMXxTG7dWHMa2E9j56q5PXZ5wkTCA
++BsAFKPKpL4ceZ1MXNwm/YQS3HxnEfVWBsPjues9mnNShgZIjz11PlH05zMrJOUB
+gi4bru1v7a66ssejz3RQ/zJ0u1IYnVPzVLbAsAyyr8vd71vvzXOLmfgcdvWCcotZ
+kPQbIKacAnbtRULyIEFDXHVLGays3u+c33QzQX1M7Pu5QGXymLrpOzpna4aR99Ax
+jxB50tT6d0KchOyn3M10bd9MMSyiEv2bCvp3GPdrTM5ouKjYFgsQDoazZubV+Rai
+vto2glhQi29oGkj0NuXf13Ijgn0Yu3qJIkJNsTXGzMaEvcIKyHNaGDdDqHOgOiUQ
+2EtEmmE79zbnf+3jkT3jjMcU3bxmj1aG+kX/ErK2yWAGVjYsetimCUSu4yT6Pv/+
+MKONbGDswMqWAIMWwLUp4kkbDDyQC7eTGB4OFLn1BVg5ol+FRD8VcAHfWasSE1WW
+BiAk1TvN9Sp+ZLXZBphNwp8lbm3gwUwTpvs7X81B0RByN7rx7hLBaJ1viW7mMx0K
+JV+/Ei2voErvo1J0xd9W
+=QTlX
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
+@@ -620,8 +620,17 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
++ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ {
++ item = NULL;
++ frag = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
+
++
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ */
+@@ -777,6 +786,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
++ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+@@ -835,8 +845,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+- max, ok);
++ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy)
+@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -777,6 +778,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+@@ -2170,6 +2172,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy)
+@@ -1147,6 +1147,15 @@ start:
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
++ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++
++ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1278,7 +1287,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+- if (s->session == NULL)
++ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy)
+@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 267031)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (working copy)
+@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+ #define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
+
+ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
+ {
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD)
+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+=QENL
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Modified: head/share/xml/advisories.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/share/xml/advisories.xml Wed Jun 4 21:36:09 2014 (r45010)
+++ head/share/xml/advisories.xml Thu Jun 5 13:03:07 2014 (r45011)
@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@
<name>6</name>
<day>
+ <name>5</name>
+
+ <advisory>
+ <name>FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl</name>
+ </advisory>
+ </day>
+
+ <day>
<name>3</name>
<advisory>
_______________________________________________
[email protected] mailing list
http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-doc-all
To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"