svn commit: r45570 - in head/share: security/advisories security/patches/SA-14:18 xml
Xin LI <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Author: delphij
Date: Tue Sep 9 10:29:20 2014
New Revision: 45570
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/45570
Log:
Add SA-14:18.openssl.
Added:
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
Modified:
head/share/xml/advisories.xml
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl.asc Tue Sep 9 10:29:20 2014 (r45570)
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssl
+Announced: 2014-09-09
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2014-08-07 21:04:42 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
+ 2014-09-09 10:09:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p8)
+ 2014-08-07 21:06:34 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2014-09-09 10:13:46 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p1)
+ 2014-09-09 10:13:46 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p11)
+ 2014-09-09 10:13:46 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p18)
+ 2014-08-07 21:06:34 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
+ 2014-09-09 10:13:46 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p15)
+CVE Name: CVE-2014-3506, CVE-2014-3507, CVE-2014-3508, CVE-2014-3510,
+ CVE-2014-3509, CVE-2014-3511, CVE-2014-3512, CVE-2014-5139
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
+a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
+Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
+and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
+general purpose cryptography library.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS handshake message may cause OpenSSL
+to consume large amounts of memory. [CVE-2014-3506]
+
+The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS packet could cause OpenSSL to leak
+memory. [CVE-2014-3507]
+
+A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from
+the stack. [CVE-2014-3508]
+
+OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to
+a denial of service attack. [CVE-2014-3510]
+
+The following problems affect FreeBSD 10.0-RELEASE and later:
+
+If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+up to 255 bytes to freed memory. [CVE-2014-3509]
+
+A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+is badly fragmented. [CVE-2014-3511]
+
+A malicious client or server can send invalid SRP parameters and overrun
+an internal buffer. [CVE-2014-3512]
+
+A malicious server can crash the client with a NULL pointer dereference by
+specifying a SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated
+with the client. [CVE-2014-5139]
+
+III. Impact
+
+A remote attacker may be able to cause a denial of service (application
+crash, large memory consumption), obtain additional information,
+cause protocol downgrade. Additionally, a remote attacker may be able
+to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable system if the application has been
+set up for SRP.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 10.0]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-10.0.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 9.3]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-9.3.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 9.2, 9.1, 8.4]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-9.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/8/ r269687
+releng/8.4/ r271305
+stable/9/ r269687
+releng/9.1/ r271305
+releng/9.2/ r271305
+releng/9.3/ r271305
+stable/10/ r269686
+releng/10.0/ r271304
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140806.txt>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3506>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3507>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3508>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3509>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3510>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3511>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3512>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-5139>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl.asc>
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+=f4To
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch Tue Sep 9 10:29:20 2014 (r45570)
@@ -0,0 +1,726 @@
+Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (working copy)
+@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ err:
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
++
+ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long len)
+ {
+@@ -289,12 +290,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *data;
+- int i;
+- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
++ int i, length;
++
++ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
++ * Need at least one content octet.
++ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
++ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ */
+- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
++ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
++ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
++ length = (int)len;
++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
++ {
+ if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons
+ data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
+ ret->data = NULL;
+ /* once detached we can change it */
+- if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
++ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
+ {
+ ret->length=0;
+ if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
+- data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
++ data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
+ ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+ }
+- memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
++ memcpy(data,p,length);
+ /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
+ ret->data =data;
+- ret->length=(int)len;
++ ret->length=length;
+ ret->sn=NULL;
+ ret->ln=NULL;
+ /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
+- p+=len;
++ p+=length;
+
+ if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
+ *pp=p;
+Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c (working copy)
+@@ -471,12 +471,13 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
+
+- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
+- buf[0]='\0';
++ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
++ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
++ buf[0] = '\0';
++
++ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+ return(0);
+- }
+
+-
+ if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
+ {
+ const char *s;
+@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
+ i=(int)(l/40);
+ l-=(long)(i*40);
+ }
+- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
++ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
+ {
+ *buf++ = i + '0';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ n++;
+@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
+ i = strlen(bndec);
+ if (buf)
+ {
+- if (buf_len > 0)
++ if (buf_len > 1)
+ {
+ *buf++ = '.';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
+@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+-
+Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c (working copy)
+@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
+ int longg ;
+ int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
+
++ if (BN_ucmp(g, N) >= 0)
++ return NULL;
++
+ if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
+@@ -117,6 +120,9 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N
+ if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
++ if (BN_ucmp(A, N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(B, N) >= 0)
++ return NULL;
++
+ longN= BN_num_bytes(N);
+
+ if ((cAB = OPENSSL_malloc(2*longN)) == NULL)
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
+@@ -586,30 +586,33 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
++ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
++ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
++static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
++ {
++ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
++ return s->max_cert_list;
++ return max_len;
++ }
+
+ static int
+-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
++dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ {
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
++ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
++ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+- */
+- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+- else
+- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ if (frag_len == 0)
++ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
+- goto err;
+-
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+@@ -638,7 +641,8 @@ static int
+
+
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+- * retransmit and can be dropped.
++ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
++ * does not need to be freed.
+ */
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
+ {
+@@ -658,7 +662,9 @@ static int
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
+- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
++ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
++ i=-1;
++ if (i<=0)
+ goto err;
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+@@ -675,10 +681,6 @@ static int
+
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+-
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+@@ -686,14 +688,18 @@ static int
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
++ * would never have reached this branch. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+@@ -700,7 +706,7 @@ err:
+
+
+ static int
+-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
++dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ {
+ int i=-1;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+@@ -720,7 +726,7 @@ static int
+ /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
+ * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
+ */
+- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ item = NULL;
+
+ /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
+@@ -745,9 +751,12 @@ static int
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
++ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
++ goto err;
++
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+@@ -759,26 +768,31 @@ static int
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
++ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
++ i = -1;
++ if (i<=0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+-
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
++ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
++ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
++ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
++ * been discarded. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c (working copy)
+@@ -982,6 +982,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1172,6 +1179,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1231,6 +1245,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+@@ -1706,5 +1727,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+-
+-
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c (working copy)
+@@ -348,16 +348,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ * to read more records to find out.
+ * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+- * attacks. */
++ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
++ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ {
+-#if 0
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+-#else
+- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+-#endif
+ }
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+@@ -364,7 +360,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
+ else
+ v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+@@ -444,6 +440,18 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ v[1] = p[4];
+
++ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
++ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
++ * record. It's format is:
++ * Byte Content
++ * 0-1 msg_length
++ * 2 msg_type
++ * 3-4 version
++ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
++ * 7-8 session_id_length
++ * 9-10 challenge_length
++ * ... ...
++ */
+ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
+ if (n > (1024*4))
+ {
+@@ -450,8 +458,16 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ if (n < 9)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
+ j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
++ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
++ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
++ * packet bytes. */
+ if (j <= 0) return(j);
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy)
+@@ -953,6 +953,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
++ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+
+ sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+@@ -1459,6 +1468,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ p+=i;
+ n-=param_len;
+
++ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++
+ /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+@@ -2252,6 +2267,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (working copy)
+@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+- SSL_aNULL,
++ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_3DES,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+- SSL_aNULL,
++ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_AES128,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
+ TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ SSL_kSRP,
+- SSL_aNULL,
++ SSL_aSRP,
+ SSL_AES256,
+ SSL_SHA1,
+ SSL_TLSV1,
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy)
+@@ -2798,6 +2798,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
++ || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h (working copy)
+@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define SSL_TXT_aGOST94 "aGOST94"
+ #define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
+ #define SSL_TXT_aGOST "aGOST"
++#define SSL_TXT_aSRP "aSRP"
+
+ #define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS"
+ #define SSL_TXT_DH "DH"
+@@ -2309,6 +2310,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350
++#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS 371
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352
+ #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c (working copy)
+@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+ {0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
++ {0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0, 0,SSL_aSRP, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+
+ /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+ {0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0, SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+@@ -1628,6 +1629,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cip
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ au="PSK";
+ break;
++ case SSL_aSRP:
++ au="SRP";
++ break;
+ default:
+ au="unknown";
+ break;
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c (working copy)
+@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH) ,"bad srp b length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH) ,"bad srp g length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH) ,"bad srp n length"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS) ,"bad srp parameters"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH) ,"bad srp s length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE) ,"bad srtp mki value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c (working copy)
+@@ -1402,6 +1402,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_C
+ s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
++ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
++ continue;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (working copy)
+@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
+ #define SSL_aPSK 0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
+ #define SSL_aGOST94 0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
+ #define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
++#define SSL_aSRP 0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
+
+
+ /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
+@@ -1173,4 +1174,6 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(
+ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
+
++int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
++
+ #endif
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (working copy)
+@@ -1446,15 +1446,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return 0;
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
++ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
++ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
++ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ #if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c (working copy)
+@@ -408,17 +408,47 @@ err:
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
++ {
++ SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
++ /* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
++ * by checking B != 0 since B < N
++ */
++ if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
++ || BN_is_zero(srp->B))
++ {
++ *al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
++ {
++ if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ }
++ else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++
+ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+- if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
+- return -1;
+-
+- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL &&
+- !SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
+- return -1 ;
+-
+ RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+@@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
+ return -1;
+
+- /* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
+- if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL)
+- return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
+-
+ return 1;
+ }
+
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-10.0.patch.asc Tue Sep 9 10:29:20 2014 (r45570)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+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+=Htnr
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:18/openssl-9.3.patch Tue Sep 9 10:29:20 2014 (r45570)
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+===================================================================
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (revision 270128)
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c (working copy)
+@@ -285,17 +285,29 @@ err:
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
++
+ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long len)
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+- int i;
+- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
++ int i, length;
++
++ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
++ * Need at least one content octet.
++ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
++ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ */
+- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
++ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
++ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
++ length = (int)len;
++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
++ {
+ if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons
+ else ret=(*a);
+
+ p= *pp;
+- if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
++ if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
+ {
+ if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
+- ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
++ ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+ if (ret->data == NULL)
+ { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
+ }
+- memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
*** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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