svn commit: r45928 - in head/share: security/advisories security/patches/EN-14:12 security/patches/SA-14:24 security/patches/SA-14:25 security/patches/SA-14:26 xml
Dag-Erling Sm??rgrav <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Author: des
Date: Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014
New Revision: 45928
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/45928
Log:
Add EN-14:12, SA-14:24, SA-14:25 and SA-14:26.
Added:
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:12.zfs.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:24.sshd.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:25.setlogin.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:26.ftp.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
Directory Properties:
head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/ (props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/ (props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/ (props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ (props changed)
Modified:
head/share/xml/advisories.xml
head/share/xml/notices.xml
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:12.zfs.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:12.zfs.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-14:12.zfs Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: NFSv4 and ZFS cache consistency issue
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: zfs
+Announced: 2011-11-04
+Credits: Bart Hsiao, Marcelo Araujo, Kevin Buhr
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2014-10-07 06:00:09 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
+ 2014-10-15 06:31:08 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC2)
+ 2014-11-04 23:31:17 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p12)
+ 2014-10-07 06:00:32 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:46 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p5)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:17 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p15)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:45 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p22)
+ 2014-11-04 23:30:23 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:15 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p19)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:http://security.freebsd.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The Network File System (NFS) allows a host to export some or all of
+its file systems that can be any kind of file systems such like UFS, ZFS
+etcetera, so that other hosts can access them over the network and mount
+them as if they were on local disks.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+In a configuration where two or more clients mount a ZFS file system over
+NFSv4 from a FreeBSD server, if client1 caches a directory listing and a
+file in the directory is renamed on client2, then client1 can end up in
+a state where the cached but incorrect directory contents persists indefinitely
+and is never updated.
+
+III. Impact
+
+When client2 renames a file or directory, client1 does not receive the
+changed attributes and never does a READDIR to get the updated contents.
+This could result in a client that has incorrect information about the
+actual content of the mounted file system.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+3) To update your present system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify zfs.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/zfs.patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
+corrected in FreeBSD.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/8/ r274108
+releng/8.4/ r274111
+stable/9/ r272677
+releng/9.1/ r274112
+releng/9.2/ r274113
+releng/9.3/ r274114
+stable/10/ r272676
+releng/10.0/ r274110
+releng/10.1/ r273122
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+The latest revision of this Errata Notice is available at
+http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:12.zfs.asc
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Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:24.sshd.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:24.sshd.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-14:24.sshd Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Denial of service attack against sshd(8)
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssh
+Announced: 2014-11-04
+Credits:
+Affects: FreeBSD 9.1, 9.2 and 10.0.
+Corrected: 2014-05-04 07:28:26 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:31:17 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p12)
+ 2014-05-04 07:57:20 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:17 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p15)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:45 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p22)
+CVE Name: CVE-2014-8475
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+OpenSSH is an implementation of the SSH protocol suite, providing an
+encrypted and authenticated transport for a variety of services,
+including remote shell access. The sshd(8) daemon is the server side
+of OpenSSH.
+
+Heimdal is an implementation of Kerberos 5, which provides
+authentication and single sign-on capability for many network
+services, including OpenSSH.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+Although OpenSSH is not multithreaded, when OpenSSH is compiled with
+Kerberos support, the Heimdal libraries bring in the POSIX thread
+library as a dependency. Due to incorrect library ordering while
+linking sshd(8), symbols in the C library which are shadowed by the
+POSIX thread library may not be resolved correctly at run time.
+
+Note that this problem is specific to the FreeBSD build system and
+does not affect other operating systems or the version of OpenSSH
+available from the FreeBSD ports tree.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An incorrectly linked sshd(8) child process may deadlock while
+handling an incoming connection. The connection may then time out or
+be interrupted by the client, leaving the deadlocked sshd(8) child
+process behind. Eventually, the sshd(8) parent process stops
+accepting new connections.
+
+An attacker may take advantage of this by repeatedly connecting and
+then dropping the connection after having begun, but not completed,
+the authentication process.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+Possible workarounds include rebuilding sshd with Kerberos support
+disabled or installing the security/openssh-portable package from the
+FreeBSD ports tree or an official package repository.
+
+Systems that do not run an OpenSSH server are not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify sshd.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/sshd.patch
+
+c) Recompile sshd. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src/secure/usr.sbin/sshd
+# make && make install
+
+4) Restart the affected service
+
+To restart the affected service after updating the system, either
+reboot the system or execute the following command as root:
+
+# service sshd restart
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r265314
+releng/9.1/ r274112
+releng/9.2/ r274113
+stable/10/ r265313
+releng/10.0/ r274110
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<other info on vulnerability>
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8475>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:24.sshd.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:25.setlogin.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:25.setlogin.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-14:25.setlogin Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Kernel stack disclosure in setlogin(2) / getlogin(2)
+
+Category: core
+Module: kernel
+Announced: 2014-11-04
+Credits: Mateusz Guzik
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2014-11-04 23:29:57 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-PRERELEASE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC4-p1)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC3-p1)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC2-p3)
+ 2014-11-04 23:31:17 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p12)
+ 2014-11-04 23:30:47 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:46 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p5)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:17 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p15)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:45 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p22)
+ 2014-11-04 23:30:23 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:15 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p19)
+CVE Name: CVE-2014-8476
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The setlogin(2) system call sets the login name of the user associated
+with the current session. The getlogin(2) routine returns the login name
+of the user associated with the current session, as previously set by
+setlogin(2).
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+When setlogin(2) is called while setting up a new login session, the
+login name is copied into an uninitialized stack buffer, which is then
+copied into a buffer of the same size in the session structure. The
+getlogin(2) system call returns the entire buffer rather than just the
+portion occupied by the login name associated with the session.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An unprivileged user can access this memory by calling getlogin(2) and
+reading beyond the terminating NUL character of the resulting string.
+Up to 16 (FreeBSD 8) or 32 (FreeBSD 9 and 10) bytes of kernel memory
+may be leaked in this manner for each invocation of setlogin(2).
+
+This memory may contain sensitive information, such as portions of the
+file cache or terminal buffers, which an attacker might leverage to
+obtain elevated privileges.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 9.1]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify setlogin-91.patch.asc
+
+[All other versions]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify setlogin.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/8/ r274108
+releng/8.4/ r274111
+stable/9/ r274109
+releng/9.1/ r274112
+releng/9.2/ r274113
+releng/9.3/ r274114
+stable/10/ r274107
+releng/10.0/ r274110
+releng/10.1/ r274115
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8476>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:25.setlogin.asc>
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Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:26.ftp.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:26.ftp.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-14:26.ftp Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Remote command execution in ftp(1)
+
+Category: core
+Module: ftp
+Announced: 2014-11-04
+Credits: Jared McNeill, Alistair Crooks
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2014-11-04 23:29:57 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-PRERELEASE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC4-p1)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC3-p1)
+ 2014-11-04 23:34:46 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RC2-p3)
+ 2014-11-04 23:31:17 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p12)
+ 2014-11-04 23:30:47 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:46 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p5)
+ 2014-11-04 23:33:17 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p15)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:45 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p22)
+ 2014-11-04 23:30:23 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
+ 2014-11-04 23:32:15 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p19)
+CVE Name: CVE-2014-8517
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The ftp(1) userland utility is an interactive FTP client. It can also
+be used non-interactively, by providing a URL on the command line. In
+this mode, it supports HTTP in addition to FTP.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+A malicious HTTP server could cause ftp(1) to execute arbitrary
+commands.
+
+III. Impact
+
+When operating on HTTP URIs, the ftp(1) client follows HTTP redirects,
+and uses the part of the path after the last '/' from the last
+resource it accesses as the output filename if '-o' is not specified.
+
+If the output file name provided by the server begins with a pipe
+('|'), the output is passed to popen(3), which might be used to
+execute arbitrary commands on the ftp(1) client machine.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Users are encouraged to replace ftp(1) in
+non-interactive use by either fetch(1) or a third-party client such as
+curl or wget.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 8]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify ftp-8.patch.asc
+
+[All other versions]
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch
+# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify ftp.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile ftp. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ftp
+# make && make install
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/8/ r274108
+releng/8.4/ r274111
+stable/9/ r274109
+releng/9.1/ r274112
+releng/9.2/ r274113
+releng/9.3/ r274114
+stable/10/ r274107
+releng/10.0/ r274110
+releng/10.1/ r274115
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8517>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:26.ftpd.asc>
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Added: head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+Index: sys/cddl/contrib/opensolaris/uts/common/fs/zfs/zfs_vnops.c
+===================================================================
+--- sys/cddl/contrib/opensolaris/uts/common/fs/zfs/zfs_vnops.c.orig
++++ sys/cddl/contrib/opensolaris/uts/common/fs/zfs/zfs_vnops.c
+@@ -2827,6 +2827,7 @@ zfs_getattr(vnode_t *vp, vattr_t *vap, int flags,
+ #endif
+ vap->va_seq = zp->z_seq;
+ vap->va_flags = 0; /* FreeBSD: Reset chflags(2) flags. */
++ vap->va_filerev = zp->z_seq;
+
+ /*
+ * Add in any requested optional attributes and the create time.
Added: head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/EN-14:12/zfs.patch.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Index: secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile
+===================================================================
+--- secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile.orig
++++ secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile
+@@ -57,6 +57,16 @@
+ DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT} ${LIBCRYPTO} ${LIBZ}
+ LDADD+= -lcrypt -lcrypto -lz
+
++# Fix the order of NEEDED entries for libthr and libc. The libthr
++# needs to interpose libc symbols, leaving the libthr loading as
++# dependency of krb causes reversed order and broken interposing. Put
++# the threading library last on the linker command line, just before
++# the -lc added by a compiler driver.
++.if ${MK_KERBEROS_SUPPORT} != "no"
++DPADD+= ${LIBPTHREAD}
++LDADD+= -lpthread
++.endif
++
+ .if defined(LOCALBASE)
+ CFLAGS+= -DXAUTH_PATH=\"${LOCALBASE}/bin/xauth\"
+ .endif
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:24/sshd.patch.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+Index: sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+===================================================================
+--- sys/kern/kern_prot.c.orig
++++ sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+@@ -2073,19 +2073,20 @@
+ int
+ sys_getlogin(struct thread *td, struct getlogin_args *uap)
+ {
+- int error;
+ char login[MAXLOGNAME];
+ struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
++ size_t len;
+
+ if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME)
+ uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
+ PROC_LOCK(p);
+ SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
+- bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, login, uap->namelen);
++ len = strlcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, uap->namelen) + 1;
+ SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+- error = copyout(login, uap->namebuf, uap->namelen);
+- return(error);
++ if (len > uap->namelen)
++ return (ERANGE);
++ return (copyout(login, uap->namebuf, len));
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -2104,21 +2105,23 @@
+ int error;
+ char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME];
+
++ CTASSERT(sizeof(p->p_session->s_login) >= sizeof(logintmp));
++
+ error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL);
+- if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
+- error = EINVAL;
+- else if (!error) {
+- PROC_LOCK(p);
+- SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
+- (void) memcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp,
+- sizeof(logintmp));
+- SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
+- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
++ if (error != 0) {
++ if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
++ error = EINVAL;
++ return (error);
+ }
+- return (error);
++ PROC_LOCK(p);
++ SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
++ strcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp);
++ SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
++ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
+ void
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin-91.patch.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+=o8um
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Index: sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+===================================================================
+--- sys/kern/kern_prot.c.orig
++++ sys/kern/kern_prot.c
+@@ -2066,21 +2066,20 @@
+ int
+ sys_getlogin(struct thread *td, struct getlogin_args *uap)
+ {
+- int error;
+ char login[MAXLOGNAME];
+ struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
++ size_t len;
+
+ if (uap->namelen > MAXLOGNAME)
+ uap->namelen = MAXLOGNAME;
+ PROC_LOCK(p);
+ SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
+- bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, login, uap->namelen);
++ len = strlcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, uap->namelen) + 1;
+ SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+- if (strlen(login) + 1 > uap->namelen)
++ if (len > uap->namelen)
+ return (ERANGE);
+- error = copyout(login, uap->namebuf, uap->namelen);
+- return (error);
++ return (copyout(login, uap->namebuf, len));
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -2099,21 +2098,23 @@
+ int error;
+ char logintmp[MAXLOGNAME];
+
++ CTASSERT(sizeof(p->p_session->s_login) >= sizeof(logintmp));
++
+ error = priv_check(td, PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+ error = copyinstr(uap->namebuf, logintmp, sizeof(logintmp), NULL);
+- if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
+- error = EINVAL;
+- else if (!error) {
+- PROC_LOCK(p);
+- SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
+- (void) memcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp,
+- sizeof(logintmp));
+- SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
+- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
++ if (error != 0) {
++ if (error == ENAMETOOLONG)
++ error = EINVAL;
++ return (error);
+ }
+- return (error);
++ PROC_LOCK(p);
++ SESS_LOCK(p->p_session);
++ strcpy(p->p_session->s_login, logintmp);
++ SESS_UNLOCK(p->p_session);
++ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
++ return (0);
+ }
+
+ void
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:25/setlogin.patch.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+Index: contrib/lukemftp/src/fetch.c
+===================================================================
+--- contrib/lukemftp/src/fetch.c.orig
++++ contrib/lukemftp/src/fetch.c
+@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
+ url_decode(decodedpath);
+
+ if (outfile)
+- savefile = xstrdup(outfile);
++ savefile = outfile;
+ else {
+ cp = strrchr(decodedpath, '/'); /* find savefile */
+ if (cp != NULL)
+@@ -566,8 +566,7 @@
+ rangestart = rangeend = entitylen = -1;
+ mtime = -1;
+ if (restartautofetch) {
+- if (strcmp(savefile, "-") != 0 && *savefile != '|' &&
+- stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
++ if (stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
+ restart_point = sb.st_size;
+ }
+ if (urltype == FILE_URL_T) { /* file:// URLs */
+@@ -1085,17 +1084,25 @@
+ } /* end of ftp:// or http:// specific setup */
+
+ /* Open the output file. */
+- if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
+- fout = stdout;
+- } else if (*savefile == '|') {
+- oldintp = xsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+- fout = popen(savefile + 1, "w");
+- if (fout == NULL) {
+- warn("Can't run `%s'", savefile + 1);
+- goto cleanup_fetch_url;
++
++ /*
++ * Only trust filenames with special meaning if they came from
++ * the command line
++ */
++ if (outfile == savefile) {
++ if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
++ fout = stdout;
++ } else if (*savefile == '|') {
++ oldintp = xsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
++ fout = popen(savefile + 1, "w");
++ if (fout == NULL) {
++ warn("Can't execute `%s'", savefile + 1);
++ goto cleanup_fetch_url;
++ }
++ closefunc = pclose;
+ }
+- closefunc = pclose;
+- } else {
++ }
++ if (fout == NULL) {
+ if ((rangeend != -1 && rangeend <= restart_point) ||
+ (rangestart == -1 && filesize != -1 && filesize <= restart_point)) {
+ /* already done */
+@@ -1278,7 +1285,8 @@
+ (*closefunc)(fout);
+ if (res0)
+ freeaddrinfo(res0);
+- FREEPTR(savefile);
++ if (savefile != outfile)
++ FREEPTR(savefile);
+ FREEPTR(user);
+ FREEPTR(pass);
+ FREEPTR(host);
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp-8.patch.asc Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-14:26/ftp.patch Wed Nov 5 00:28:45 2014 (r45928)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+Index: contrib/tnftp/src/fetch.c
+===================================================================
+--- contrib/tnftp/src/fetch.c.orig
++++ contrib/tnftp/src/fetch.c
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
+ url_decode(decodedpath);
+
+ if (outfile)
+- savefile = ftp_strdup(outfile);
++ savefile = outfile;
+ else {
+ cp = strrchr(decodedpath, '/'); /* find savefile */
+ if (cp != NULL)
+@@ -571,8 +571,7 @@
+ rangestart = rangeend = entitylen = -1;
+ mtime = -1;
+ if (restartautofetch) {
+- if (strcmp(savefile, "-") != 0 && *savefile != '|' &&
+- stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
++ if (stat(savefile, &sb) == 0)
+ restart_point = sb.st_size;
+ }
+ if (urltype == FILE_URL_T) { /* file:// URLs */
+@@ -1098,17 +1097,25 @@
+ } /* end of ftp:// or http:// specific setup */
+
+ /* Open the output file. */
+- if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
+- fout = stdout;
+- } else if (*savefile == '|') {
+- oldintp = xsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+- fout = popen(savefile + 1, "w");
+- if (fout == NULL) {
+- warn("Can't execute `%s'", savefile + 1);
+- goto cleanup_fetch_url;
++
++ /*
++ * Only trust filenames with special meaning if they came from
++ * the command line
++ */
++ if (outfile == savefile) {
++ if (strcmp(savefile, "-") == 0) {
++ fout = stdout;
*** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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