svn commit: r48363 - in head/share: security/advisories security/patches/SA-16:12 security/patches/SA-16:13 xml
Xin LI <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Author: delphij
Date: Thu Mar 10 10:18:18 2016
New Revision: 48363
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/48363
Log:
Add SA-16:12 and SA-16:13.
Added:
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3-fix.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3-fix.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3.patch.xz (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3.patch.xz.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:13/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:13/bind.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:13/bind.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
Modified:
head/share/xml/advisories.xml
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl.asc Thu Mar 10 10:18:18 2016 (r48363)
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssl
+Announced: 2016-03-10
+Credits: OpenSSL Project
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2016-03-04 00:40:15 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA3)
+ 2016-03-03 07:30:55 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p13)
+ 2016-03-03 07:30:55 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p30)
+ 2016-03-10 03:58:48 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-03-10 10:03:28 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p38)
+CVE Name: CVE-2016-0702, CVE-2016-0703, CVE-2016-0704, CVE-2016-0705
+ CVE-2016-0797, CVE-2016-0798, CVE-2016-0799, CVE-2016-0800
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
+a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
+Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
+and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
+general purpose cryptography library.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS
+sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a
+Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and
+non-vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting
+SSLv2 and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP
+or POP3) shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability
+is known as DROWN. [CVE-2016-0800]
+
+A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that
+receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered
+rare. [CVE-2016-0705]
+
+The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing memory
+management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly allocated, and
+sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of distinguishing
+these two cases. [CVE-2016-0798]
+
+In the BN_hex2bn function, the number of hex digits is calculated using an int
+value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large
+values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because
+|i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL
+leading to a subsequent NULL pointer dereference. For very large values of
+|i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In
+this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is
+insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in
+BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is
+ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This
+is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. [CVE-2016-0797]
+
+The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" formatted string in
+the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of
+a string and cause an out-of-bounds read when printing very long strings.
+[CVE-2016-0799]
+
+A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the
+Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA
+keys. [CVE-2016-0702]
+
+s2_srvr.c did not enforce that clear-key-length is 0 for non-export ciphers.
+If clear-key bytes are present for these ciphers, they displace encrypted-key
+bytes. [CVE-2016-0703]
+
+s2_srvr.c overwrites the wrong bytes in the master key when applying
+Bleichenbacher protection for export cipher suites. [CVE-2016-0704]
+
+III. Impact
+
+Servers that have SSLv2 protocol enabled are vulnerable to the "DROWN" attack
+which allows a remote attacker to fast attack many recorded TLS connections
+made to the server, even when the client did not make any SSLv2 connections
+themselves.
+
+An attacker who can supply malformed DSA private keys to OpenSSL applications
+may be able to cause memory corruption which would lead to a Denial of
+Service condition. [CVE-2016-0705]
+
+An attacker connecting with an invalid username can cause memory leak, which
+could eventually lead to a Denial of Service condition. [CVE-2016-0798]
+
+An attacker who can inject malformed data into an application may be able
+to cause memory corruption which would lead to a Denial of Service
+condition. [CVE-2016-0797, CVE-2016-0799]
+
+A local attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions
+could recover RSA keys. [CVE-2016-0702]
+
+An eavesdropper who can intercept SSLv2 handshake can conduct an efficient
+divide-and-conquer key recovery attack and use the server as an oracle to
+determine the SSLv2 master-key, using only 16 connections to the server
+and negligible computation. [CVE-2016-0703]
+
+An attacker can use the Bleichenbacher oracle, which enables more efficient
+variant of the DROWN attack. [CVE-2016-0704]
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 9.3]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3.patch.xz
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3.patch.xz.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-9.3.patch.xz.asc
+
+Note that the initial patch version contains a serious regression that
+would lead to crash. The following patch must be applied to address it.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3-fix.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-9.3-fix.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-9.3-fix.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 10.1]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-10.1.patch.xz.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 10.2]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-10.2.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r296598
+releng/9.3/ r296611
+stable/10/ r296371
+releng/10.1/ r296341
+releng/10.2/ r296341
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160301.txt>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0702>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0703>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0704>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0705>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0797>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0798>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0799>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0800>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2.1.11 (FreeBSD)
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind.asc Thu Mar 10 10:18:18 2016 (r48363)
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Multiple BIND vulnerabilities
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: bind
+Announced: 2016-03-10
+Credits: ISC
+Affects: FreeBSD 9.x
+Corrected: 2016-03-10 07:47:55 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-03-10 10:03:28 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p38)
+CVE Name: CVE-2016-1285, CVE-2016-1286
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
+The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+Testing by ISC has uncovered a defect in control channel input handling
+which can cause named to exit due to an assertion failure in sexpr.c
+or alist.c when a malformed packet is sent to named's control channel
+(the interface which allows named to be controlled using the "rndc"
+server control utility). [CVE-2016-1285]
+
+An error when parsing signature records for DNAME records having specific
+properties can lead to named exiting due to an assertion failure in
+resolver.c or db.c. [CVE-2016-1286]
+
+III. Impact
+
+A remote attacker can deliberately trigger the failed assertion if the
+DNS server accepts remote rndc commands regardless if authentication
+is configured. Note that this is not enabled by default. [CVE-2016-1285]
+
+A remote attacker who can cause a server to make a query deliberately
+chosen to generate a response containing a signature record which
+would trigger a failed assertion and cause named to stop. Disabling
+DNSsec does not provide protection against this vulnerability.
+[CVE-2016-1286]
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but hosts not running named(8) are not
+vulnerable.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+The named service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is
+recommended but not required.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+The named service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is
+recommended but not required.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:13/bind.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:13/bind.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify bind.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot the system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r296608
+releng/9.3/ r296611
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01352>
+
+<URL:https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01353>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1285>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1286>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2.1.11 (FreeBSD)
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz
==============================================================================
Binary file. No diff available.
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.1.patch.xz.asc Thu Mar 10 10:18:18 2016 (r48363)
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:12/openssl-10.2.patch Thu Mar 10 10:18:18 2016 (r48363)
@@ -0,0 +1,2963 @@
+--- crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c
+@@ -416,6 +416,8 @@
+ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+ {
+ srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
++ int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
++
+ if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
+ p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
+@@ -424,21 +426,25 @@
+
+ if (p->user == NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
+- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
++ goto err;
+ }
++
+ if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
+ (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
+ p->user->info) < 0) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
++ goto err;
+ }
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,
+ "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
+ p->login, p->user->info);
+- /* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
++ ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
++
++err:
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user);
+ p->user = NULL;
+ p->login = NULL;
+- return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+@@ -2244,9 +2250,10 @@
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+- srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
++ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+@@ -2300,9 +2307,10 @@
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+- srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
++ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+@@ -2387,9 +2395,10 @@
+ while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+- srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
++ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+@@ -2616,9 +2625,10 @@
+ && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
+ srp_callback_parm.user =
+- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+- srp_callback_parm.login);
++ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
++ srp_callback_parm.login);
+ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+@@ -2654,6 +2664,22 @@
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++ if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
++ && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
++ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
++ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
++ srp_callback_parm.user =
++ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
++ srp_callback_parm.login);
++ if (srp_callback_parm.user)
++ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
++ srp_callback_parm.user->info);
++ else
++ BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
++ continue;
++ }
++#endif
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+ delay(1000);
+ #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+@@ -125,16 +125,16 @@
+ # define LLONG long
+ #endif
+
+-static void fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+- const char *, int, int, int);
+-static void fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+- LLONG, int, int, int, int);
+-static void fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+- LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
+-static void doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
+-static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
+- size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
+- const char *format, va_list args);
++static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
++ const char *, int, int, int);
++static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
++ LLONG, int, int, int, int);
++static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
++ LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
++static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
++static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
++ size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
++ const char *format, va_list args);
+
+ /* format read states */
+ #define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@
+ #define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
+ #define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
+
+-static void
++static int
+ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
+ char **buffer,
+ size_t *maxlen,
+@@ -196,7 +196,8 @@
+ if (ch == '%')
+ state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+ else
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
++ return 0;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_FLAGS:
+@@ -302,8 +303,9 @@
+ value = va_arg(args, int);
+ break;
+ }
+- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+- value, 10, min, max, flags);
++ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
++ max, flags))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+@@ -326,9 +328,10 @@
+ value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ break;
+ }
+- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+- ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
+- min, max, flags);
++ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
++ ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
++ min, max, flags))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+@@ -335,8 +338,9 @@
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+- fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+- fvalue, min, max, flags);
++ if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
++ flags))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+@@ -355,8 +359,9 @@
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+- va_arg(args, int));
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
++ va_arg(args, int)))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
+@@ -366,13 +371,15 @@
+ else
+ max = *maxlen;
+ }
+- fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
+- flags, min, max);
++ if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
++ flags, min, max))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
+- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+- value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
++ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
++ value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'n': /* XXX */
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+@@ -394,7 +401,8 @@
+ }
+ break;
+ case '%':
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
++ return 0;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+@@ -418,46 +426,56 @@
+ *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
+ if (*truncated)
+ currlen = *maxlen - 1;
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0');
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
++ return 0;
+ *retlen = currlen - 1;
+- return;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static void
++static int
+ fmtstr(char **sbuffer,
+ char **buffer,
+ size_t *currlen,
+ size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+ {
+- int padlen, strln;
++ int padlen;
++ size_t strln;
+ int cnt = 0;
+
+ if (value == 0)
+ value = "<NULL>";
+- for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln) ;
++
++ strln = strlen(value);
++ if (strln > INT_MAX)
++ strln = INT_MAX;
++
+ padlen = min - strln;
+- if (padlen < 0)
++ if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
+ padlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ padlen = -padlen;
+
+ while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ --padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
++ return 0;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ ++padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static void
++static int
+ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
+ char **buffer,
+ size_t *currlen,
+@@ -517,17 +535,20 @@
+
+ /* spaces */
+ while (spadlen > 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ --spadlen;
+ }
+
+ /* sign */
+ if (signvalue)
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
++ return 0;
+
+ /* prefix */
+ while (*prefix) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix);
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
++ return 0;
+ prefix++;
+ }
+
+@@ -534,20 +555,24 @@
+ /* zeros */
+ if (zpadlen > 0) {
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
++ return 0;
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+ }
+ /* digits */
+- while (place > 0)
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
++ while (place > 0) {
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* left justified spaces */
+ while (spadlen < 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ ++spadlen;
+ }
+- return;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+ static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+@@ -578,7 +603,7 @@
+ return intpart;
+ }
+
+-static void
++static int
+ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
+ char **buffer,
+ size_t *currlen,
+@@ -657,24 +682,29 @@
+
+ if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+ if (signvalue) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
++ return 0;
+ --padlen;
+ signvalue = 0;
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
++ return 0;
+ --padlen;
+ }
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ --padlen;
+ }
+- if (signvalue)
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
++ if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
++ return 0;
+
+- while (iplace > 0)
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
++ while (iplace > 0) {
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
+@@ -681,23 +711,32 @@
+ * char to print out.
+ */
+ if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
++ return 0;
+
+- while (fplace > 0)
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
++ while (fplace > 0) {
++ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
++ fconvert[--fplace]))
++ return 0;
++ }
+ }
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
++ return 0;
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+
+ while (padlen < 0) {
+- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
++ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
++ return 0;
+ ++padlen;
+ }
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static void
++#define BUFFER_INC 1024
++
++static int
+ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
+ char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c)
+ {
+@@ -708,13 +747,14 @@
+ assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
+
+ if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
+- *maxlen += 1024;
++ if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
++ return 0;
++
++ *maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
+ if (*buffer == NULL) {
+ *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
+- if (!*buffer) {
+- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+- return;
+- }
++ if (*buffer == NULL)
++ return 0;
+ if (*currlen > 0) {
+ assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
+ memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
+@@ -721,11 +761,11 @@
+ }
+ *sbuffer = NULL;
+ } else {
+- *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+- if (!*buffer) {
+- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
+- return;
+- }
++ char *tmpbuf;
++ tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
++ if (tmpbuf == NULL)
++ return 0;
++ *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -736,7 +776,7 @@
+ (*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
+ }
+
+- return;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /***************************************************************************/
+@@ -768,7 +808,11 @@
+
+ dynbuf = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_push_info("doapr()");
+- _dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format, args);
++ if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
++ args)) {
++ OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
++ return -1;
++ }
+ if (dynbuf) {
+ ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+@@ -803,7 +847,8 @@
+ size_t retlen;
+ int truncated;
+
+- _dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args);
++ if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
++ return -1;
+
+ if (truncated)
+ /*
+--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl.orig
++++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@
+ .align 16
+ .Lmul_enter:
+ mov ${num}d,${num}d
+- mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%r10d # load 7th argument
++ movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
++ lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
+ push %rbx
+ push %rbp
+ push %r12
+@@ -73,53 +74,105 @@
+ push %r13
+ push %r14
+ push %r15
+-___
+-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
+- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
+- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
++
+ .Lmul_alloca:
+-___
+-$code.=<<___;
+ mov %rsp,%rax
+ lea 2($num),%r11
+ neg %r11
+- lea (%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2))
++ lea -264(%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
+ and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
+
+ mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
+ .Lmul_body:
+- mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
++ lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
+ ___
+ $bp="%r12";
+ $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size"
+ $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
+ $code.=<<___;
+- mov %r10,%r11
+- shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
+- and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
+- not %r10
+- lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
+- and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
+- lea 96($bp,%r11,8),$bp # pointer within 1st cache line
+- movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
+- movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
+- movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
+- movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
++ movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
++ movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
++ lea 24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization)
++ and \$-16,%r10
+
+- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
+- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
+- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
+- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
+- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
+- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
+- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
++ pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
*** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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