svn commit: r48880 - in head/share: security/advisories security/patches/SA-16:20 security/patches/SA-16:21 security/patches/SA-16:22 security/patches/SA-16:23 xml
Gleb Smirnoff <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Author: glebius (src committer)
Date: Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016
New Revision: 48880
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/doc/48880
Log:
Publish todays advisories.
Approved by: so
Added:
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch (contents, props changed)
head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch.asc (contents, props changed)
Modified:
head/share/xml/advisories.xml
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Kernel stack disclosure in Linux compatibility layer
+
+Category: core
+Module: linux(4)
+Announced: 2016-05-31
+Credits: CTurt
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2016-05-31 16:57:42 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:50 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p4)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:45 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p18)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:41 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p35)
+ 2016-05-31 16:58:00 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:37 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p43)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD is binary-compatible with the Linux operating system through a
+loadable kernel module/optional kernel component. The support is provided
+for amd64 and i386 machines.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The implementation of the TIOCGSERIAL ioctl(2) does not clear the output
+struct before copying it out to userland.
+
+The implementation of the Linux sysinfo() system call does not clear the
+output struct before copying it out to userland.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An unprivileged user can read a portion of uninitialised kernel stack data,
+which may contain sensitive information, such as the stack guard, portions
+of the file cache or terminal buffers, which an attacker might leverage to
+obtain elevated privileges.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but systems not using the Linux binary
+compatibility layer are not vulnerable.
+
+The Linux compatibility layer is not included in the default GENERIC kernel.
+
+The following command can be used to test if the Linux binary compatibility
+layer is loaded:
+
+# kldstat -m linuxelf
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Reboot is required.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+Reboot is required.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify linux.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r301055
+releng/9.3/ r301049
+stable/10/ r301054
+releng/10.1/ r301050
+releng/10.2/ r301051
+releng/10.3/ r301052
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:http://cturt.github.io/compat-info-leaks.html>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Kernel stack disclosure in 4.3BSD compatibility layer
+
+Category: core
+Module: kernel
+Announced: 2016-05-31
+Credits: CTurt
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2016-05-31 16:57:42 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:50 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p4)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:45 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p18)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:41 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p35)
+ 2016-05-31 16:58:00 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:55:37 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p43)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD has binary compatibility layer with historic 4.3BSD operating
+system.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The implementation of historic stat(2) system call does not clear the
+output struct before copying it out to userland.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An unprivileged user can read a portion of uninitialised kernel stack data,
+which may contain sensitive information, such as the stack guard, portions
+of the file cache or terminal buffers, which an attacker might leverage to
+obtain elevated privileges.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but systems not using the 4.3BSD compatibility
+layer are not vulnerable.
+
+The 4.3BSD compatibility layer is not included into the default GENERIC kernel
+configuration. A custom kernel config that does not have the COMPAT_43 option
+is also not vulnerable.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Reboot is required.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify stat.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r301055
+releng/9.3/ r301049
+stable/10/ r301054
+releng/10.1/ r301050
+releng/10.2/ r301051
+releng/10.3/ r301052
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:http://cturt.github.io/compat-info-leaks.html>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Directory traversal in cpio(1)
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: libarchive
+Announced: 2016-05-31
+Credits: Alexander Cherepanov
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD
+Corrected: 2016-05-21 09:03:45 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:35:03 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p4)
+ 2016-05-31 16:33:56 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p18)
+ 2016-05-31 16:32:42 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p35)
+ 2016-05-21 09:27:30 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:23:56 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p43)
+CVE Name: CVE-2015-2304
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The libarchive(3) library provides a flexible interface for reading and
+writing streaming archive files such as tar(1) and cpio(1), and has been the
+basis for the FreeBSD implementation of the tar(1) and cpio(1) utilities
+since FreeBSD 5.3.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The cpio(1) tool from the libarchive(3) bundle is vulnerable to a directory
+traversal problem via absolute paths in an archive file.
+
+III. Impact
+
+A malicious archive file being unpacked can overwrite an arbitrary file on
+a filesystem, if the owner of the cpio process has write access to it.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Reboot is not required.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+Reboot is not required.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 10.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify libarchive-10.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 9.3]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify libarchive-9.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r300363
+releng/9.3/ r301044
+stable/10/ r300361
+releng/10.1/ r301046
+releng/10.2/ r301047
+releng/10.3/ r301048
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2304>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Buffer overflow in libarchive(3)
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: libarchive
+Announced: 2016-05-31
+Affects: FreeBSD 9.3
+Corrected: 2016-05-21 09:27:30 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
+ 2016-05-31 16:23:56 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p43)
+CVE Name: CVE-2013-0211
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The libarchive(3) library provides a flexible interface for reading and
+writing streaming archive files such as tar and cpio, and has been the
+basis for FreeBSD's implementation of the tar(1) and cpio(1) utilities
+since FreeBSD 5.3.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+An integer signedness error in the archive_write_zip_data() function in
+archive_write_set_format_zip.c in libarchive(2) could lead to a buffer
+overflow on 64-bit machines.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An attacker who can provide input of their choice for creating a ZIP archive
+can cause a buffer overflow in libarchive(2) that results in a core dump or
+possibly execution of arbitrary code provided by the attacker.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available but 32-bit systems are not vulnerable.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Reboot is not required.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
+platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+A reboot is not required.
+
+3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify libarchive.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
+affected branch.
+
+Branch/path Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/9/ r300363
+releng/9.3/ r301044
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
+following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
+machine with Subversion installed:
+
+# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
+
+<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-0211>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXTcSUAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnjuwP/36GShkMxVtvEF3LeZCtT1bT
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+URXCjA5XayDc0iZySd4r
+=XTv8
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+--- sys/compat/linux/linux_ioctl.c.orig
++++ sys/compat/linux/linux_ioctl.c
+@@ -916,6 +916,8 @@
+
+ case LINUX_TIOCGSERIAL: {
+ struct linux_serial_struct lss;
++
++ bzero(&lss, sizeof(lss));
+ lss.type = LINUX_PORT_16550A;
+ lss.flags = 0;
+ lss.close_delay = 0;
+--- sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c.orig
++++ sys/compat/linux/linux_misc.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@
+ int i, j;
+ struct timespec ts;
+
++ bzero(&sysinfo, sizeof(sysinfo));
+ getnanouptime(&ts);
+ if (ts.tv_nsec != 0)
+ ts.tv_sec++;
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:20/linux.patch.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIcBAABCgAGBQJXTcSQAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnpM0QAImzU1p8XlerAgX5aqvZA+MT
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+Js3hl5m552T5bwxACftw
+=nyQH
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c.orig
++++ sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
+@@ -2068,6 +2068,7 @@
+ struct ostat *ost;
+ {
+
++ bzero(ost, sizeof(*ost));
+ ost->st_dev = st->st_dev;
+ ost->st_ino = st->st_ino;
+ ost->st_mode = st->st_mode;
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:21/stat.patch.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIcBAABCgAGBQJXTcSRAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rn4scQAOI8NMv7HPw0NigEysKEiThH
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+NWDRp4dkoUXcKD6AX52d
+=egwA
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+--- contrib/libarchive/cpio/bsdcpio.1.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/cpio/bsdcpio.1
+@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@
+ .It Fl Fl insecure
+ (i and p mode only)
+ Disable security checks during extraction or copying.
+-This allows extraction via symbolic links and path names containing
++This allows extraction via symbolic links, absolute paths,
++and path names containing
+ .Sq ..
+ in the name.
+ .It Fl J , Fl Fl xz
+--- contrib/libarchive/cpio/cpio.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/cpio/cpio.c
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
+@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@
+ case OPTION_INSECURE:
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ break;
+ case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
+ cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
+@@ -300,6 +302,7 @@
+ "Cannot use both -p and -%c", cpio->mode);
+ cpio->mode = opt;
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ break;
+ case OPTION_PRESERVE_OWNER:
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive.h.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive.h
+@@ -562,6 +562,8 @@
+ /* Default: Do not use HFS+ compression if it was not compressed. */
+ /* This has no effect except on Mac OS v10.6 or later. */
+ #define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_HFS_COMPRESSION_FORCED (0x8000)
++/* Default: Do not reject entries with absolute paths */
++#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS (0x10000)
+
+ __LA_DECL int archive_read_extract(struct archive *, struct archive_entry *,
+ int flags);
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
+@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@
+ Note that paths ending in
+ .Pa ..
+ always cause an error, regardless of this flag.
++.It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++Refuse to extract an absolute path.
++The default is to not refuse such paths.
+ .It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE
+ Scan data for blocks of NUL bytes and try to recreate them with holes.
+ This results in sparse files, independent of whether the archive format
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
+@@ -2504,8 +2504,9 @@
+ /*
+ * Canonicalize the pathname. In particular, this strips duplicate
+ * '/' characters, '.' elements, and trailing '/'. It also raises an
+- * error for an empty path, a trailing '..' or (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
+- * set) any '..' in the path.
++ * error for an empty path, a trailing '..', (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
++ * set) any '..' in the path or (if ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++ * is set) if the path is absolute.
+ */
+ static int
+ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+@@ -2524,8 +2525,15 @@
+ cleanup_pathname_win(a);
+ #endif
+ /* Skip leading '/'. */
+- if (*src == '/')
++ if (*src == '/') {
++ if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++ "Path is absolute");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
++ }
++
+ separator = *src++;
++ }
+
+ /* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
+ for (;;) {
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
+@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@
+ assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
++ /*
++ * Without security checks, we should be able to
++ * extract an absolute path.
++ */
++ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ assert(0 == unlink("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp"));
++
++ /* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
++ assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS);
++ failure("Extracting an absolute path should fail here.");
++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ archive_entry_free(ae);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileNotExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++
+ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_free(a));
+
+ /* Test the entries on disk. */
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-10.patch.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIcBAABCgAGBQJXTcSSAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rn3vQP/0Vnpmx02B5/7yX/bIuX6MmG
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+=cXQF
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+--- contrib/libarchive/cpio/bsdcpio.1.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/cpio/bsdcpio.1
+@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@
+ .It Fl -insecure
+ (i and p mode only)
+ Disable security checks during extraction or copying.
+-This allows extraction via symbolic links and path names containing
++This allows extraction via symbolic links, absolute paths,
++and path names containing
+ .Sq ..
+ in the name.
+ .It Fl J
+--- contrib/libarchive/cpio/cpio.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/cpio/cpio.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
+@@ -231,6 +232,7 @@
+ case OPTION_INSECURE:
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ break;
+ case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
+ cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
+@@ -265,6 +267,7 @@
+ "Cannot use both -p and -%c", cpio->mode);
+ cpio->mode = opt;
+ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
++ cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
+ break;
+ case OPTION_PRESERVE_OWNER:
+ cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive.h.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive.h
+@@ -477,6 +477,8 @@
+ #define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER (0x0800)
+ /* Detect blocks of 0 and write holes instead. */
+ #define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE (0x1000)
++/* Default: Do not reject entries with absolute paths */
++#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS (0x10000)
+
+ __LA_DECL int archive_read_extract(struct archive *, struct archive_entry *,
+ int flags);
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
+@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@
+ Note that paths ending in
+ .Pa ..
+ always cause an error, regardless of this flag.
++.It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++Refuse to extract an absolute path.
++The default is to not refuse such paths.
+ .It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE
+ Scan data for blocks of NUL bytes and try to recreate them with holes.
+ This results in sparse files, independent of whether the archive format
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write_disk.c
+@@ -1649,8 +1649,9 @@
+ /*
+ * Canonicalize the pathname. In particular, this strips duplicate
+ * '/' characters, '.' elements, and trailing '/'. It also raises an
+- * error for an empty path, a trailing '..' or (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
+- * set) any '..' in the path.
++ * error for an empty path, a trailing '..', (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
++ * set) any '..' in the path or (if ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
++ * is set) if the path is absolute.
+ */
+ static int
+ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
+@@ -1670,8 +1671,15 @@
+ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+ #endif
+ /* Skip leading '/'. */
+- if (*src == '/')
++ if (*src == '/') {
++ if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++ "Path is absolute");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
++ }
++
+ separator = *src++;
++ }
+
+ /* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
+ for (;;) {
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
+@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@
+ assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
+ archive_entry_free(ae);
+
++ /*
++ * Without security checks, we should be able to
++ * extract an absolute path.
++ */
++ assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ assert(0 == unlink("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp"));
++
++ /* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
++ assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
++ archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++ archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
++ archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS);
++ failure("Extracting an absolute path should fail here.");
++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
++ archive_entry_free(ae);
++ assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
++ assertFileNotExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
++
+ assert(0 == archive_write_finish(a));
+
+ /* Test the entries on disk. */
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:22/libarchive-9.patch.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+=w5dZ
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write.c.orig
++++ contrib/libarchive/libarchive/archive_write.c
+@@ -459,8 +459,12 @@
+ _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
+ {
+ struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
++ const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
+ __archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
+ ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
++ /* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
++ if (s > max_write)
++ s = max_write;
+ archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
+ return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
+ }
Added: head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch.asc
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/share/security/patches/SA-16:23/libarchive.patch.asc Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+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+=2/lb
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Modified: head/share/xml/advisories.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/share/xml/advisories.xml Tue May 31 04:17:40 2016 (r48879)
+++ head/share/xml/advisories.xml Tue May 31 17:13:22 2016 (r48880)
@@ -11,6 +11,26 @@
<name>5</name>
<day>
+ <name>31</name>
+
+ <advisory>
+ <name>FreeBSD-SA-16:23.libarchive</name>
+ </advisory>
+
+ <advisory>
+ <name>FreeBSD-SA-16:22.libarchive</name>
+ </advisory>
+
+ <advisory>
+ <name>FreeBSD-SA-16:21.43bsd</name>
+ </advisory>
+
+ <advisory>
+ <name>FreeBSD-SA-16:20.linux</name>
+ </advisory>
+ </day>
+
+ <day>
<name>17</name>
<advisory>
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