git: 31a650820f - main - Add SA-25:05.openssh.

Gordon Tetlow <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.os.freebsd.devel.cvs.doc
Message-ID <[email protected]> 
The branch main has been updated by gordon:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/doc/commit/?id=31a650820fb947107470d17e32c9338697cba850

commit 31a650820fb947107470d17e32c9338697cba850
Author:     Gordon Tetlow <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: 2025-02-21 03:09:14 +0000
Commit:     Gordon Tetlow <[email protected]>
CommitDate: 2025-02-21 03:09:14 +0000

    Add SA-25:05.openssh.
    
    Approved by:    so
---
 website/data/security/advisories.toml              |   4 +
 .../advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh.asc        | 180 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch | 143 ++++++++++++++++
 .../security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch.asc    |  16 ++
 4 files changed, 343 insertions(+)

diff --git a/website/data/security/advisories.toml b/website/data/security/advisories.toml
index 8e676bbf20..fb54b5d5e6 100644
--- a/website/data/security/advisories.toml
+++ b/website/data/security/advisories.toml
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 # Sort advisories by year, month and day
 # $FreeBSD$
 
+[[advisories]]
+name = "FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh"
+date = "2025-02-21"
+
 [[advisories]]
 name = "FreeBSD-SA-25:04.ktrace"
 date = "2025-01-29"
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9410baf89b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh                                    Security Advisory
+                                                          The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic:          Multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSH
+
+Category:       contrib
+Module:         openssh
+Announced:      2025-02-21
+Credits:        Qualys Security Advisory team
+Affects:        All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected:      2025-02-19 14:54:37 UTC (stable/14, 14.2-STABLE)
+                2025-02-21 02:56:26 UTC (releng/14.2, 14.2-RELEASE-p2)
+                2025-02-21 02:56:40 UTC (releng/14.1, 14.1-RELEASE-p8)
+                2025-02-19 16:05:16 UTC (stable/13, 13.5-STABLE)
+                2025-02-20 18:00:47 UTC (releng/13.5, 13.5-BETA3)
+                2025-02-21 02:56:50 UTC (releng/13.4, 13.4-RELEASE-p4)
+CVE Name:       CVE-2025-26465, CVE-2025-26466
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I.   Background
+
+OpenSSH is an implementation of the SSH protocol suite, providing an
+encrypted and authenticated transport for a variety of services, including
+remote shell access.
+
+II.  Problem Description
+
+* OpenSSH client host verification error (CVE-2025-26465)
+
+ssh(1) contains a logic error that allows an on-path attacker to impersonate
+any server during certain conditions when the VerifyHostKeyDNS option is
+enabled.
+
+* OpenSSH server denial of service (CVE-2025-26466)
+
+The OpenSSH client and server are both vulnerable to a memory/CPU denial of
+service while handling SSH2_MSG_PING packets.
+
+III. Impact
+
+* OpenSSH client host verification error (CVE-2025-26465)
+
+Under specific circumstances, a machine-in-the-middle may impersonate any
+server when the client has the VerifyHostKeyDNS option enabled.
+
+* OpenSSH server denial of service (CVE-2025-26466)
+
+During the processing of SSH2_MSG_PING packets, a server may be subject to a
+memory/CPU denial of service.
+
+IV.  Workaround
+
+* OpenSSH client host verification error (CVE-2025-26465)
+
+Disable the VerifyHostKeyDNS configuration directive in the ssh(1)
+configuration and rely on trust-on-first-use host keys or SSH certificate based
+host keys. See ssh_config(5).
+
+* OpenSSH server denial of service (CVE-2025-26466)
+
+No workaround is available, but this condition may be mitigated in the server
+by using the LoginGraceTime and MaxStartups server configuration directives.
+See sshd_config(5).
+
+V.   Solution
+
+Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date and
+restart sshd(8).
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# ## freebsd-update will automatically restart sshd.
+
+Note: The binary update provided by freebsd-update is slightly different than
+the patch in the source tree. Specifically, the commented out VersionAddendum
+in the ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) files and corresponding manpages is
+not included to prevent an unnecessary interactive merge operation. Since
+this was only to update a comment, it was deemed preferred to have this
+slight divergence to improve the end-user experience. The underlying source
+code is otherwise the same.
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssh.patch.asc
+
+Note: The patch listed here is the patch used by the freebsd-update build and
+is lacking the changes for the VersionAddendum comments in the configuration
+files and manpages.
+
+b) Apply the patch.  Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
+
+VI.  Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path                             Hash                     Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/14/                              24ce323f020f    stable/14-n270447
+releng/14.2/                            4b8a2f716588  releng/14.2-n269517
+releng/14.1/                            fe49460873e0  releng/14.1-n267740
+stable/13/                              2fc62d0bd4f7    stable/13-n259174
+releng/13.5/                            78b4f775184c  releng/13.5-n259148
+releng/13.4/                            14c733f25493  releng/13.4-n258278
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://www.qualys.com/2025/02/18/openssh-mitm-dos.txt>
+
+<URL:https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#9.9p2>
+
+<URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-26465>
+
+<URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-26466>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:05.openssh.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEthUnfoEIffdcgYM7bljekB8AGu8FAme37REACgkQbljekB8A
+Gu/++hAAuhFt0VHitGW+zyAv6m6AXTT/l9O+77jqacIGtut1MkXUfqkdDrXLUo+Y
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+QBGP7+bLCRKtHCb8LsYoOpmZO9fkbEIKURA4ym+WQWubxjG2d7L5rzNggKe/KoUj
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+Cn5JCAb0u5xCr4brDqk7EvvAh245w+CiO5BaM5HmoWDncGxD5oU=
+=wbm/
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch b/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d49fe53ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+--- crypto/openssh/krl.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/krl.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.59 2023/07/17 05:22:30 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.60 2025/02/18 08:02:48 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <[email protected]>
+  *
+@@ -674,6 +674,7 @@
+ 			break;
+ 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+ 			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				error_f("insane bitmap gap");
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+@@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		error_f("alloc failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+--- crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1226,6 +1226,7 @@
+ 	    "[email protected]") == 0) {
+ 		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
+@@ -1235,6 +1236,7 @@
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
+@@ -1252,6 +1254,7 @@
+ 		}
+ 		if (*certs != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
+@@ -1263,6 +1266,7 @@
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
+@@ -1759,6 +1763,7 @@
+ 	/* record new key/sid */
+ 	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
+ 		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
++		r = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
+--- crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-client.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-client.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.12 2022/01/14 03:34:00 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.13 2025/02/18 08:02:48 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+  *
+@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@
+ 		}
+ 		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("calloc failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		srk->key = key;
+@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@
+ 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
+ 		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
+--- crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
+ 	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
+ 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+-	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
++	    xxx_conn_info) != 0)
+ 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -700,6 +700,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ 		debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+@@ -710,6 +711,7 @@
+ 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+ 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -729,6 +731,7 @@
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ 		error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+ 	ident = format_identity(id);
+--- crypto/openssh/sshsig.c.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/sshsig.c
+@@ -874,6 +874,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
+ 		error_f("buffer error");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */
+--- crypto/openssh/version.h.orig
++++ crypto/openssh/version.h
+@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+ 
+-#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20240806"
++#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD	"FreeBSD-20250219"
diff --git a/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch.asc b/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9aa682debb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/patches/SA-25:05/openssh.patch.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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