Re: cold boot attacks on cgd?
César Catrián Carreño <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.crypto |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, 26 Feb 2008 02:02:59 +0000 "Steven M. Bellovin" <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mon, 25 Feb 2008 18:49:18 -0300 > César Catrián Carreño <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi list. > > > > According to this url, http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/ , a crypto > > key can be retrieved from RAM after the computer is shutdown. > > > > Is CGD vulnerable (storing the key on RAM), to this kind of attack? > > Yes. > > There is apparently some BIOS magic that can be done to force certain > sections of RAM to be zeroed by the BIOS at boot time. I don't know > anything more about how to set that flag. Even if it is set, there's > no defense against someone chilling the RAM, removing it from your > machine, and putting it into their own. > > --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb Should the CGD's parameters file secure storage deal with this issue? -- César Catrián Carreño
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