Patch: rework kernel random number subsystem (*nearly final*)
Thor Lancelot Simon <[email protected]> Mon, 7 Nov 2011 01:22:42 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.kernel,gmane.os.netbsd.devel.crypto,gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 05:15:55PM -0400, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: > > I have placed a patch at http://www.panix.com/~tls/rnd1.diff which > implements many changes to the generation and use of randomness > in the kernel (I previously sent it to these lists directly but > it seems to be too large). > > It is (most of) the first step in a three step process I envision for major > overhaul of this subsystem: > > 1) Provide infrastructure needed to separate entropy > harvesting from random stream generation. Clean up > interfaces between existing kernel components that > deal with random number generation and consumption. There's a new patch attached here (rnd4.diff) which I intend to commit as soon as I find and fix one remaining bug. This version of the patch adds some infrastructure the new random/urandom pseudodevices will need and addresses several nasty race conditions around rekeying by changing the rndpool mutex from IPL_SOFTCLOCK to IPL_VM. The patch is also at http://www.panix.com/~tls/rnd4.diff . It also fixes several miscellaneous bugs (including a severe one in rnd_add_data that has been around for a long time) and addresses KNF issues in my previous patches. There are also a few performance tweaks. The mutex change to IPL_VM should not have much performance impact as it's never held during copy in/out and my next set of changes will eliminate any direct access to the entropy pool (thus any taking of the mutex) by the pseudodevices -- that is, from userspace consumers. The bug which remains is this: * With a LOCKDEBUG, RND_VERBOSE kernel, run the attached "arandom" test program, which reads as much data with sysctl kern.arandom as it can, in a tight loop. * If you don't have a hardware RNG, you will see many rekeyings of the arc4random generator. The entropy pool will drain, and soon you will see "forced" rekeyings. * While you run the test program, the system will be fine. If you kill the test program and wait a minute or two, the system will lock up. Heck if I know where it is; if anyone else sees it, I'd love to know. Rekeying of the 'kern.urandom' generator (with a source change to force that much more often) causes no such symptom so I assume it must be in the libkern arc4random code somewhere. Thor
rnd4.diff.bz2
(application/octet-stream, 39.8 KB) - not displayed
arandom.c
(text/plain, 472 B)
/*
* Use sysctl to read constantly from the kernel arc4random generator,
* provoking reseeds.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char whack[8192];
size_t whacksiz = sizeof(whack);
while(1) {
if (sysctlbyname("kern.arandom", whack, &whacksiz,
NULL, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"sysctl error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
return 0;
}
urandom.c
(text/plain, 467 B)
/*
* Use sysctl to read constantly from the kernel cprng_strong generator,
* provoking reseeds.
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int whack;
size_t whacksiz = sizeof(whack);
while(1) {
if (sysctlbyname("kern.urandom", &whack, &whacksiz,
NULL, 0)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"sysctl error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
return 0;
}