Re: cprng_fast implementation benchmarks
<[email protected]> Thu, 24 Apr 2014 14:03:32 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.crypto,gmane.os.netbsd.devel.kernel |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Apr 23, 2014, at 7:56 PM, Thor Lancelot Simon <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 02:21:31PM +0000, [email protected] wrote: >> >> I?ve been watching this long stream of messages flying by, and I?m a bit concerned about the approach. >> >> As I understand it, there is a strong RNG, based on RC4 (?ARC4?) in the kernel today. > > No. There is a "strong" RNG, based on the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG with AES128 > as the block transform. > > There is also a "fast" RNG, based on RC4. > > We are discussing the replacement of the "fast" RNG. Ok. But if that’s a non-strong RNG, why are we discussing security properties? And why are we considering algorithms this complex, rather than using a PRNG? In other words, this is being treated like it’s in between a PRNG and a strong RNG. I don’t understand why there can be a middle ground like that, and what its required properties would be. paul