Re: Relax the prohibition of usage fchdir(2) to quit a chroot

IMHO, we should not implement this "feature".  We should not introduce 
ways to avoid deliberate, well-thought-out security mechanisms.

The use-case itself is broken, in my opinion.



On Sun, 21 Sep 2014, Kamil Rytarowski wrote:

> Thanks Marc,
>
> Well, right the better word is 'add feature' and we would change the
> discussion from 'don't touch anything' to 'let's add chroot
> restrictions swappable in runtime, that's a cool feature opening
> opportunities' and then to mind-storm ideas what and how to restrict.
>
> In some other way we might end up with floating patches around ;-)
>
> With kind regards.
>

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