Re: Relax the prohibition of usage fchdir(2) to quit a chroot
Joerg Sonnenberger <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 11:37:23AM +0200, Kamil Rytarowski wrote: > The second side of this ugly hack is that it opens the possibilities > to flawlessly interfere between the native and a chroot environment > and make the job done immediately -- just enter_chroot() and > quit_chroot() and you are done, with zero modification to the > code-base, zero additional-logic. Replacing flawlessly the broken > design with something sane produced many and different difficult > use-cases of RPM features to get implemented - and in the end I was > enforced to abandon it at that time. If you really want to introduce chroot backdoors, you can create a pair of processes with a Unix Domain Socket in between and allow the chrooted process to request files from the outside process. Joerg