Re: bozo .htpasswd exposure
JP <[email protected]> Tue, 20 Nov 2018 11:08:54 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAHN8BqoaATDxNJ6T43HxMZiQ4JnfPcqBXH2HTc0y7KmYV1JFjQ@mail.gmail.com> |
/abc/.htpasswd => results in 403 /.htpasswd => exposes encrypted passwords So there's a conditional at line 1478 of bozohttpd that can bypass the check_special_files call. Basename is null in the case of "/.htpasswd" for some reason and the call is therefore bypassed. (Additionally, the "|| basename[1]" part of the if clause seems to make assumptions of the contents of basename[0] and it seems could lead to bypassing the check_special_files call in the case of one-character-long directory names; but this statement needs more research) JP On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:36 AM JP <[email protected]> wrote: > I see it. I don't know why my .htpasswd is exposed then. I'll keep > digging.. > > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 9:34 AM Martin Husemann <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 03:31:44PM +0100, Martin Husemann wrote: >> > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 09:19:55AM -0500, JP wrote: >> > > I don't see any code preventing the exposure of the file >> > >> > AUTH_FILE is missing from bozo_check_special_files() ? >> >> No, that one calls bozo_auth_check_special_files() and there is the check >> that you are looking for. >> >> Martin >> >