Re: hardlinks to setuid binaries
David Sainty <[email protected]> Sat, 26 Mar 2022 18:58:24 +1300
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAD9nmrGN9xJdaXPMTmgYfdL6dayWd6DdhtHcnYtL-ywUJdFMQw@mail.gmail.com> |
On Sat, 26 Mar 2022 at 12:00, Taylor R Campbell <[email protected]> wrote: > > Maybe pkg_delete, and any tool to update base, should clear the > suid/sgid bits first? (Of course, if you clear the suid/sgid bit on > /usr/bin/su and something goes wrong with the update, you might be in > bad shape...) If it's immediately prior to an unlink anyway that does seem like a harmless enhancement. > A heavier hammer, not requiring changes to pkg_delete or anything, > would be to prohibit creating hard links to files with suid/sgid bits, > and to prohibit setting the suid/sgid bits on files with >1 link. But > we'd have to think through the consequences -- e.g., that would rule > out having a /rescue/su built with crunchgen like the rest of rescue > (but that's not something we do at the moment anyway). What else > might rely on multiple links to a suid/sgid file? Could do the hard links first, and the chmod u+s last :)