Re: hardlinks to setuid binaries

Joerg Sonnenberger <[email protected]> Sun, 27 Mar 2022 22:08:21 +0200
Newsgroups gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Am Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 09:37:38AM -0400 schrieb Jan Schaumann:
> Any thoughts on this?  Should there be a sysctl to
> disable this?  This is not a new discovery; has this
> been discussed before?

The long standing recommendation is to separate user-writeable
filesystems from system filesystems. It solves a number of different
"attack" vectors at the same time. If root is going to create suid
binaries in /tmp, they kind of asked for it to be abused.

IMO nothing should be done here.

Joerg