Re: hardlinks to setuid binaries
Joerg Sonnenberger <[email protected]> Sun, 27 Mar 2022 22:08:21 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.netbsd.devel.security |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Am Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 09:37:38AM -0400 schrieb Jan Schaumann: > Any thoughts on this? Should there be a sysctl to > disable this? This is not a new discovery; has this > been discussed before? The long standing recommendation is to separate user-writeable filesystems from system filesystems. It solves a number of different "attack" vectors at the same time. If root is going to create suid binaries in /tmp, they kind of asked for it to be abused. IMO nothing should be done here. Joerg