openssl fixes backport
Ted Unangst <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.os.openbsd.announce |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Some fixes from OpenSSL 1.0.1i have been backported to 5.5 and 5.4.
See http://www.openbsd.org/errata55.html
untrusted comment: signature from openbsd 5.5 base secret key
RWRGy8gxk9N930/jzqCCFMfSCKMjKDSYrXSKPhnGlL2r21nCGEPw+wOEDXpQC6Zispe8gewI7duy5T76oRpvWFGyzsYxl6pWfAc=
OpenBSD 5.5 errata 10, August 9, 2014:
This patch contains backported fixes for OpenSSL issues.
Refer to https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140806.txt
Apply patch using:
signify -Vep /etc/signify/openbsd-55-base.pub -x 010_openssl.patch.sig \
-m - | (cd /usr/src && patch -p0)
Then build and install libcrypto and libssl
cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/crypto
make obj
make
make install
cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/ssl
make obj
make
make install
Then restart services which depend on OpenSSL.
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c,v
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -p -r1.9 a_object.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c 3 Nov 2011 02:34:32 -0000 1.9
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_object.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
return(NULL);
}
+
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *data;
- int i;
- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ int i, length;
+
+ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
+ * Need at least one content octet.
+ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+ {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+ length = (int)len;
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT
data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
ret->data = NULL;
/* once detached we can change it */
- if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
ret->length=0;
if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
- data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+ data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
- memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
+ memcpy(data,p,length);
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data =data;
- ret->length=(int)len;
+ ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
- p+=len;
+ p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c,v
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -p -r1.6 ec_lib.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:13 -0000 1.6
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group,
int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (group->meth->dbl == 0)
+ if (group->meth->invert == 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c,v
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -p -r1.5 ecp_smpl.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:13 -0000 1.5
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -1181,9 +1181,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_G
int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1;
- size_t pow2 = 0;
- BIGNUM **heap = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
+ BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
size_t i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -1198,124 +1197,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(con
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (tmp0 == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err;
-
- /* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values.
- * Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single
- * explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value.
- */
-
- pow2 = 1;
- while (num > pow2)
- pow2 <<= 1;
- /* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num.
- * We need twice that. */
- pow2 <<= 1;
-
- heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]);
- if (heap == NULL) goto err;
-
- /* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort:
- *
- * heap[1]
- * heap[2] heap[3]
- * heap[4] heap[5] heap[6] heap[7]
- * heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15]
- *
- * We put the Z's in the last line;
- * then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where
- * empty or 0 entries are treated as ones);
- * then we invert heap[1];
- * then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its
- * parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion).
- */
- heap[0] = NULL;
- for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
- heap[i] = NULL;
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err;
+
+ prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
+ if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
- heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z;
- for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++)
- heap[i] = NULL;
-
- /* set each node to the product of its children */
- for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
- {
- heap[i] = BN_new();
- if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (heap[2*i] != NULL)
+ {
+ prod_Z[i] = BN_new();
+ if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
+ * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */
+
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
+ {
+ if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
- if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1]))
- {
- if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i]))
- {
- if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i],
- heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
- }
- }
+ if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err;
}
}
- /* invert heap[1] */
- if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1]))
+ for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
{
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx))
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
}
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every
+ * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
+
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx))
+ {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
- /* in the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
+ /* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
- * i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */
- if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
- if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
+ * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */
+ if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
}
- /* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */
- for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2)
+ for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i)
{
- /* i is even */
- if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1]))
- {
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err;
- if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err;
- }
- else
+ /* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of
+ * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
- if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err;
+ /* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product
+ * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+ /* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+ /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
+ if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err;
}
}
- /* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
+ {
+ /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
+ if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
+
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
EC_POINT *p = points[i];
-
+
if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z))
{
/* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
- if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
-
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
@@ -1329,20 +1308,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(con
}
ret = 1;
-
+
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
- if (heap != NULL)
+ if (prod_Z != NULL)
{
- /* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */
- for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
- if (heap[i] != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(heap[i]);
+ if (prod_Z[i] != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
}
- OPENSSL_free(heap);
+ OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
}
return ret;
}
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c,v
retrieving revision 1.2.4.3
diff -u -p -r1.2.4.3 d1_both.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c 5 Jun 2014 20:16:56 -0000 1.2.4.3
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -587,29 +587,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s,
return 0;
}
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
int i = -1, is_complete;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
goto err;
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
- */
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
- else
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
- goto err;
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
/* Try to find item in queue */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
@@ -636,7 +639,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
}
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
- * retransmit and can be dropped.
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
*/
if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
{
@@ -656,7 +660,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -673,10 +679,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
if (item == NULL)
{
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if (item == NULL)
{
@@ -684,21 +686,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
i = -1;
}
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+ * would never have reached this branch. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -718,7 +724,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
* don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
*/
- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
item = NULL;
/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -743,9 +749,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
}
else
{
- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -757,26 +766,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i<=0)
goto err;
}
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if ( item == NULL)
goto err;
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+ * been discarded. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
@@ -1177,6 +1191,8 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+ if (!frag)
+ return 0;
memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -p -r1.5 d1_clnt.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.5
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_clnt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -868,12 +868,18 @@ int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s)
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#endif
+#endif
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
@@ -982,6 +988,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
@@ -1172,6 +1185,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
@@ -1231,6 +1251,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
@@ -1706,5 +1733,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-
-
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c,v
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -p -r1.6 d1_srvr.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.6
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -597,10 +597,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
}
else {
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
@@ -969,6 +970,11 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c,v
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -p -r1.9 s23_lib.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c 3 Nov 2011 02:34:33 -0000 1.9
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ int ssl23_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_C
long l;
/* We can write SSLv2 and SSLv3 ciphers */
+ /* but no ECC ciphers */
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHr ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHe ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH ||
+ c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDH ||
+ c->algorithm_auth == SSL_aECDSA)
+ return 0;
if (p != NULL)
{
l=c->id;
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c,v
retrieving revision 1.14
diff -u -p -r1.14 s23_srvr.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.14
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s23_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
- * attacks. */
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
-#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
-#else
- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+ if (n < 9)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+ * packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.26.8.2
diff -u -p -r1.26.8.2 s3_clnt.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c 5 Jun 2014 20:09:30 -0000 1.26.8.2
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
@@ -902,6 +903,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@@ -953,6 +955,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -1456,6 +1467,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
@@ -2248,6 +2265,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c,v
retrieving revision 1.18
diff -u -p -r1.18 s3_enc.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c 14 Feb 2013 15:11:43 -0000 1.18
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_enc.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -642,10 +642,18 @@ int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_
int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret, sha1len;
ret=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_md5,sender,len,p);
+ if(ret == 0)
+ return 0;
+
p+=ret;
- ret+=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+
+ sha1len=ssl3_handshake_mac(s,NID_sha1,sender,len,p);
+ if(sha1len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret+=sha1len;
return(ret);
}
static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.20.4.3
diff -u -p -r1.20.4.3 s3_pkt.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 5 Jun 2014 17:05:16 -0000 1.20.4.3
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, un
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return(-1);
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c,v
retrieving revision 1.29.8.1
diff -u -p -r1.29.8.1 s3_srvr.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 5 Jun 2014 17:05:16 -0000 1.29.8.1
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -2781,6 +2781,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
+ || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c,v
retrieving revision 1.24
diff -u -p -r1.24 ssl_lib.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c 13 Oct 2012 21:25:14 -0000 1.24
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/ssl_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -1397,6 +1397,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+ !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+ continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
p+=j;
}
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c,v
retrieving revision 1.12.8.1
diff -u -p -r1.12.8.1 t1_lib.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c 8 Apr 2014 00:55:39 -0000 1.12.8.1
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c 8 Aug 2014 14:02:03 -0000
@@ -360,15 +360,16 @@ int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsig
return (int)slen;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -460,8 +461,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -668,24 +667,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
ret += el;
}
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -723,8 +723,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
long lenmax;
@@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
@@ -855,10 +854,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
}
#endif
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
@@ -1035,8 +1034,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1070,8 +1068,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -1427,8 +1424,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1438,15 +1434,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ if (!s->hit)
{
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;